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THE LIFE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

VOLUME III.

THE LIFE
OF
HENRY JOHN TEMPLE.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON:

WITH
Selections from his Correspondence.

BY THE LATE
RIGHT HON. SIR HENRY LYTTON BULWER (LORD DALLING).

VOLUME III.

EDITED BY THE HON. EVELYN ASHLEY, M.P.



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P R E F A C E.

A word is needed to tell the history of this Volume and to explain its fragmentary shape. When the papers relating to the life of Lord Palmerston, which the late Lord Dalling had left behind him, were placed in my hands, they were in so confused and unfinished a state that there was very great difficulty in arranging them so as to present anything like a consecutive narrative, while avoiding alterations of the text. It was desired that what he had written should be given to the public, and yet it could not possibly be published as it stood. It became necessary, therefore, literally to piece the garment together, and to connect the eloquent tatters by means of new matter. Chapters II., V., VI., VII., and XI., and some of the notes to the letters in Chapters VIII. and IX., comprise, with a few unimportant additions, the work of Lord Dalling. The biography is not carried down beyond the year 1847, as that is the date to which his observations extended.

E. A.

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
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LIFE OF HENRY JOHN TEMPLE,

THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.



CHAPTER I.

LETTERS AND SPEECHES, 1835-1841.

THE last volume carried the history down to the year 1840, but some letters relating to an earlier period are here inserted as treating of home events which were omitted. At the dissolution consequent on the formation of the short-lived Peel administration in 1834, Lord Palmerston lost his seat for South Hampshire, and the year 1835 found him in temporary banishment from the House of Commons, though throwing himself with sufficient ardour into the strife to write as if he had been personally present in the division lobby. The Duke of Wellington had succeeded to the Foreign Office, while Lord Stanley and Sir James Graham, who had seceded from the Whig Ministry, had declined the overtures made to them by Sir Robert Peel.

“ Stanhope Street, March 10, 1835.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ We have beaten the Ministry twice, on the Speakership * and the Address,† but not by the majority I expected. Still they are in a minority, even when aided by Stanley; and no Government can possibly go on if it has not a majority, and a *sure* majority, in the House of Commons. Whenever Stanley votes against them with his fifty followers they will be in a woful plight; and he will do so when the proper time comes. They want to coax him to join them, and then the Duke would make believe to retire, by going to the Horse Guards, and Goulburn and Herries, &c., would make way for Stanley's friends; but Stanley will not give in to this. He has a much better game to play by keeping aloof. It never could answer to him to place himself as Peel's second and follower—abandoning all the natural and hereditary connections of the Derby family, and transplanting himself into the Tory nursery. He will do no such thing. He will try to keep the present Government in till the Irish Church question is settled, and when that only point of difference between himself and his late colleagues is got rid of, he will turn round on Peel and help to knock him over, and join in re-establishing a Whig administration.

* Mr. Abercromby was chosen by a majority of ten over the votes given for Sir Charles Sutton.

† Amendment to the Address carried by a majority of seven.

“This is what Stanley will do, if things take the course he wishes ; but the House of Commons will not wait for this slow process, and will probably dismiss the Peel Government before Easter. The Government will probably carry to-night the continuance of the Malt Tax, because our people will vote with them on that question. But Friday Hume moves a short supply of three months, in order to place the Government on its good behaviour.* That vote may be carried, and if it is it will be a deep humiliation to the Government. If they are not beaten then, they will be so on John Russell’s motion on the 23rd about the Irish Church, and *then*, I think, they must retire.† Peel had a meeting of friends at the Foreign Office on Saturday last about the Malt Tax, and told them that there was a degree of beating which even he could not stand, and that if he was defeated about that tax he should go out. The next fortnight or three weeks will certainly be very important. I do not believe in another dissolution. The Government will not venture upon so unconstitutional a step ; and if they were to do so, I do not think they would gain by it ; on the contrary, they would probably lose.

“I have not yet heard of any seat, and indeed I should rather defer coming into Parliament till after

* Mr. Hume withdrew his motion two days after.

† Lord John Russell’s resolution to apply to education the surplus revenues of the Irish Church was carried against Ministers by thirty, and they resigned.

the change of Government, if change there is to be, in order not to have two elections.

“This death of the Emperor of Austria may produce important consequences; but if, as the *Chronicle* of to-day announces, and as indeed is most probable, Metternich has succeeded in getting the new Emperor into his hands, there will be no change in the policy of Austria, except that, as Metternich will be more powerful when governing over an imbecile Emperor than he was when governing under the last Emperor, the Metternich system will be pursued with more uncontrolled vigour, and with more undeviating perseverance than ever.

“The symptoms of discontent, however, which have shown themselves in Transylvania and in Hungary are not to be wholly disregarded; and whenever the waters which Metternich is forcibly damming up shall break loose, there will be a considerable commotion in the land.

“We are all curiosity to know what has been the cause, and what is the object, of the sudden sailing of our fleet from Malta. Ponsonby always has had a longing to have the squadron opposite Seraglio Point, and I believe after all there is no place in Europe in which it could be more useful. But I hear he is still acting under my instructions, as almost all our diplomatists are; for after all the abuse which the Tories were pleased to lavish upon me, the Duke seems to have discovered that the measures and instructions of his predecessor required “*no reform.*” Now my

instructions, I rather think, were sent to you, and you know therefore what they were. Pozzo looks uneasy, and not happy; as an individual he must regret his Paris habits of life, which were much more agreeable to him than his mode of living here can possibly be; and as a Russian ambassador, the perilous condition of the Tories must be truly painful to him. But, on the whole, Russia has not, I believe, much to choose between Whig and Tory; for I suspect that the Duke is, if possible, more hostile to Russia than I was—fully as much impressed with the necessity of checking her insatiable ambition, and quite as determined to employ the means which England possesses to do so. The fact is that Russia is a great humbug, and that if England were fairly to go to work with her we should throw her back half a century in one campaign. But Nicholas, the proud and insolent, knows this, and will always check his pride and moderate his insolence when he finds that England is firmly determined and fully prepared to resist him.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

A Melbourne Ministry was again formed, and Lord Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office.

“Foreign Office, April 21, 1835.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Here I am again at my old work. The papers contain all the new appointments, and I therefore do not repeat them. The Government will, I

think, stand ; the Tories are strong in this House of Commons, but some thirty or forty people who are for the Government in the abstract will come over, some twenty or thirty more will stay away, and thus we shall have a much larger majority in office than we had in opposition. If we are not strong enough we must dissolve after the next registration, and then we shall gain forty or fifty votes more. The two great measures for this session are the Irish Church and Municipal Corporation Reform. These must be carried if possible ; and if the Lords throw them out, that will strengthen our position and weaken that of the Tories ; but I hope they will do no such foolish thing.* Granville goes back to Paris of course. The Duke has acted with great fairness and honour in his administration of our foreign relations ; he has fulfilled with the utmost fidelity all the engagements of the Crown, and feeling that the existence of his Government was precarious, he made no arbitrary changes in our system of policy. The truth, however, is, that English interests continue the same let who will be in office, and that upon leading principles and great measures men of both sides, when they come to act dispassionately and with responsibility upon them, will be found acting very much alike. I shall remain in the House of Commons, Grant goes to the Lords.† I was urging Ludolf‡ two days

* The Appropriation Clauses in the Irish Church Bill were struck out in the House of Lords, and the Bill abandoned by Ministers.

† As Lord Glenelg.

‡ Minister from the King of Naples.

ago upon the Chapel question. He said it was against the principles of the Catholic religion to allow of Protestant chapels; I answered him by quoting the case of Rome itself, where Protestant chapels are allowed. He said the lower classes at Naples are not so enlightened as at Rome; I said I feared the objections were not in the lower classes, who usually care little about such things, but among some prejudiced officers in some public department of the State; that in all governments there are some persons who, from honest but erroneous opinions, oppose every innovation, but I hoped that the enlightened persons who form the real government at Naples would overrule these minor objectors. I observed that if there is any real objection to our building a chapel, I could not see why the Neapolitan Government should not allow us to hire one, if a suitable one can be found. He promised to write to his Government upon the subject, and I wish you would not lose sight of the matter. Ludolf told me he believed that our merchants at Naples had sent, or were going to send, a petition to the House of Commons. I told him that if such a petition got into the hands of any Liberal member no power on earth could prevent its being presented, and that disagreeable things might be said to which it would perhaps not be easy for me to reply as I should wish to be able to do.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ Foreign Office, March 5, 1836.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I mean to send a messenger every month to sweep up and down Italy, and to give means of safe communication, and here is one of them ; so if you have any despatches unanswered, and any communications and instructions unexecuted, you will have an opportunity of doing the needful, and reporting it by him. But you must not detain him beyond his specified time.

“ We are going on well here, and the Government is gaining strength every day ; our measures are approved by the House and the country, and our majority in the House of Commons is certain, and a dissolution would increase it. The Lords will, I expect, be more manageable than last year, because their hopes of a change of Government or a change of majority in the Commons must now have become very slight.

“ We stand as well abroad as at home. The acceptance of our mediation by France and the United States is a great feather in our cap.* It is a tribute to the high character of England which, perhaps, never before was equalled, and is a triumphant answer to the Tory assertions, that the honour and character of the country had suffered under our administration of affairs.

* In the long-standing dispute between those two countries as to claims made against France for losses sustained by American subjects under the Berlin and Milan decrees. It had led to the withdrawal of the French Minister from Washington.

“When two of the most powerful maritime nations accept us as mediators upon a point of national honour, it is clear that they must think that we have not forfeited our own.

“The naval augmentation of 5000 men was voted last night in the House of Commons *unanimously*; even Hume (though disapproving) giving up his objection. This must have an effect abroad, as showing that we *can* obtain supplies from Parliament when we really want them.

“I have kept this messenger two days, and cannot keep him longer, but have no time to write more by him.

“I will send you a copy of Peregrine Courtenay’s ‘Life of Sir William Temple’ as soon as I can get it bound for you. It is an interesting work.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“There will be no change of policy in France. Louis Philippe is really minister, and Thiers is all for English alliance, and Madame Lièven* and Talleyrand will be disappointed. They tried to rout out Broglie as they tried to get rid of me, in hopes by that means of breaking off the alliance between England and France.”

The Liberal party, on the principle of treating Ireland as on an equal footing with the mother

* Wife of the Russian Ambassador.

country, were proposing this Session, not only to get rid of the Orange ascendancy in the Irish corporations, but to re-establish them on a wider basis. To this the Tories objected, and succeeded, as Lord Palmerston puts it, in dishing the measure in the Lords.

“ Foreign Office, May 2, 1836.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I write as usual with the post just going. The Lords are dishing the Irish Corporation Bill, but the Irish members all say they would rather have it as the Lords are making it, than let things continue as they are. To get rid of the Orange corporations would be to them a riddance worth any sacrifice almost. If the Lords do not put in a clause preventing the Crown from granting charters, the Crown can grant new charters to all the great towns in Ireland in spite of the abolition of the old corporations. The charters cannot give power to levy rates, but in most of the Irish towns there are local Acts giving all the powers necessary for such purposes; so that collision on the Irish Bill will not involve us in any insurmountable difficulties.* Everything looks well. Manufactures are prospering, wheat is getting up, and agriculture doing better, and the country in great contentment. Offences in Ireland are also much diminished. I hear from pretty good authority

* The Bill was, however, dropped on its return from the Lords, as the Commons rejected their amendments.

that Metternich the other day wanted to increase the Austrian army and Collovrath to reduce it; and that after a sharp contest Metternich was obliged to give way; but that a family council is to be appointed to exercise that power of deciding in such cases, which the present Emperor is too imbecile to exert. This seems a prelude to the decline of Metternich's power, and a great blessing for Europe it would be that his orb should set in the night of private life.

"The Dukes of Orleans and Nemours are evidently going a-courting. I hope they will succeed.

"England is to be as full of railways as a ploughed field is full of furrows, but the crop they will bear is more doubtful; one is proposed from Salisbury to Southampton by Romsey, and down along side the canal to Redbridge. I shall try to oppose it, and think another line will be taken from Romsey to Southampton by Cupernham, Crampmoor, and Bishopstoke.

"I am glad the chestnut turns out well. I am riding another of Biondetta's, now six years old, by Tarrare. It has not high action to look at; but when one is on it, one feels upon a football, he is so springy and elastic.

"Our Session will not be so long as last year, but will run on into August.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON.

“Remember me to Matuszevie,* and tell him that though we battled in conference, and are supposed by the world not to have parted friends, I have a very great regard for him, and am quite sure we shall meet as good friends as ever when we next come together again.”

The matter referred to at the end of the next letter was the case of an English merchant at Constantinople who, for accidentally wounding a Turkish boy while out shooting in the neighbourhood of Scutari, was bastinadoed without inquiry, put in irons, and confined in the common gaol. Our ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, only obtained his release by the declaration that he would cease to hold official communication were his demands not immediately complied with, and he also required the dismissal of the Reis Effendi, or Foreign Minister. While Lord Ponsonby was waiting for instructions from home the Divan yielded, and the Reis Effendi retired from office on the plea of ill health, to the great disgust of the Russian representative, who remonstrated against this concession to British influence.

“Foreign Office, July 9, 1836.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Melbourne’s triumph is a great one for the Government. A different result would have been

* Had been one of the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Conference about Belgium, and was now Minister at Naples.

very embarrassing. One was rather surprised at the declaration made by the Attorney-General, but I begin to believe it is really true; at all events, the prosecution was a political conspiracy, and has failed, as it deserved to do. The Tories had hoped much from it, and from the division on the Irish Corporation Bill, but the verdict for Melbourne, and the eighty-six majority, have settled them for the present. We shall, therefore, probably go on till next Session, at all events. But the King and the Court hate us, and wish us at the devil. I believe I am the only one of the ministers whom the King likes personally. He was fond of Melbourne, too; but has not yet forgiven him for cramming Dr. Hampden down his throat the other day for an Oxford professorship. He likes Lansdowne and Minto also. The rest he dislikes. He said the other day to Cutlar Ferguson, who came with some courts-martial, ‘Aye! you are just like Lord John Russell, who never can find his papers.’ Russia is coquetting with Durham;* and in order to cajole him, is obliged to be civil to us; so his appointment has answered. Metternich has taken a fling, as if bit by a horse-fly, and Ancillon† has mimicked him as a donkey would do. The King much approved my answers to both. The Lords will pass the Irish Corporation Bill next year, if we are still in office. They could not well do so this year, but it would have been better for them to have done

* Earl of Durham was British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

† Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

so; they would have escaped much rowing which they will now get during the interval.

“I have just got Ponsonby’s reports about Churchill, but have not been able to read them yet. I fear he may have gone a little too far; but all his colleagues, not excepting Roussin,* are jealous of him, and would be too glad of an opportunity to throw him over if they could. I must support him to the full extent of propriety.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Stanhope Street, September 29, 1836.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“It is twelve at night, and I am just starting for Broadlands for three days while Glenelg is taking physic in London, so I have not much time to write to you. These military insurrections in Spain and Portugal are the devil; and are doubly provoking because they would not have happened if our worthy friend and faithful ally, Louis Philippe, had fulfilled his engagements, and acted up to the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty.† But, be the cause what it may, he has pretty nearly thrown us, the Queen, and the treaty over. Some say it is his fear of republicans; some his desire to curry favour with Austria and

* French Ambassador at Constantinople.

† Signed at London April 22, 1831, between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, for the expulsion from the Portuguese dominions of Carlos and Miguel, the two Absolutist claimants to the thrones of Spain and Portugal.

Russia, in order to marry the Duke of Orleans to a princess ; some that he wishes Carlos to succeed, that he may marry a French princess to Carlos's son. He is a great goose for his pains ; for any result but the triumph of the Queen's cause would be fraught with danger to him and his dynasty.

"I by no means, however, despair of that cause. We have just heard of Gomez's defeat by Alaix ; if that turns out not to be one of the fables of the *Madrid Gazette*, it may have important results. The Queen's party want nothing to ensure them success *but* money, honesty, ability, and courage, *slight* requisites, and found in Spain on every roadside. It is, however, quite marvellous that those qualities should be so rare in the Peninsula ; and, at all events, their absence shows what a detestable system of government has existed in those countries for a long time past.

"Here, we are going on well ; the revenue improving, manufactures and commerce thriving, agriculture rallying, and the money market getting right again without a panic. Our master is becoming more calm, though not in his heart more reconciled to having servants whom he did not choose. Personally, he is civil and good-natured, though, politically, he liketh us not. We shall, however, maintain our ground till Parliament meets, and then we are safe.

"I am daily expecting to hear of some row in the Neapolitan territory. If the King's 70,000 men do not take a fancy for a constitution, they have taken

lessons from Austria to some purpose, and are fully as wise as they are valiant. It is to be hoped, however, that they will remain quiet; for the Austrians would come in again if there was a move, and then all hope of improvement would be at an end. Whatever may happen, however, your line is clear.

“We have nothing to do with the internal affairs of other countries, and neither impose nor oppose constitutions. The French Government professes the utmost cordiality, and the firmest determination to maintain the alliance unimpaired. I can hardly keep my countenance when poor Bourquenay repeats to me these prescribed assurances. Adieu!

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Foreign Office, November 1, 1836.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We have had within the last three days a heavy fall of snow, two or three inches deep, and a hard frost. To-day it thaws; but this is more like January than the end of October. In other respects, however, we are doing pretty well. The little differences between Radicals and Whigs are of no importance, and will disappear in unanimity when Parliament meets. The registration has been on the whole favourable to us; and an income of upwards of £150,000 a year, of different charitable trusts, and which had hitherto been employed chiefly in largess to Tory voters in borough towns, has by recent

decrees of the Court of Chancery been placed in the hands of other trustees, who will apply it to other uses for which it was destined by the bequeathers. This is a gain to us. On the whole, we should certainly increase our majority by a dissolution, and therefore, as the Tories could not take office without dissolving, I think they will wait for some more favourable opportunity to turn us out. In the meanwhile, I believe the Queen is in a dangerous state of health.

“She was subject to a constant eruption on her face; she had recourse to lotions and various quackeries to get rid of it; snuff of some particular kind, and Heaven knows what. It seems that the cause was not removed, but only shifted in its effect; and they say her lungs are now affected. She has certainly a very bad cough, and is grown exceedingly thin. Her loss would be a misfortune, notwithstanding her political bias against us. The King would probably marry again; and then we might have a long minority before us, which is one of the worst things in a representative Government; or else the Queen’s place would be taken at Court by the old Princesses, who are quite as Toryish, but not so sensible as the Queen.

“The King is grown calm again, having recovered from his disappointment at not getting rid of us at the end of the Session.

“Commerce is prospering, our manufactures thriving, agriculture reviving; and every foreigner who takes a tour into the interior of the country, comes

back in a state of wonderment at the prosperity of England. The crisis with which the money market was threatened has blown over, and our revenue goes on progressively increasing as the taxes are taken off.

“I had a long talk the other day with Signor Arpino about commercial matters. He is intelligent and enlightened, but has something still to learn in political economy.

“We shall see whether Bowring* will open the minds of the Neapolitans. He is a very good-humoured, lively, agreeable, well-informed man; a complete Republican in his opinions, and would put up the guillotine in a manner as gentle and kind-hearted as that in which Izaak Walton would handle the frog he was to impale. However, you should be civil to him. He professes great regard for me; and indeed I have been useful to him. His ‘Commercial Reports,’ however, are able documents, and contain much valuable information.

“I went down to the Winchester Music Meeting last week. Almost all the county was there. Winchester never was so full since the barracks were tenanted by troops. The like number of civilians probably never was found within the city. I staid the two days with Garnier.† I called on Dr. Latham, now ninety-seven, well, hearty, and cheerful; eating

* The late Sir John Bowring. A negotiation was going on for a commercial treaty with the kingdom of Naples.

† The late Dean of Winchester. Curiously enough, he also reached the age of ninety-seven, or thereabouts.

a good dinner at five, complaining only that his eyes no longer enabled him to read, and that when he had walked a mile and a half or two miles, he grew weary. I was very glad to have an opportunity of calling on him; at his time of life, perhaps, it is unlikely I may ever have another.

“I went on for three days afterwards to Broadlands. I like my new gardener much; as a gardener, he is better than poor Watson, but as a companion, of course he cannot replace his predecessor. You will find the place improved when you return.

“Louis Philippe has been treating us scurvily about Spanish affairs. But the fact is, he is as ambitious as Louis XIV., and wants to put one of his sons on the throne of Spain, as husband to the young Queen; and he thinks this scheme more likely to be accomplished by the continuance of disorder in Spain than by the termination of the civil war, and the establishment of national independence. Still, depend upon it, Carlos cannot win, though it certainly is not the fault of the Queen’s generals that he does not. I hope there may be a counter revolution in Portugal, but so do not hope the Holy Alliance. They think the Constitution of 1820 may bring back Miguel and despotism again, as it did once before. They hate Pedro’s charter, because it is too reasonable a system of government; an impracticable constitution is a thing to their heart.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

The Constitution of 1820, above referred to, established what amounted almost to universal suffrage among one of the most ignorant populations in Europe. The Cortes formed only one body, claimed the initiation of all laws and the right of approving all treaties, besides the privilege of altering the fundamental laws without the consent of the Crown. The King had no power either of prorogation or dissolution. He had a right of veto, but only conditionally, until the Cortes declared their adherence to the original measure, when he was bound immediately to give his sanction to the bill. Even the appointment of civil, military, and naval officers could be claimed by the Cortes on the vote of a majority. The charter which Don Pedro promulgated in 1826 was a constitutional form of government, more nearly modelled on our own. Donna Maria, however, had been compelled in August of this year, under the pressure of a revolutionary rising, to restore the "impracticable" constitution, and, as will be seen by the next letter, a counter revolution, attempted in November, failed through want of energy.

"Brighton, December 1, 1836.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"I am glad you send us frequent despatches during the prevalence of the cholera at Naples, because it is a satisfaction to hear from you. The disorder, however, appears not to have been so fatal in proportion to the number of persons attacked as it

has been in other countries, and I should say that this seems to have been the case generally in Italy. Still, you may suppose that we are anxious to hear from you often. I came down here yesterday for a Council, among other matters to fix the meeting of Parliament for the 31st January. I find the King well, and tolerably quiet; with a little gout for the first time in his foot, but by aid of a large cloth shoe he walks about as well as usual. The Queen is much better, and has quite got rid of her cough, which some time ago was the cause of uneasiness to her medical attendant.

“The Court are patient under their affliction at not being able to get rid of us, and seem to have made up their minds to a Christianlike resignation.

“The questions for next Session will be Irish Corporation Reform, Irish Tithes, and English Church Rates. I do not despair of our being able to settle them all in a satisfactory manner. The Tories will probably let the Irish Corporation Bill pass—we shall perhaps be able so to divide and modify the appropriation plan, as to get it through; and for Church Rates, we have a scheme not yet digested which I think will do. Something also we must do about Irish Poor Laws; but the less the better.

“Peninsular affairs are so bad that they cannot become worse, and must therefore become better. The attempt at counter revolution at Lisbon was an ill-concocted, premature, and ill-executed scheme of the Court party, in which we had no share. Sal-

danha had a plan which, if time had been allowed him, would have succeeded. He was working in the provinces, and in due time the change would have been made spontaneously, as it were, by the nation itself, and without violence or convulsion. But the adherents of Terceira and the Court party were jealous of Saldanha, and fearful that if he was allowed to make the counter revolution, he would thereby acquire influence and power, from which it was their *first* object to exclude him. Hence they resolved to be beforehand with him, and judging of others by themselves, and remembering how small an armed force overcame them, they imagined it would be just as easy to overcome the Republicans. But they were deceived. They miscalculated their own means, their own courage, and the means and courage of their opponents. Those who undertake to make revolutions should have either overpowering force, or overawing courage. These silly courtiers had neither; and they failed ignominiously.

“The result, however, has not been as bad as it might have been. The Passos* Government have found out that they had exaggerated their own strength, and, becoming more sensible of their dependence on the clubs, they are trying to emancipate themselves by drawing closer to the Chartists;† and after all perhaps they may end in establishing a good

* Manuel Passos was the revolutionary Minister of the Interior.

† The advocates of the form of government established by Don Pedro's charter.

and moderate kind of constitution. It was not worth while to have a civil war in Portugal for the mere sake of maintaining Palmella, Villareal, and Valenza as hereditary legislators in a House of Peers. The nobles both in Spain and Portugal are the most incapable part of the nation, and therefore a remodelling of the Upper Chambers in both countries seems a reasonable thing.

“As to Spain, the Queen wants money, good generals, and honest men; how she will get any of these, Heaven knows. But Carlos is out of the question. Suppose him to drop from the mountains of Biscay upon Madrid—how is he to maintain himself there? His Biscayans would not leave their own country to go and mount guard at Madrid; the robbers and plunderers who run about under Gomez would never submit to be restrained by discipline, and accept pay instead of plunder. Carlos would, therefore, be without any military force; but if he had one, who are to be his ministers? Could the Bishop of Leon, or Erro, or any of his Inquisition-mongers, pretend now to govern Spain? It is out of the question. And yet Torreno, and Martinez de la Rosa, and my foolish friend Miraflores, would never become the ministers of a *Rey absoluto*.

“It seems, therefore, to me, that however bad the present condition of the Queen’s cause, that of Carlos is far more desperate. Louis Philippe, who is as ambitious as Louis XIV., schemes for acquiring possession of the Northern Provinces of Spain, and he

thinks that the result of civil war and misery will be to lead those Provinces to seek French protection; but this will never be. This was Talleyrand's scheme.

"We had a tremendous hurricane the day before yesterday, and I hear I have had fifty trees blown down at Broadlands. It is lucky I have planted a good many young ones, so that I shall the less miss those that have been blown down.

"Yours affectionately,

"PALMERSTON."

Railways have made a difference in such liability to delay on the road as is related in the following letter:—

"Broadlands, December 31, 1836.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"I am glad to find by your despatch that cholera was nearly over, and trust you will have got through it at Naples as well as you did in London, without catching so ungentlemanlike and vulgar a disorder.

"I came down here last Tuesday through the snow, and was twelve hours coming, including one hour I stopped to dine; but we have had less snow here than elsewhere. Of course it is not the general depth of it that has blocked up the roads, but its accumulation by drift in particular places.

"I lost about fifty trees in the park and pleasure ground by the gale at the end of November, but they are not missed. The young plantations begin

to take their places. I am expecting some of the diplomatists, and I shall remain here another week or ten days.

“We know nothing of what has been passing on the Continent, all the mails having been stopped by the weather. One of my messengers reached the Foreign Office last Thursday, having started from Boulogne the Friday before, and having thus been seven days getting from Boulogne to Downing Street. He tried to go by land from Dover to London, but found it impossible, and so took shipping and came by sea. We shall do very well in Parliament, in spite of all the attacks of the Tory papers, and the boasts of the Tory Dinnerites. The Radicals will stand by us; and we shall produce some good measures, which will be well received, and make us popular. The King is on the whole well, though suffering now and then from gout. The Queen’s health is more precarious. She would be a loss, notwithstanding that she is politically against us. We shall begin with Irish Corporation Reform, and other measures of that kind, and leave Irish Tithes and Appropriation Clause till late in the Session. The Corporation Bill is the best to fight the Lords upon, and if we force them to strike upon that, we shall be stronger for other things. I understand, also, that they are likely to surrender upon that bill.*

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

* They did not do so, but carried a motion for postponement.

William IV. died in June 1837, and the country was now preparing for the coronation of the Queen.

“ Stanhope Street, April 14, 1838.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I have sent you a renewal of your leave, and I hope you may take advantage of it, and come over to us this summer ; we shall be very glad indeed to see you, and you are fairly entitled to a return home for a time. I am going on Monday to Windsor, from thence on Wednesday or Thursday to Tiverton to dine my electors ; and thence I shall return by Broadlands, where, however, I shall only be able to spend two days before Parliament meets again. The Government has, I think, got over all its threatened dangers, and we shall have the making of the Coronation Peers. That will be a good job for us ; twenty or twenty-five new votes in the Upper House, though they may not give us a majority, will yet make us cut a more respectable figure. The Queen is as steady to us as ever, and was in the depth of despair when she thought we were in danger of being turned out. She keeps well in health, and even in London takes long rides into the country, which have done her great good.

“ Our friend the King of Holland has made believe to renew the negotiation, but it is all sham, and will lead to nothing.

“ Spanish affairs look better. The Queen’s troops are everywhere successful, and the Cortes have agreed

to a loan. If this loan is large enough to pay the army and to fill Torreno's pockets, which are pretty deep, the war will be finished this summer, and Carlos will be compelled to retire to hide his ignominious head somewhere else.

"In the meanwhile, things are looking much better in Portugal. The Government has at last resolved to put down the clubs; and having willed to do so, found itself immediately able, and the anarchy which has ruled over Portugal for a year and a half was put down in a couple of days. If Spain and Portugal can be made independent, free, and prosperous, they will become a most valuable addition to the balance of power in Europe; and the time may come when Austria and Prussia will heartily thank us for having done that which they have so stoutly resisted. France and Russia may, naturally enough, take a different view of the matter.*)

"People think that Nicholas is following the fate of Paul, at least in regard to mind. He certainly has grown morose, irritable, and violent. This may be the natural effect of finding so many things in his empire going wrong. The young Prince will be here for the Coronation. They say he is mild, but has not the talent of his father. We want a King Log on the Russian Throne; we have had too many King Storks.

"There will be lots of extra ambassadors, and shoals of princes, at our Coronation. Heaven knows

* See Appendix II.

what we shall do with them, or how and where they will find lodging. They will be disappointed, both as to the effect they will themselves produce, and as to the splendour of the ceremony they come to witness. State coaches, fine liveries, and gilt harness make no sensation in London, except among the coachmakers and stablemen; and even they look more to the neatness than to the magnificence of the turn-out; and the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs, after all, will beat them all. And then as to dinners, balls, and the like, money alone will not do them; there must be a house of suitable dimensions, and that is not easily found. I do not think that marriage has yet entered the Queen's head; perhaps some of her visitors may inspire her with the idea; but after being used to agreeable and well-informed Englishmen, I fear she will not easily find a foreign prince to her liking. We had a most ludicrous end to our Spanish debate, but it was worthy of the motion. They were half ashamed of it, and will certainly not bring it on again, at least in our House—though Londonderry has given notice for it in the Lords.

“Your despatches are remarkably well written: so clear, such good English, and in so sensible a style, without affectation or unsuitable pretension. Good-bye.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

The motion referred to above was to the effect that in the opinion of the House no advantage had resulted to Spain or England from the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act, in order to enable Englishmen to serve in Spain. The debate, in which Lord Palmerston took no part, was adjourned, and next day, when the order for resuming the discussion was read, no member rising to address the House, the Speaker put the question. There was a cry of Aye from the opposition, and of No from the ministerial side of the House. Whereupon the Speaker said, "I think the Noes have it," which was challenged, and a division took place amid great confusion, all parties being taken by surprise and entirely unprepared for so abrupt a conclusion of the proceedings. The motion was negatived by 70 to 62. A warm discussion followed, and some endeavours were made to revive the debate, but without result.

During the session of 1839, Lord Palmerston, in a debate on the 19th of March, asserted, in the following words, that the protection of English interests was the guiding principle of his conduct and of his foreign policy :—

"In the outset, I must deny the charge made personally against myself, and against the Government to which I belong, of an identification with the interests of other nations.

"I venture to say that never was there an administration that paid more attention to the com-

mercial interests of this country. And this I will add, that much as I feel the importance of the alliance of this country with other powers, and much as I wish to perpetuate such alliances, and to endeavour to render other nations as friendly as possible with this, I am satisfied that the interest of England is the Polar star—the guiding principle of the conduct of the Government; and I defy any man to show, by any act of mine, that any other principle has directed my conduct, or that I have had any other object in view than the interests of the country to which I belong. I therefore repel this as an idle taunt, for I am convinced that any one who knows my personal feelings, or my public conduct, will acquit me of that charge.”

The letters which follow relate to a short but sharp quarrel that we had with the Neapolitan Government on a matter which concerned us as traders. By a treaty concluded in 1816 between Great Britain and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the commercial intercourse between the two countries was placed on the most favourable footing for both; and it was stipulated that the Neapolitan Government should grant to no other state mercantile privileges disadvantageous to the interests of England. In 1838, the King of Naples granted to a French company a monopoly of all the sulphur produced and worked in Sicily, to the great detriment of the English trade in sulphur. The British Government remonstrated vigorously, and in July 1839, the King of Naples promised that

the monopoly should cease on the 1st January, 1840. It continued, however, and in February, Lord Palmerston called on the Neapolitan Government for the immediate termination of the monopoly and full indemnity for all losses sustained by British subjects since its commencement. Sir William Temple returned to Naples with full powers and instructions to insist on these two points; but after a delay of a few days, it was announced to him that the King did not consider the sulphur contract a violation of the treaty. The British Government immediately prepared to enforce its demand by the presence of the Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Stopford. On the 17th April, the British ships of war commenced hostilities and captured a number of Neapolitan vessels. Finally, Naples accepted the mediation of France on the terms named by Lord Palmerston.

“Foreign Office, March 13, 1840.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I send you some important instructions, which you will execute without delay. We cannot stand any longer the postponement of the abolition of the Sulphur Monopoly. It is a clear violation of the Treaty of 1816, which gives our subjects in Sicily a right to dispose of their personal property, of whatever kind, by sale, in any way they like, without hindrance or loss. We must have not only the repeal of the monopoly, but full compensation for

losses; and you should let Cassaro* know that the Admiral is instructed to take whatever measures may be necessary in the way of reprisal, if these two demands are not immediately complied with. Of course we only require at present an engagement to pay back losses as may be duly substantiated by adequate proof, but Cassaro must write a note pledging his government unequivocally to that effect. The manner of ascertaining the amount of loss you may perhaps be able to settle at once, by communicating with some of our merchants and learning what fair mode they would suggest. Perhaps a mixed commission might be accepted for the purpose of verifying accounts and vouchers, but then it would be necessary that the principles according to which the losses are to be calculated should be settled beforehand, as was done by Lord Ponsonby with the Brazilian Government, in 1828, when he drew up a memorandum, which was signed by both parties, laying down the rules according to which the claims should be admitted or rejected. The details of that case would not be applicable to this, because in that case our claim was for compensation for losses arising from the illegal detention and capture of British vessels by Brazilian ships blockading Buenos Ayres during the war between Brazil and Buenos Ayres. But it would be sufficient for the present to get a 'promissory note' from Cassaro admitting the general principle, and if there should be any difficulty in settling now the

* The Neapolitan Foreign Minister.

mode of ascertaining the amount, that may be left for future arrangement ; but in that case it must be assumed that the Neapolitans are to pay whatever we can show to be due.

“ If the Sulphur Monopoly has been abolished when you receive this, you will equally insist on the compensation being promised ; and if it should be refused, you will equally send for Stopford’s ships to make reprisals.

“ The messenger is to be at your orders to go on to Malta with anything you may have to send thither.

“ When this question is arranged, you will then begin with the treaty ; but we cannot allow the abolition of the monopoly to be the result of the new treaty, because that monopoly is a violation of the old treaty, and we cannot conclude a new treaty while the present one remains broken. If matters should come to reprisals, that would not be a reason for you to leave Naples, because reprisal is not an act of war ; and our ships should not establish a blockade or commit any more direct act of hostility without further instructions from hence. If we come to hostilities, then it would be fitting for you to withdraw and go to Rome to wait further instructions.

“ Our public affairs are going on well. The good majority on the vote of confidence has fixed us for the Session, and has enabled us to survive defeats in smaller matters. Nothing could be more foolish on

the part of the Tories than to give us that advantage. Prince Albert is much liked, and the Queen has been inviting some of the Tories, such as the Chesterfields, Beauforts, &c., and this has had a very good effect. The Duke of Wellington is better, but quite gone by as a public man and a parliamentary leader. We have been giving some dinner and evening parties, which have had a very good political effect, have helped the party, and have pleased many individuals belonging to it.

“We have made no further progress as yet about Turco-Egyptian affairs, as we are waiting the decision of the new French Government thereupon.

“I keep myself remarkably well, because, as the distance from my new house to the office is too short to make a ride, I have established for myself a rule to ride up to Hyde Park and round the Ring every day between eleven and one, as I find the most leisure moment; and I have hitherto done this every day, and feel much the better for it. It only takes half an hour.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“ Foreign Office, April 20, 1840.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I send you by a messenger copies of the communications which have passed between us and the French about Neapolitan affairs, and copies of despatches which I have sent you through the French Government. You will see that we have accepted the good offices of the French Government for the attainment of our demands, but that we cannot abate any part of those demands ; and that in order to leave the King of Naples more at liberty to yield to the advice of the French, we have agreed to suspend for three weeks the further continuance of reprisals, without, however, releasing the ships which may already have been taken.

“ I desire this messenger to go through Rome, in case you should have retired thither from Naples, in consequence of any act of violence on the part of the King against British property and subjects.

“ I have felt great pleasure in reading your despatches and seeing your account of the manner in which you have acquitted yourself in the difficult position in which you have been placed. You have acted with judgment, firmness, decision, and temper ; in short, it is impossible for anybody to have done better, and I am very glad that you have had this matter to deal with. Your notes are remarkably well written, and, without being at all uncivil or

offensive, but being, on the contrary, perfectly polite and courteous, they are as decided and energetic in substance as it was possible to be. I very much approve of your having insinuated in one of them that, even if the Neapolitan Government gave the assurances you required, Sir R. Stopford would still come to Naples.

“It is possible that the matter may have been arranged before the French negotiator arrives, but it is also possible that it may not. In that case your part during the time he is negotiating will be easy and simple—you will only have to wait to see what he can accomplish; but if he asks you to waive any part of your demands, you will say that your hands are tied on that point, and that you have no power to do so. If the Neapolitan Government yields, there ought to be some instrument drawn up, in the shape of a convention or protocol, to be signed by you and the Neapolitan Minister. I should not think that the French Plenipotentiary would have anything to do with that, in the way of signing it. But it ought to contain a general engagement to make compensation to British subjects for all just claims which they may have against the Neapolitan Government for losses incurred by reason of the acts of that Government or its officers. I will send you in a few days a list of the claims, but I do not like to detain this message till that list can be made out. I fancy they are not large, excepting the claim about the corn which our people were prevented from selling in

December 1838. I do not think we can justly include Flynn's claim, as he was lately transported for forgery. I have referred to the Queen's Advocate the question, what is to be done with British property found on board Neapolitan vessels which may be detained, and I will send you his opinion by the next messenger.

“Our domestic affairs go on well. We had a tolerable majority the other day on Graham's motion about China,* and we stand in no danger, I think, during the rest of the Session. My speech on that motion has had great success; all our party were delighted with it, and said it was a triumph to the party, and many of the other side have paid me compliment upon it, saying it amused them and kept their attention alive, and was dexterous. It was a good fair speech, but has, I think, been rather more praised than it deserved. There is no danger at present of war with the United States about the boundary question. All the violent notes you see in the paper mean nothing. Van Buren† wants to get the management of the question into his own hands out of those of the State of Maine, and he has, I believe, succeeded; but he has done this for the purpose of keeping peace and not of making war. In fact, the States are in such a condition of bankruptcy and financial and commercial distress, that it is not

* That the hostilities in China were mainly to be attributed to the want of foresight and precaution on the part of Her Majesty's present advisers.

† The President of the United States.

likely they would make war unnecessarily and unjustly.

“The commissioners whom I sent last year to explore the country, have just made their report, and it is very much in favour of our claim, and it totally knocks over the claim of the Americans. I shall probably lay it before Parliament.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Carlton Terrace, May 13, 1840.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I send you another messenger, that you may be in possession of all that has passed between us and the French Government about the Neapolitan quarrel. Guizot read me a letter to-day from Thiers, saying that no full powers had hitherto been received by Scora Capriola, and that Capriola at Naples had been dismissed at the instigation of the King’s confessor, for having accepted the French mediation, but Thiers begged Guizot to assure me that he would not allow either himself or us to be the dupes of the King of Naples. I foresee that the matter will not be settled without blows, or more vigorous measures on our part; and the first thing we shall do will be to establish a blockade and to cut off all communication between Italy and Sicily. I am delighted with the good sense and ability which you have shown in the whole matter. It is quite impossible for anybody to have done better. You have always done just the

right thing upon every occasion, and have written your despatches as well as possible. ✓

“The French Government have asked us for leave to bring over from St. Helena the remains of Bonaparte, and we have given them permission to do so. This is a thoroughly French request, but it would have been foolish in us not to have granted it; and we have therefore made a merit of doing so readily and with a good grace.

This murder of old Lord William Russell is a horrible thing. The perpetrator has not yet been discovered; but there can be no doubt that it was done by Courvoisier, his Swiss valet. The moral is, that people ought always to sleep with their bed-room door locked, and with loaded pistols in their room. I have no doubt that in a few days the murder will be brought home to the valet; for, in fact, it could have been committed by nobody else.

I send you one of our new post-office penny covers; the design is by Mulready, one of our best artists; and, as a work of art, is really excellent. It is difficult to get so much subject so distinctly into so small a compass.*

We are making good way in our session, and I think it will be over towards the end of July. There is no chance of the Tories ousting us before that time, and therefore we are good for another year. The

* The first idea under the new penny postage scheme was that the Post Office should engrave and sell envelopes which would go free.

Duke of Wellington is breaking fast, and if he should be obliged to retire from public life, the Tory party would fall to pieces, and some of the moderate peers would come over to us.

“The people of Vienna and Berlin affect to say that we are in the wrong about Naples, but this is evidently for the purpose of driving us to make matters up. I tell them, however, that we do not care what they think, but know ourselves to be in the right, and mean to compel the Neapolitans to give way. I said to Castalcicala, that the only thing we regret in the matter is the danger to Sicily; he replied that I might make myself quite easy on that score, as he knew from his own observation that no country ever was more quiet and contented than Sicily! I said I was delighted to hear so, and from such good authority. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“HON. WILLIAM TEMPLE.”

“C. T., July 13, 1840.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I am on every account very glad that the Sulphur question is settled, it is a great embarrassment out of the way, and we want all our ships to be in the Levant, where we have work for them to do. We have determined to go ahead with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, as France will not join us; and we mean to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate all Syria, except a southern bit between the sea, Lake

Tiberias, the Jordan, and the Dead Sea, and bounded to the north by a line drawn from the Mediterranean just above the fortress of Acre to Lake Tiberias. We mean to give him ten days to accept this offer, Egypt to be held by hereditary tenure, and the end of Syria for his life. If he does not accept this in ten days, then we shall offer him Egypt by hereditary tenure, without the lower part of Syria; and if he does not in ten days more accept that, then he will not have Egypt by hereditary tenure; and if he resists, he must abide the issue of events. All this is for the present a profound secret; but we shall make it known to France in a few days, when our convention is signed. Therefore, till it is publicly announced, you must neither say nor admit anything about it. Minto* writes by this messenger to Stopford, to prepare him for the instructions which he may shortly expect to receive, to support the Syrian people against Mehemet and Ibrahim. I have been overwhelmed with business of all kinds of late, but continue quite well. Our session is drawing to a close, and our parliamentary difficulties seem to have flown away for the present.

Prince Albert is to be sole regent during the confinement of the Queen, and if any misfortune were to happen during the minority of the heir to the throne, or rather, of the infant sovereign, there is already a Bill in force to provide for the regency till the arrival of Ernest,† if as a signal punishment for the sins

* First Lord of the Admiralty.

† King of Hanover.

of the nation he were to come to the throne of England.

We have nearly settled our disputes with Portugal as well as with Naples; and I hope we have put the Boundary question into a train for arrangement.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“My Priam filly three-year old, out of Gallopade’s dam, has won the only two races she has started for; one at Stockbridge and the Queen’s Plate at Guildford; and she may win a stake this week at Southampton.”

“C. T., July 27, 1840.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“As this messenger will touch at Naples, I send you by him, for your own private information, the convention which we signed the other day between the Four Powers and Turkey. We have tried for many months past to persuade France to join us in some practicable arrangement; but having at last failed in every endeavour, we have been obliged to act without her. I have not shown Guizot the convention itself, nor the answers to it, or the protocols; but I have told him their substance. We cannot show the convention, &c., till it shall have been ratified. Thiers and Guizot are very angry, of course, because they had persuaded themselves that the English Cabinet never would be induced to separate

itself from France on this question. Ellice had misled Thiers; and Guizot had been deceived by the foolish language held by Holland and Clarendon, who went talking away in favour of Mehemet Ali. However, the French had some foundation for their mistake; for when it came to the point, I found such resistance on the part of Holland and Clarendon, and such lukewarmness on the part of some of the other members of the Cabinet, that I sent in my resignation, saying that I saw there was a disinclination in some leading members to adopt my views; and that as I never would be the instrument to work out a policy which I thought injurious to the interests of my country, and full of danger to the peace of Europe, I relieved Melbourne from the embarrassment of deciding between me and those who differed from me, by placing my office at his disposal. The dissidents upon this withdrew their opposition, and the waverers came round to my views. I was quite sure that France would not venture to quarrel with us, and oppose the Four Powers by force of arms in order to protect Mehemet Ali; and so it has turned out. Thiers has sent a querulous reply to my mem., complaining of unkind and uncourteous treatment; but ending with a declaration of his determination to maintain peace.

“ We can soothe his personal feelings; and when he has got over his mortification, which he soon will do, perhaps he may be induced to help us, by persuading the Pasha to yield. This may open a new

line for the gratification of French vanity ; and so as we carry our objects we care not much by what fair means it is accomplished. It is lucky that we have finished our Neapolitan dispute ; and one reason which made me so impatient to do so was, that I foresaw we should want our whole disposable force to carry on our operations in the Levant. I daresay Thiers thinks that we have out-manceuvred him in this matter by getting him to finish his mediation sooner than he would have brought it to an end ; and this makes him more angry. But his ill-humour will blow over, and his interest will make him come round to us again.

“In the meanwhile Neumann, Bulow, and Brunnov are delighted, and their Courts will, I doubt not, be equally pleased. In fact, if we had yielded to France on this occasion, we should have made her the dictator of Europe, and her insolence would have known no bounds ; and we should soon have had to quarrel with her upon some matter directly affecting the interests or the honour of the two countries, and upon which perhaps neither party would have been able with honour to give way.

“Our session is nearly over ; and the Tories are split more than ever. The Duke and Peel are not upon speaking terms ; they quarrelled about the Canada Union Bill. Peel pledged himself for it ; the Duke afterwards against it ; and Peel wrote to the Duke to say that if he, the Duke, turned the Government out upon that Bill, Peel would not belong to

the new Government, because that Government must be founded upon opposition to the principle of union between the Upper and Lower Canadas, while Peel was pledged in favour of that principle.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“HOR. WILLIAM TEMPLE.”

“C. T., February 9, 1841.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Here is a messenger going to Naples, but, as usual, I have not much time to write by him. We have had a very cold and severe winter. It began three weeks before Christmas, and they are now skating on all the lakes and ponds, and yesterday and to-day one might have skated all through the streets and parks, the ground having been covered with a coat of ice. Prince Albert fell into the lake in Buckingham Palace Gardens to-day while skating; but it was not out of his depth, and he was soon extricated; though it is a cold day for a ducking.

“Public affairs go on well; our foreign concerns prosper in every direction; we have put down all our enemies in Affghanistan, and I think we shall succeed in carrying our points in China. But partly from the mismanagement of the military officer in command, and partly from natural causes, the sickness of the troops employed at Chusan has been very great, and upwards of 200 men have died. This fully justified George Elliot in going on with the negotiation, instead of breaking it off and going at

once to blows. For his force was so weakened that he had not the means to act with effect. The sickness, however, had diminished towards the end of October, and the men were all getting well again.

“This affair of Mr. McLeod in America is awkward and unpleasant. I cannot think, however, that the Americans will proceed to extremities with him, and I am the more inclined to think so in consequence of the violent speech of Mr. Grainger, a friend of the new President. Mr. Grainger said that if McLeod was proved to be guilty he would be convicted; that if convicted, he would be condemned; and if condemned, he would most assuredly be executed. When a man connected with a government that is or is to be holds such language in Parliament, it seems clear to me that it is for the purpose of holding high a principle which he thinks will not be carried into practice. If they were to hang McLeod we could not stand it, and war would be the inevitable result.

“At home our affairs go on equally well; that is to say, the country is quiet and prosperous, Ireland contented, manufactures and trade reviving, and agriculture doing tolerably well. The Chartists are pretty tranquil, though not extinct, nor more moderate in their views and feelings. But the elections which have taken place have not been favourable, and we had lost three seats; to-day, however, we have gained one back again, for we have carried St. Albans against Lord Verulam’s second son. It is a great victory, but, I fear, obtained by gross bribery;

only, as the bribery has been equal on both sides, I suppose both sides will wish to avoid any searching inquiry. There certainly has been more bribery in the small boroughs since the Reform Bill than there ever was before. The Tories are anxious to turn us out, and take the government, and they mean to make some grand attack before Easter. They may perhaps beat us on some point, as our majority is very scanty ; but I imagine we should dissolve before going out ; because if we simply went out they must dissolve, for they could not go on with this House of Commons ; and if there must be a dissolution, better let it be with us than with them in power. Perhaps, however, they may not be able to beat us after all.

“ I fancy the French have been very busy intriguing at Naples ; let me know in a despatch anything you may learn about this. Adieu.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ The Hon. WILLIAM TEMPLE.”

The McLeod affair, alluded to in the foregoing letter, very nearly led to a war with the United States. During the Canadian rebellion an American steamer, called the ‘*Caroline*,’ which had been engaged in carrying arms to the rebels, was boarded in the night by a party of loyalists, set on fire, and driven over the Falls of Niagara. She was lying at the time within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of New York, and an American citizen lost

his life in the affray. In January 1841, Alexander McLeod, a British subject, was arrested while engaged on some business in New York State, and imprisoned on a charge of murder, because, as was alleged, he had been concerned in the attack on the vessel. The British Government demanded his release on the ground that he was acting under orders, and that the responsibility for the deed rested with them, and not with an individual such as McLeod. The United States Government, by the mouth of Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, replied that they could not interfere with the internal concerns of the State of New York, or with the action of its authorities.

The following letter to Mr. Fox, our Minister at Washington, indicates the tone which Lord Palmerston felt bound to assume in presence of such an argument. The directness with which he informs the United States Cabinet of the intentions of the British Government probably contributed to the maintenance of peace, and may well be commended to the attention of all foreign secretaries who are writing upon questions on which they know that the English people have made up their minds :—

“Foreign Office, February 9, 1841.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“We most entirely approve the tone you have taken and the language you have held about the affair of Mr. McLeod, and so do the public in general. There never was a matter upon which all

parties—Tory, Whig, and Radical—more entirely agreed; and if any harm should be done to McLeod the indignation and resentment of all England will be extreme. Mr. Van Buren should understand this, and that the British nation will never permit a British subject to be dealt with as the people of New York propose to deal with McLeod, without taking a signal revenge upon the offenders. McLeod's execution would produce war, war immediate and frightful in its character, because it would be a war of retaliation and vengeance.

“It is impossible that Mr. Forsyth can wish to bring upon the two countries such a calamity, and we can have no doubt that he will prevent it. He must have the means of doing so, or else the Federal Union exists but in name. But I presume that if we tell him that in the event of McLeod's execution we should make war upon the State of New York, he would reply that in such case we should *ipso facto* be at war with the rest of the Union. But if that is so, the rest of the Union must have the means of preventing the State of New York from doing a thing which would involve the whole Union in war with England. Forsyth's doctrine is pure nullification doctrine; but that is what he cannot intend to maintain.

I have spoken most seriously to Stevenson* on this matter, and have told him, speaking not officially, but as a private friend, that if McLeod is executed

* United States Minister in London.

there must be war. He said he quite felt it; that he is aware that all parties have but one feeling on the subject, and he promised to write to the President privately as well as officially by to-day's post.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“H. S. Fox, Esq.”

McLeod was tried at Utica, in the month of October; and the jury, by their verdict of “Not guilty,” cut a knot which seemed at first likely to yield only to the sword.

On the dissolution of Parliament, Lord Palmerston went down to his constituents at Tiverton. Before the Reform Bill, the election of its Members of Parliament rested with twelve burgesses and twelve assistants, incorporated by a charter of James I. The following characteristic extract from the concluding portion of his speech at the conclusion of his canvass emphasises the cry with which the Whigs went to the country :—

“You for years and years had seen going on, at stated periods, an insulting mockery, called an election for members of Parliament (hear, hear, and cheers). You have been told that within the four walls of a privileged building some conjuring process was going on, by which two simple gentlemen were to be converted into members of the House of Commons (cheers and laughter). How that was done not one among you knew. There were four and twenty conjurors who performed this magical incantation in secret, and, like the witches in Macbeth, by putting divers ingredients into their

cauldron, they drew out two members of Parliament. They produced these results of necromancy, and they told you they were your representatives (cheers and laughter). You recoiled, gentlemen, from the resemblance; you said there was no likeness between you (A voice: 'More like jackasses,' laughter); that they were no more the representatives of the honest men and of the beautiful women in Tiverton than were figures in a magic-lantern of Jack the Giant-Killer, or Gog and Magog. You are now able to choose an enlightened member of your own; you have succeeded in driving away those conjurors, and in breaking the spell; but, gentlemen, the magic was too strong for the hands of any individual; it required a spell more potent than that by which you were bound; that spell could only be found in an act of the Imperial Legislature; that spell was found in the Reform Bill (great cheering). Your conjurors fled like the shades of night before the first dawn of the morning sun; the light of reform has arisen, and dispelled those magical illusions; your mock representatives vanished into air, and you then proceeded to elect two good honest representatives of substantial flesh and blood like yourselves, capable to represent you in Parliament, and who, having real ears like yourselves (A voice from the crowd: 'Not like jackasses'), having ears to hear, having eyes to see, having tongues to speak, and legs to come among you, and hands to shake your hands with, and with an honest shake too, they did that which your representatives before never had felt for, experienced, or dreamed of (great cheering). You then were able to tell those real representatives what your real feelings and opinions upon public matters were. Your voice has reached the Parliament of England through the members whom you have sent there. You are really represented, and you take your place and add your share in the deliberations of the national legislature of the country (great cheering). Well, then, gentlemen, I say it is impossible that a people who, like yourselves, have made such a transition—who have passed from a state of nonentity

to which you had been previously condemned, to a state of active zeal and efficient participation in the affairs of the country (cheers)—it is impossible that a population who have made such a change by the abolition of political monopoly, under the restraints in which they and their forefathers had for so long a period grown, should not be ready to extend to the principle of commercial monopoly the same condemnation which had been pronounced, for your enlargement and for your liberation, upon the principle of political monopoly (cheers).

* * * * *

“Well, then, gentlemen, I stand before you for your votes at the ensuing election upon the principle of being an enemy to the system of monopoly (great cheering). I claim your support on the ground that I support the principle of extending freedom in our commercial relations.”

CHAPTER II.

LORD PALMERSTON IN OPPOSITION.

THE elections of 1841 startled a good many persons at home, but abroad they excited still greater surprise. Foreign statesmen could not conceive how a government which had shown such vigour, and met with such success in its dealings with other states, should not have obtained a firmer hold on the enthusiasm of their own countrymen.

In the preceding volume some of the causes have been stated under the influence of which the Melbourne Ministry had been for some time drifting into discredit. No fault, except his dry and curt manner, could be found with Lord John Russell as a parliamentary leader.

He had the two qualities most essential for that position, tact and spirit. In face of the most skilful and accomplished debater that ever sat on the opposition benches in the House of Commons, he never showed any fear of his antagonist: and I often admired the brevity with which, in his replies, he said

the thing that was necessary, and omitted everything that was superfluous. In the same manner, Lord Palmerston had achieved the object for which a British Minister is most esteemed without engaging us in war, and he had raised our character and strengthened our prestige as much as he could have done by any successful contest.

Yet, notwithstanding the abilities of these two eminent men; notwithstanding the distinguished talents of almost every member of the highly intellectual Cabinet to which they belonged; notwithstanding the wit, the good-humour, the various accomplishments and statesmanlike moderation of the Premier—than whom few men ever brought to his elevated station a more cultivated mind or a more manly understanding—the administration wanted that quality which in a face is called “expression,” and neither captivated the affections nor commanded the respect of the public.

On the other hand, the Opposition had the advantage of being personified in a chief who was recognised by a large portion of the nation as the type of enlightened Prudence. Known to be averse to great constitutional changes—of which people were then tired; believed to be favourable to useful administrative reforms—which people then expected; for many years “the great man of the House of Commons,” Sir Robert Peel, had grown into “the great man of the country,” which wished to see him at the head of its affairs. It was no marvel then that an

election, made to try the strength of parties, placed him at the head of a majority of ninety.

The first question he had to deal with was a financial one. The late Government had gone on from year to year, and from day to day, scrambling by small means through pressing difficulties; without the courage, and consequently without the capacity to face the growing evil, and provide an adequate remedy for it.

This was perhaps the great moment in Sir Robert Peel's life. Comprehensive, but practical; bold, and yet cautious, he proposed measures which dealt at once with the present position and the future prosperity of the country. An Income Tax assured public credit and at once checked the deficiency in revenue; and the diminution of duties, where their excess destroyed the security of their collection, or where their collection cost more than their produce, or where they weighed unduly on the comforts or industry of the people,—placed our commercial and our financial policy on a basis which did not include the speculative doctrines of unlimited Free Trade, nor support the unwise restrictions of exaggerated Protection.

But the Conservative statesman, in doing this, moved on treacherous ground; for no position is so safe to maintain under a despotism, or so difficult to maintain under a free government, as one between extremes. It was thus that Protectionists (though at first only in murmurs) accused the Prime Minister of

perfidy, whilst the Free Traders charged him with cowardice : the one because he admitted the general principles of Free Trade ; the other because he did not carry them, without any limitation, into practice.

But the great impending battle was on a question which, though called commercial, was in fact more political than commercial. There has been at all times, and in all countries, a sort of bitter feeling entertained by men making sudden fortunes by speculation and trade against those who inherit a fortune in land from a well-known ancestry. In the long process of society this feeling disappears in individuals and families, as in time they rise into the caste from which their forefathers were excluded ; but as between class and class, the manufacturer in the town has a species of feeling bordering on antipathy for the squire in the county. The last is certainly not more selfish than the first. Few manufacturers take the same interest in those who work for their mills that the country gentleman takes in those who cultivate his ground. The country gentleman, moreover, whose fortune is already made, and connected inseparably with the fortunes of his country, takes a larger view of the national interest, and is more to be depended upon in any great national crisis, than the manufacturer or tradesman, whose fortune depends on the events of the hour. It may be added that the frank bearing, the manly and athletic habits of our landed gentry, the influence they derived from ancient birth and traditional associations, their independent

position, had in our old society long made them the dominant and popular body in the nation. Influenced by this prestige, and the belief that a state should not be dependent on foreign states for a main article of its food, and that, owing to the charges on land, it was impossible for the cultivators of our soil to support unlimited foreign competition, the legislature had for many years sanctioned restrictions on foreign grain as a matter of course, the only subject at times in dispute being the extent and nature of such restrictions. The great change, however, which had taken place of late in our institutions; the suppression of many seats in Parliament for which peers or country gentlemen returned the members; the calling into political existence of the great manufacturing towns; and above all, perhaps, the creation of the ten-pound householders, which gave such overbearing importance to the feelings of the small shopkeeper,—had much weakened the power, and consequently diminished the partisans of the territorial aristocracy. And now there were bold and very eloquent men representing the manufacturers, and gathering round their banner all the partisans of democracy, who, putting themselves at the head of what was called the “Anti-Corn-Law Movement”—but which might with propriety have been called the “Anti-Country Gentleman’s Movement”—went about the country denouncing the landed proprietor as “the grasping tyrant, bloated in his superfluity by the taxes he imposed on the food of a starving population.” The

Radicals followed these leaders ; but the two great parties contending for office avoided for a while any extreme resolutions.

The Whigs, indeed, had at that time in their ranks many country gentlemen whom they did not wish to offend ; and the Tories had so far compromised themselves with respect to Free Trade doctrines in general, that it was impossible for them to be the advocates of high protecting duties on the one article of corn.

The early debates, therefore, were confined to the question as to whether there should be a moderate fixed duty, or a moderate duty regulated by a sliding scale ; Lord John Russell contending for the one, Sir Robert Peel for the other. What delayed a more decided contest was the doubt which prevailed for a time as to what was the real force of the landed party ; for the old belief that some tax on corn was necessary still coloured the speeches of leading statesmen and the articles of leading newspapers ; and few were fully aware of the change which had quietly taken place since 1832 in public thought beneath the surface of public expression.

Lord Palmerston, who, with other Canningites, had always belonged to the school of Mr. Huskisson—a school which recognised the principles of political economy without shutting its eyes to the fact that general political considerations might limit or govern the application of those principles—voted with his party for the fixed duty, but was one of the first to discern clearly that all duty must ere long be re-

moved. His speech, then, on the 9th of February, 1842, is evidently impregnated with this idea, and goes far beyond the arguments in favour of a fixed duty over a variable one. "Why," says he, "is the earth on which we live divided into zones and climates? Why do different countries yield different productions to people experiencing similar wants? Why are they intersected with mighty rivers, the natural highways of nations? Why are lands most distant from each other brought almost into contact by the very means which seems to divide them? Why, Sir, it is in order that man may be dependent upon man: it is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the diffusion of knowledge, by the exchange of mutual benefits, engendering mutual kind feelings, multiplying and confirming friendly relations. It is in order that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilization with one hand, peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, better. Sir, this is the dispensation of Providence; this is the decree of that power which created and disposed the universe. Away, then, with those who, with arrogant and presumptuous folly, would fetter the inborn energies of man; who would set up their own miserable legislation to oppose the great standing laws of nature."

It might be argued that, had Providence been so bent on promoting interchange of commodities amongst the distant divisions of mankind, all rivers would have been navigable, ports would have every-

where abounded, and the sea, blessed only by gentle breezes, would have been unexposed to storms. Providence seems, in fact, to have left this, as many other human matters, to the judgment and sagacity of man, who has to be guided by the conflicting suggestions which justice and expediency, morality and convenience, may, under differing circumstances, interpose. But eloquence is not logic; and I have made this quotation because it shows Lord Palmerston once more in the character of an orator—a character he had reassumed—and because it also shows that he was perfectly convinced at that time that the Corn Laws were doomed, and that he, as a country gentleman as well as a statesman, would be unwise in attempting to prop them up. I say he had reassumed the character of an orator, because the reputation he had acquired in that character during the three or four years that had preceded Lord Grey's Government, had gradually passed away during the period he had been conducting a most laborious department, which affords few opportunities of making speeches, and enjoins as a rule, when they are made, caution rather than display.

To turn, however, from home to foreign affairs, as those by which Lord Palmerston was principally interested.

The questions of foreign policy open to discussion during Sir Robert Peel's administration related to the United States and France. With the former we concluded two treaties; one settling their north-

western frontier—a question which, strange to say, had been left in abeyance since the close of the war; and another determining the division of the territory of Oregon, respecting which the claims of the Americans had—as is usually the case in all similar affairs with that people—been growing every year that had left them undetermined.

It was only at the moment that the Peel administration was breaking up that this last treaty was concluded; consequently no debate took place on it during that administration; but the Ashburton Treaty provoked many observations, and from no one more than Lord Palmerston.

A Commission had been appointed for the settlement of the question of the boundary between British North America and the United States, which had been pending for forty years. Great Britain claimed as the boundary a line corresponding with the terms of the treaty of 1783. The United States claimed a line not in accordance with this treaty.

The Government of Sir Robert Peel determined to send to the United States a special ambassador, fully empowered to effect an adjustment of this and other differences with that country. The person chosen for this service was Lord Ashburton, who arrived at New York on the 1st April, 1842.

Lord Ashburton was a gentleman much considered in the United States, and closely connected with them by the commercial dealings of the house of Baring, to which he had belonged. His selec-

tion as our special ambassador made it evident that we were prepared to purchase agreement by concession, as he would never, in this position, have accepted a mission which was likely to be unciliatory or unsuccessful; and, as far as the frontier question was concerned, it must be admitted that the public in our country were well contented to conciliate a people with which it jars on our national sympathies to be in hostility, by concessions respecting an unknown country of which they had never realised the possession.

The plenipotentiary on the part of the United States was Mr. Webster, and the negotiations resulted in a treaty (signed at Washington on the 9th August in the same year), in which the boundaries between the territories of the two powers are defined in detail, and stipulations entered into for the safeguard of the interests of settlers and others whose lands passed, by the operation of the treaty, from the jurisdiction of one state to that of the other.

There was another question, however, settled in the Ashburton Treaty on which more interest was felt—the question commonly called “The Right of Search.” Bent on suppressing, if possible, the traffic in slaves, we fully admitted that we had no right to meddle with the vessels of other states employed in that traffic, and which did not give us the permission so to do. But we maintained that we had a right to ascertain whether a ship was entitled to the colours it might think proper to display. This was

contested by the United States, who would not allow their vessels to be visited under any pretext whatsoever. This question, which could not be settled on principle, it was attempted to settle practically, without attending to principle, and many were inclined to consider that a law passed by the United States making the slave trade piracy, and the employment of an adequate American squadron for the suppression of it, was practically equivalent to the acknowledgment of a power which we did not abandon in words, but it would be understood we should not attempt to exercise.

Lord Palmerston, however, regarded these transactions from a different point of view, styling the Ashburton Treaty "The Ashburton Surrender," inasmuch as that it really resigned a right to which he contended we had an undoubted claim, and which we had hitherto declared we could not resign with honour.

In a letter to Lord Minto he writes :

" Ashburton's treaty is very discreditable to the negotiators who concluded it, and to the Government who sanctioned it. The negotiator was outwitted, and the Government has made unnecessary sacrifice of things which are not only losses to us, but in the hands of the Americans will prove instruments of future aggression against us ; and as there still remain unsettled several questions which must, one of these days, become subjects of angry discussion between the two countries, it was highly unwise to

consent to any arrangement now which will, by-and-by give them a greater pull upon us.

“The objection; which I think even our peace-loving partisans must feel, is, that the treaty tends to render peace insecure by even multiplying possible points of difference, and by giving the Americans additional means of annoying us, and therefore fresh temptation to do so.

“The motto of the Government in foreign affairs, seems to be, ‘Give way.’ There is for this course a plausible defence, that it preserves peace, but that defence will not stand examination and discussion.”

Lord Palmerston maintained, indeed, as may have been learnt from his correspondence relative to Belgium, that the true policy of England was never to put forward any pretension that was unjust, but to give up none which justice supported as long as there was a possibility of defending it—by arms, if its value justified our having recourse to arms; by negotiation, if we carried our defence no farther than argument; leaving our adversary in doubt, however, till the last as to whether we should finally protest or fight. He laughed to scorn the theory that you should yield immediately everything for which you were not prepared to go to war. “Why,” he used to say, “every state would be disposed to give up three out of every four questions sooner than go to war to maintain them. If you choose to give way hastily on these, because you are not prepared to go to war for them, you will most frequently

anticipate your antagonist. Nor is this all. It is not concession on this matter or that which is of national importance : it is the habit of making concessions, and creating a belief that you will make them, which is fatal to a nation's interest, tranquillity, and honour. To create such a belief in a democratic government, especially a government which is prone to seek at all times to please the multitude, is a sure way to have constant troubles with that government : from every difficulty you avoid to-day will rise twenty difficulties round you to-morrow ; for every man who seeks popularity will attempt to gain it at your expense."

He said : " You give up to-day to the Americans, who are an encroaching people, a point that you deem of small importance : this is certain to lead to your being asked to give up another point of more importance to-morrow ; and you will thus eventually be brought to give up something of great importance, or to fight because you decline to do so. Nor is this all. If you still say : ' Don't let us fight,' you avoid war with the Americans ; but other nations, who have watched your conduct with them, will imitate their conduct to you ; and the quarrel you avoided in the first instance, will multiply into a thousand quarrels before you have done with the consequences of indifference or timidity."

His maxim was, " Never give up a pin's head that you ought to keep and think you can keep ; and even if you think that in the last extremity you will

not be able to keep it, make as many difficulties as you can about resigning it, and manifest a doubt as to whether you should not sooner go to war than resign it."

It is wiser, perhaps, to lay down no absolute rule upon such subjects; but if we had to do so, all experience would teach us that we are more likely to enjoy peace under the minister who is supposed ready to fight, than under the minister who is supposed ready to yield.

But the opinion of the day was, in 1842, what it would be in a similar case in 1871, and backed the Government which, as far as the United States were concerned, was disposed to concession.

Towards the close of the session Lord Palmerston attacked the Government in a speech recapitulating the principal recent events both at home and abroad. It resembles somewhat one of those inimitable philippics with which Lord Lyndhurst at one time endeavoured annually to surprise the constitutional good-humour and philosophic indifference of Lord Melbourne; and I make the citation because it is a good specimen of Lord Palmerston's prepared style—clever, gay, epigrammatic, satirical, and producing a great effect in the House. It was a strong instance of his pluck and courage; for to get up in a thin House, at the fag end of a laborious session, to make a long speech from which no one expects any results, in the face of the most formidable antagonist you can arouse to reply to you, is an attempt that may be made

without fear by a young member, who has nothing to lose; but it is no small trial to a man who will lose more by a failure than he would gain by a success. But one of the secrets of Lord Palmerston's good fortune was, that he never contemplated a reverse, and could always take it calmly as a temporary accident, of which he would soon efface the effects.

“He went back for some of the causes, which are still in operation, to the long war which was closed by the peace of 1815.” In that war, all the passions, all the feelings, and all the energies of the nations of Europe were roused into action; and it was vain to think that men who had been so long discussing their rights, and their wrongs, could at once go back to the same state of comparative political slumber from which they had been roused by the breaking out of hostilities. Nevertheless, there were persons who indulged in that dream; but the delusion was soon dispelled. Italy, Spain, and Portugal made frequent, though unsuccessful efforts to wrest from their Government free institutions; which at length Spain and Portugal, under the auspices of England, obtained. ✓

“After the peace, the public mind of this country directed itself with great intensity to our own domestic concerns—to civil and religious disabilities under which the people laboured; and in 1829 Catholic Emancipation was carried, mainly through the energy, the wisdom, and the firmness of three men—the right honourable baronet opposite, now at the head of her Majesty's Government. the Duke

of Wellington, and a person whose name is not often associated with theirs, the right honourable and learned member for Cork.* (Cheers, and a laugh.) Lord Palmerston hoped that the Duke of Wellington would add another wreath to the laurels that grace his brow, and attain commercial emancipation for his country. The events of 1830 in France and Belgium hastened the crisis in this country. The interval since 1829 was too brief to allow the resentments which Catholic Emancipation had produced among the supporters of ministers to subside; and by resigning on a subordinate question, they expressed their conviction that a time was come when a complete measure of parliamentary reform must take place, although 'they' could not undertake it. Lord Palmerston's colleagues succeeded to power, and brought forward a measure more extensive than had been believed possible. The present state of the House, however, proved how groundless were the fears of annihilation entertained by Sir Robert Peel and his party, as were equally groundless their present fears as to striking off the fetters which cramped the productive industry of the country."

There was this difference between Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation: the one was complete in itself, the redress of a specific grievance; the other was a means to a further end.

"It was idle to suppose, when you admitted into

* Mr. O'Connell.

this House a due proportion of direct representatives of a great manufacturing and commercial community, that those representatives would not state so effectually, and with such force, the various evils under which that community laboured by reason of your prohibitory and restrictive system, that in the course of a short period of time Parliament would be induced to make great and important changes in that system. But there were many who did not look deep enough into the course of things to be convinced of that. The large party who honestly and conscientiously (for I will not attribute improper motives to them) think that the system, which we call monopoly and restriction, is not only calculated for their own benefit, but for that of the country, believed that these great stages of social improvement depended not upon the action of great and wide-spreading causes, but on the accidental opinions of particular men, who happen from time to time to be in possession of power. They thought, therefore, when from time to time we announced improvements of one sort and another, that if they could only contrive to dispossess us of the power which we held, and place it in the hands of the leaders of their party, they would be safe, and that the system which they had cherished for so long a period would be maintained. They had a majority, a large majority, in the House of Lords; all they wanted was a majority in this House. They set to work, steadily and systematically labouring in the Registration Courts; and gradually they

rose upon us, until it became obvious, from session to session, that their numbers were increasing, and that the time would probably come when they would have the command of this House as well as the other House of Parliament. The last session of the late Parliament brought matters to a crisis. Their numbers were, at all events, equal to if not greater than ours; and the measures which we announced—those great measures of commercial reform, some of which we actually brought forward—showed that the time had at length arrived when they must give us battle, and they vigorously prepared for the fight. They fought the battle in this House and in the country. Their victory was, undoubtedly, complete; and our defeat, I am ready to acknowledge, amounted almost to a rout. (Laughter.) Great was the triumph; loud was the note of exultation. But, alas! how vain is human wisdom! how short the foresight of even the wisest men!—when a few months passed over their heads, the songs of triumph were changed into cries of lamentation. The very parties whom they had selected to be their chosen champions—the very guardians whom they had armed with power for their defence—turned their weapons upon them, and most inhumanly, and with unrelenting cruelty, struck blows which, if they have not already proved fatal, must, in all probability, lead sooner or later to their utter extinction.

“The triumphant party had been deceived; but by whom? By themselves. It was not to be supposed

that the late ministers had so impregnated the air of Downing Street with free-trade principles that their successors caught the infection as they would an epidemic; still less that those recently propounded doctrines and opinions were the result of studies since the present ministers had entered upon office, when it was known that every hour of a minister's day must be devoted to the current business of his office.

“It is not to be supposed that her Majesty's ministers applied themselves, between the 3rd of September, when they entered office, and the 3rd of February, when Parliament met, to the study of Adam Smith, Ricardo, M'Culloch, Mill senior, and other writers of the same kind. (Laughter.) No; it is clear that the opinions which they have so well expounded in the present session must be the result of long meditation—of studies deliberately pursued during the ten years of comparative leisure which even a state of the most active opposition will still afford, and they must have come into office fully imbued with those sound principles the enunciation of which has excited so much admiration on this side of the House and has created so much surprise and alarm on the other.

“The points connected with domestic affairs to which ministers invited the practical attention of Parliament, were the deficiency of the revenue, the corn and provision laws, the bankruptcy law, improvements in the law of ecclesiastical jurisdiction,

the law respecting the registration of electors, and the existing distress of the country. With respect to the financial deficiency, the first thing ministers did was to increase it by what we think an unnecessary sacrifice of a large portion of the duty on timber. But, after having increased the deficiency, I must admit that they completely made good the whole, with a vengeance, by imposing the income-tax; and I am inclined to think that that tax will be found much more productive than they themselves expect it to be, not only of revenue, but of discontent." He then showed how the Bankruptcy Bill had been treated—brought down July 8th to the House of Commons, when attention could not be bestowed upon it; the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Bill put off. "As to the Registration of Electors Bill, to do anything with that now is out of the question. I now come to the distress of the people. The subject was adverted to in the speech from the throne, and yet no effectual measures have been proposed—still less have any been carried through on which we could place the least reliance for relieving that distress." In fact, the language of Government had been admirable, though their conduct had not been deserving of such entire commendation.

In the course of this speech Lord Palmerston attacked Lord Stanley* in the following terms:—

"The noble Lord the member for North Lan-

* The late Earl of Derby.

cashire is almost the only member of the present Government who, in the course of this session, has said much upon foreign affairs. The noble Lord, on the occasion to which I allude, made a very good off-hand speech: for no man is a better off-hand debater than the noble Lord. But off-hand debaters are sometimes apt to say whatever may come into their heads on the spur of the moment, without stopping to consider—as they would do if they had time—whether what they are going to say is strictly consistent with the facts to which it applies.

“I remember to have heard of a celebrated minister of a foreign country, living about the middle of the last century, who was giving instructions to one of his agents as to the language he should hold in regard to the conduct of another government. The agent, having listened to the instructions, ventured, with great humility and very submissively, to suggest, that the language which he was ordered to hold was not strictly consistent with fact, and might indeed be thought to be altogether at variance with fact. What was the minister’s answer? ‘Never mind *that*! What in the world does *that* signify? it is a good thing to say, and take care you say it.’ That minister would, I think, have made not a bad off-hand debater in this House. However, I assure the noble Lord that I don’t accuse him of having, on the occasion to which I refer, or on any other, stated that which he believed to be inconsistent with fact. What I accuse him of, is,

speaking about facts in regard to which he happened to be wholly uninformed. The noble Lord charged the late Government in general, and myself in particular, with having, by our restless meddling in every part of the world, created for him and his colleagues such embarrassments, political and commercial, that in every quarter they were met by difficulties arising from the work of our hands. That was his charge; and that charge I meet with an entire denial; and I shall be able to prove my denial, though the noble Lord did not stop to endeavour to prove his charge.

“ I must say that the noble Lord’s charge shows a great want of information on his part, as to the state of our foreign relations. It may be that the noble Lord and his colleagues have been too busily occupied in their own departments to have leisure to ransack the archives of the Foreign Office to know what passed in our time; but then, really, they who are so wholly uninformed ought not to make such positive assertions. But the noble Lord’s attack upon me and my colleagues is an instance not only of great want of information, but also of the grossest ingratitude. So far from having left embarrassments to our successors, we have bequeathed to them facilities. Why, what have they been doing since they came into office? They have been living upon our leavings. They have been subsisting upon the broken victuals which they found upon our table. They are like a band of men who have made a

forcible entrance into a dwelling, and who sit down and carouse upon the provisions they found in the larder."

Lord Palmerston further stated that the ministers came into office September 3rd. The speech from the throne was on February 3rd: yet the whole of the Speech, with a single exception, was a record of what had been done by their predecessors: it made no complaints of embarrassments, but contained only expressions of satisfaction at what had passed, and happy anticipations as regarded the future. It mentioned the treaty concluded with the four powers for the suppression of the slave trade; "A treaty," said Lord Palmerston, "concluded by us."* It next mentioned a treaty concluded with the same powers for opening the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, to which the present ministers gave a more imposing title; for they described it in the royal speech as "having for its object the security of the Turkish empire and the maintenance of the general tranquillity." This was saying, in other words, that *we* had succeeded in fixing an important element in the balance of power. The next point was the restoration of friendly intercourse with Persia; the negotiations carried on by the late ministry with Spain, Brazil, Naples; and the treaty with Portugal he claimed credit for; as also for the settlement with Denmark respecting the tolls

* M. Guizot delayed the signing of the Treaty in order to deprive Lord Palmerston of that satisfaction.

of the Baltic; and he would like to know when ministers could produce a like settlement with Hanover respecting the tolls of the Elbe. Exception had been taken to his China policy, but, on that head, he would appeal to the declarations of the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords; merely observing that if a satisfactory arrangement of commerce with a nation of two hundred millions of people was the consequence, a greater benefit to British manufactures could hardly be conceived. On entering office the late ministers found eighteen treaties; they concluded fourteen; two of those with Austria and Turkey, of great importance; and also the convention regulating French and English fisheries. There was one instance in which they failed—the settlement of the Portendic claims; their successors would know how that question was beset with difficulties. As for America, the Boundary question there grew up before they entered office—before Lord Stanley grew up—but they had done what it had occurred to no previous Government to do, they appointed two commissions, who had ascertained that the line claimed by Great Britain corresponded with the terms of the treaty of 1783, and that the line claimed by the United States did not. In the Right of Search question ministers had adopted the arguments of their predecessors. Lord Palmerston claimed credit for opening new markets on the coast of Arabia, of Abyssinia, and, by laying the foundation of the commerce which must take place, in

China, and in the countries to the west of the Indus (*i.e.*, Affghanistan). The late disaster there, which had nothing to do with the original measure, he attributed to the want of ordinary military precautions.

He contended that commerce had expanded wonderfully under the late ministry, and gave figures to support this statement. In regard to home affairs, the prospect was rather cheering. Government was pledged to the principle of free trade; they could not recede, and they would have the support of the Opposition. As to foreign affairs, he looked with considerable apprehension and fear to a Government acting upon a system of timidity, of apathy, and of compromise.

It is impossible to argue, from these extracts, that the Whig champion had the best of the battle; but it would be unfair to deny that he had made a speech which few other men in the House of Commons could have made. Moreover, a public man gains much, if his audacity is sustained by ability, in assuming boldly a great position; and it is not unfrequently that the evident ambition to take the lead in a popular assembly confers, on a favourable opportunity, that lead upon you: and during this session and the succeeding ones intervening between his return to office, Lord Palmerston not unostentatiously put forward and vindicated his pretensions to be the second, if not the first man, in the Liberal ranks. He had, in fact, no alternative but to win this position or retire

into private life, for he was just at that critical point in his career at which a bold and aspiring man has gathered round him the covert opposition of rivals, without having arrived at that in which he secures the open allegiance of followers.

In the following year he seemed, however, anxious to have it understood that he was rather an adherent to Lord John Russell than a rival, and on the only occasion on which he spoke at any length, studiously adopted, and said that he adopted, his language and sentiments.

On our main difficulty with France, public opinion was less favourable to the Government. In 1842, without any reason or pretext, as far as I can discover, beyond the desire of appropriating something that did not belong to it, the French Government determined to take possession, under some title or other, of the Marquesas, having been disappointed in their previous design of hoisting the tricolor in New Zealand. A certain Admiral Thouars, accordingly bullied Queen Pomare into a prayer to be placed under the protection of the King of the French. The British Government, to which her majesty addressed herself for assistance in this emergency, did not feel disposed to interfere. But the British missionaries were less inclined to be quiescent. The Sandwich Islands had long been a field of contention between them and the Catholic missionaries of France, each thinking it a duty to perplex the minds of those ignorant islanders with the mysterious

grounds of their own differences rather than with the broad morality and simple faith of the Christian creed.

The Protestants had hitherto had the best of the battle, and at their suggestion the Queen of Tahiti had requested the British Government to take herself and her dominions under its protection. We had declined this honour, though with the most friendly expressions. A certain Mr. Pritchard, at once a Protestant missionary and the British consul, was the great man of the islands, and might in reality be said to have been, for some time past, their actual sovereign. He was, of course, ignorant as to the manner in which the French proceedings would be viewed at home by the Government; but he knew perfectly well how they would be viewed by the ministers of his own persuasion; and there can be little doubt that, without going so far as either to encourage the queen or her subjects to absolute resistance to the French authorities, and the recall of that involuntary act of submission that her majesty had made to them, he spoke in no measured terms of French violence and Roman Catholic arrogance, superstition, and usurpation. It is probable, also, that he let fall dark hints as to conduct which Protestant England, the Queen of the Ocean, might pursue, and kept up at a pretty high temperature the discontent which the act had of itself not unnaturally produced.

The English in Tahiti did not know whether the French admiral had acted under orders, or only on his own authority; and they were also doubtful how

his conduct in either case would be viewed in England. It may be presumed, therefore, that they rather encouraged than discouraged the growing desire to reassume independence, and the house of Mr. Pritchard became naturally the rallying point of the national and Protestant party.

The Tahiti government had not, however, gone so far as to renounce the guardianship it had accepted, but it did nothing to stifle the murmurs which this guardianship had provoked; and Queen Pomare had ventured to change the flag over her palace, which it appears that M. de Thouars had assigned to her, by suppressing some stars and substituting cocoa leaves in their stead. At this critical juncture Admiral de Thouars returned, and being excessively irritated by the accounts he had received, and inexpressibly disgusted at the cocoa-nut leaves, decreed Queen Pomare's dethronement, declared the Polynesian Isles annexed to the kingdom of France, and very unceremoniously seizing Mr. Pritchard, of whose consular dignity he took little heed, threw him into prison, from which, on being released, he was sent from the island. When the news of these proceedings arrived in Europe they produced no little sensation. In England a religious and a national cry at once arose. "The open and flagrant usurpation which had just taken place was," said the Opposition, "the natural consequence of our silence when the first step towards it had been taken. English honour was insulted; the Protestant re-

ligion trampled under foot; and this by the power of France, on an element where it perilled our very existence to admit a rival." Sir Robert Peel could not have faced this popular feeling had he been so inclined; but in reality he shared it, and the gravest results were to be expected if the French government adopted as its own the violent conduct of its officer. A large party in France were disposed to urge this course. Every enemy of Louis Philippe advised it; and it was said that some of his family, with the patriotic temerity which has often in their history elevated and humbled the French nation, were ready to accept the risks with the glorious audacity of such a defiance. But that monarch saw very clearly that even if war with England were desirable, it was not so for a cause like this, and before any formal remonstrance could be made against Admiral de Thouars' high-handed behaviour, it was disavowed and disapproved, and M. Guizot, whilst maintaining the protectorate which had been offered to France, refused the sovereignty that had been seized in her name.

This reduced the question between the two governments to the capture of Mr. Pritchard. But this question was not so easy to deal with. If he had really been promoting a rebellion against a state of things legally established under the suzerainty and protection of France, his consular dignity was no safeguard against punishment for conduct which had nothing to do with his consular attributions. If, on

the other hand, he was innocent on all the charges brought against him, he ought to have been reinstated in his post under a French salute, and been not only recompensed for the inconvenience he had endured, but apologized to for the indignity he had undergone.

The English Government, however, could not condemn Mr. Pritchard, against whom no act amounting to insurrection was proved, without being hooted by the English nation; and the French government could not reinstate him in his post, with marks of respect that would be humiliating to itself, without being hooted by the French nation. Thus the reasonable thing was done rather than the right one—Mr. Pritchard received a sum of money, and did not return to his post. The conclusion thus arrived at, however, was rather acquiesced in than deemed satisfactory; and the tone taken throughout the business by the French Chambers and the French press was so menacing, and even the language of M. Guizot was so haughty, that a pretty general feeling supported Lord Palmerston when he asserted that we had truckled to France, though there was no party so thoroughly convinced of the fact as to be ready to affirm it.

I have been alluding to questions of foreign policy, because, as I have said, it was in those affairs that Lord Palmerston was principally interested, and because it is by the tone that he gave to the foreign policy of England that he will take his place in our

history ; but during the period I have been rapidly running over, he had, with an evident intention of being known as an active and able member of Parliament, been mixing constantly in debate without any particular selection of subjects.

The writer of a short sketch which I have more than once quoted says in reference to this fact :—

“On no leading topic of legislation, whether of the first or second grade of importance, while Sir Robert Peel was Minister, was Lord Palmerston silent. The distress of the country, Lord Ashley’s Bill for the better regulation of mines and collieries, bribery at elections, the Ashburton Treaty, Lord Ellenborough and his Somnauth proclamation, the affairs of Servia, the outrage on Mr. Pritchard at Tahiti, the Greek loan, and the *émeute* at Athens ; the state of Ireland, the Protestant Bishopric of Jerusalem, the affairs of Scinde, the suppression of the slave trade, in which Lord Palmerston *made more than one speech of at least three hours duration* ; our relations with Brazil, the imprisonment of Don Carlos, the inclosure of commons, duelling in the army, gaming, and the question of recovering by law debts incurred at play ; the sugar duties, the shipping interest, France and Morocco, the income tax, Maynooth College, railway accidents and national defences—all obtained his attention and called forth his remarks.”

The reader will observe the stress laid on the “more than one speech of three hours on the suppression of the slave trade.” It is indeed worthy of notice that there was no subject which, during his long political life, was taken up by Lord Palmerston with so much zeal and earnestness as the suppression of the slave trade. He was a man of the world, and it was a subject which did not interest men of the

world in general. He was a politician, and it was a subject which did not much interest the ordinary run of politicians. It caused great trouble ; it very often thwarted and crossed other views and combinations ; it was the hobby in England of a class of men who generally opposed Lord Palmerston's views as to England's relations with foreign countries ; and it was wholly misunderstood abroad, where some profound scheme of selfish advantage was generally presumed to be concealed under the cloak of disinterested philanthropy. Still, Lord Palmerston's conduct was unvarying and consistent. He never lost an occasion for advancing his humane object, nor ever pardoned an agent who overlooked it.

I have heard this often alluded to with expressions of wonder, but these could only proceed from persons ignorant of a character which was essentially framed to understand and adopt a great simple idea, and to persevere in carrying it out. He looked upon the destruction of this odious trade not only as a work of generous humanity, but as a work especially connected with the pride and glory of England ; and there may be traced throughout all his actions, and all his speeches, two dominant ideas : the one to maintain the prestige and power of Great Britain, and the other to enlist that power and prestige in the service of mankind.

The cause of justice, the cause of liberty, the cause of humanity, he always thought the cause of his country ; and it was this which in the long run,

as his motives became more and more appreciated, increased his partisans and silenced his detractors, and gave him the exceptional position which towards the close of his life he triumphantly enjoyed.

He was, however, in 1841, though far advanced in life, but imperfectly comprehended, and many yet looked upon him rather as an adventurous politician than a profound statesman.

CHAPTER III.

LETTERS AND SPEECHES, 1841-1843.

THE letters which follow show us Lord Palmerston out of office, enjoying the liberty and opportunity which his retirement from the Foreign Office afforded him. Parliament had been prorogued on the 7th of October, and he had taken advantage of his leisure to visit his property in Ireland and Wales. As early as the year 1825, he had joined with the late Duke of Cleveland (then Lord William Paulet) and Mr. Paxton in leasing and working a slate quarry in North Wales. For very many years it was a loss, and its final success was a striking result of his pluck and perseverance. Lord Palmerston also spent much money and trouble in constructing the harbour to which reference is made in the following letter, for the use of the fishermen on his property in Ireland.

“ Beaudesert, November 26, 1841.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ We arrived here yesterday in our way home from Ireland. We travel by easy stages, making a

course of visits in our way, and we have some more to pay before we get home. I found everything belonging to me in Ireland going on satisfactorily. My estate much improved, and the people better clad, and living in better houses than when I last saw them, twelve years ago. My harbour, which I have been obliged to enlarge lately, is nearly finished; and though it has cost more than I reckoned upon, it will now fully answer all purposes. It will be about 800 feet long, by 300 wide, and will have thirteen or fourteen feet of water at high spring tides. On the other hand, our slate quarry in Wales will, I trust, now begin to be productive, and if our expectation should be realized, it will become a very profitable concern. Thus, I trust I shall soon find myself none the poorer for being out of office, and certainly as yet I have been much the better for it in health, and much the freer and more amused in mind. I suppose that, like a horse about his stable, though now glad to have got out, I shall soon wish to get back again to my office; but that wish has not yet arisen, and I should, as far as regards myself, very much regret any change which should bring me back to my former labours for a year and a half to come. We want next summer to make a tour through Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna, and then to descend by the Tyrol into Italy, and pass the winter months there; not omitting to visit you at Naples, where I am glad to find you are likely to be left. From Dublin we went to Powerscourt for a couple of days, and drove

to see the cascade in one of the heaviest snow storms I ever remember. We came back as we went, by Liverpool, and had a smooth passage. From Liverpool we drove round the coast of North Wales, by Conway, the Menai Bridge, and Carnarvon, to our slate quarry, near Tan y Bwlch. The hills were covered with snow, which gave the country an alpine character, though it did not add to the rapidity of our progress—and certainly our speed was not that of railroads. We passed a day at Powis Castle, where we found Powis in high force. From thence we went for a day to the Leveson's, at Aldenham, near Bridgenorth, the seat of Sir John Acton, his son, now a minor; and from thence we came on here yesterday, and have to-day had a good day's shooting. Powis has improved his castle, sensibly and slowly, but he has yet a great deal to do to make it as comfortable as it is capable of being made. We go to-morrow to Hatherton's, at Teddesley, thence to the Duke of Sutherland's, at Trentham, then for a day to Melbourne, in Derbyshire, and thence to London, where we shall stay a week or ten days, and then go and settle at Broadlands till Parliament meets; and I look forward with great pleasure to hunting, shooting, and thinning plantations as in the olden time. I wish you were coming there too, but you are better employed where you are. I was lucky this year on the Turf; I had but one horse in training, and that was Iliona, and she won me about £1700 at Newmarket in one stake, and though John

Day will no doubt send me in a large bill to set against these winnings, yet a decent surplus must still remain.

I began this at Beaudesert, and finish it on the 28th at Teddesley. Anglesey gave us two days' good shooting. He is a wonderful man for his age—73 off, and rising 74—and with only one leg he rides a pony and kills everything that gets up within reach of his gun, either before or behind him.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Broadlands, January 19, 1842.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We have been spending some weeks here very agreeably, and we went for four days to Bowood, where we found a very agreeable party. Our weather has been chiefly frosty, so that I have had no hunting; and the game this year has not been abundant, so that the shooting has been less good than usual; but still we have had game enough to afford good amusement, and an excuse for exercise. But then, after what may be called an absence of ten or eleven years, one finds plenty to do in the place, and the mere marking young trees for thinning the plantations has given me many days' employment. Then come Holmes's accounts, which have necessarily fallen greatly into arrear, and which I have not yet been able to get through. The plantations have grown very much,

and many of the trees which I have put in are beginning to assume a most respectable appearance of maturity.

“As to politics, you see as much of them by the newspapers as I do, nearly. The Government is, I conceive, secure for two or three years to come, and it is better for everybody that they should remain in that time. The country will then understand what they are, and find out the difference between them and us. We shall have a little comparative repose, and shall be able to attend somewhat to our own affairs, which it is very necessary we should—at least I find it so for one. But a majority of eighty is not eaten down in a hurry, and it will take some pretty long experience of their mismanagement and narrow-mindedness to open people’s eyes. This blunder of the Government in siding with France against Espartero* on the question of etiquette is just a specimen of what may be expected from them.

“London, February 8, 1842.

“I began this the other day in the country, but being now an idle man with nothing to do, I have not had time to finish it. We came to town to go to Windsor to meet the King of Prussia, and we did nothing else for a week afterwards but meet him from house to house. His success here was beyond anything great, and he will, I trust, have carried away with him impressions of England as favourable

* He had just been proclaimed by the Cortes sole Regent of Spain.

as those which he left in England of himself. The only people who found fault with him are the Puseyites, the new Catholic sect who have sprung up in our Church, and who saw with disgust and uneasiness the arrival of a Protestant monarch who is known to wish to bring about some kind of connection between his Protestant Church and ours.

“We are now in the agony of expectation as to Peel’s measures—I say Peel’s, because he is the Government, and his colleagues are understood to have little to say upon the matter, except to determine whether they will stay in or go out. The general notion is that he means to propose to-morrow some modification of the sliding scale of corn duties, which will be too much for the agriculturist and too little for the commercial interest, but which, nevertheless, he will ultimately carry, by the support of the Liberals against the high Tories. For we shall probably begin by dividing in favour of a fixed duty against his new scale; we shall of course be beaten by a large majority, and then I presume we shall vote for his amendment, as against the law as it stands; because to negative his amendment would be to declare a preference for the present law, and that would be inconsistent with our own opinions.

“On our commercial tariff generally, and on our system of finance, it is supposed that Peel means even to outdo us. People imagine that he intends to make even a greater reduction than we had proposed on the duty on foreign sugar; but it is not supposed

that he will touch the timber duties. Other reductions of duty are also expected, and then it is thought that he will make up the deficiency by a tax upon income arising from fixed property—that is to say, not applicable to income arising from professional industry. He will find it difficult to carry such a tax, and there are many strong objections to it; and though it will no doubt produce the amount which it may be calculated to give, yet it will diminish the expenditure of private individuals in taxable articles, and thus in some degree tend to lessen the produce of the indirect taxes. But these details are not to be stated to us till after the supplies are voted. I think the Government will weaken itself by internal differences of opinion, and by the split which this will cause in their party; but I think they are strong enough to bear this, and I see no reason why they should not go well through this year—and if they do so, they may go on equally well one or two years more.

“I think that we shall pay you a visit at Naples next winter, for we talk of a tour in the autumn, and I should much like to go to Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna, and thence down to Naples. I have never seen Germany, and wish very much to see Italy again.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Parliament met on the 3rd of February, and on the

9th, in a crowded House, Sir Robert Peel unfolded his Corn-law scheme—a sliding scale.

On 14th February Lord John Russell brought forward his amendment, condemnatory of the principle of a sliding scale, and a long debate ensued, during which Lord Palmerston, in a clever speech, taunted Sir Robert Peel with the general dissatisfaction which his measure gave, testified on his own side of the House by an eloquent silence. He said two courses were open to the minister—either to have stood by the old corn laws, in which he would have been cordially supported by a majority in the House, or to have taken a bold course in changing the corn-laws, in which case he would have obtained support from other quarters.

“It is not given to man, much less to man in office, to please all parties.” He admitted that the proposed law was a mitigation of that which it was to replace, but he proceeded to show in how trifling a degree. He contended that the duty should be fixed and known. “If a moderate fixed duty were established, you would have a complete change in the trade altogether; you would have an entirely different system of transactions in the corn market. For instead of gambling transactions, you would establish a sound and advantageous trade; and instead of the merchant hurrying at every rise in price to the foreign market on the continent—for the distant markets are hardly touched—and thus at once enhancing the price of corn, you would esta-

lish a steady and well-regulated barter, which would at the same time supply the wants and open new fields for the consumption of the produce of your manufacturing industry. Under such an arrangement the merchant would make his arrangements for buying a supply of corn in those places where it was cheapest, and would bring it home at a period when he thought that it could be best disposed of, both to the country and to himself. Above all, you would extend greatly your commercial relations with the United States." . . . He contended that the natural configuration of the globe was in order that man may be dependent upon man. It is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the extension or diffusion of knowledge by the interchange of mutual benefits engendering mutual kind feelings—multiplying and confirming friendly relations. It is that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilization with one hand and peace with the other, and render mankind happier, wiser, better. Sir, this is the dispensation of Providence; this is the decree of that power which created and disposed the universe. But in the face of it, with arrogant, presumptuous folly, the dealers in restrictive duties fly, fettering the inborn energies of man, and setting up their miserable legislation instead of the great standing laws of nature."

The House divided—For Lord John Russell's amendment, 226; against it, 349. Majority for ministers, 123.

On the 25th February, in Committee of the whole House, Mr. Christopher proposed another sliding scale — duty 25s., instead of 20s. as in Government scale.

Lord Palmerston said he should vote not *with* Mr. Christopher, but *against* Sir Robert Peel. He writes the same day to his brother about the debate:

“C. T., February 25, 1842.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We are going on with our Corn Law debate, which has been dull in general, the speeches turning chiefly upon details of scales and statistical matters. Peel’s new scale will, of course, be carried, and it will be an improvement on the present law. But at all events it is the first step towards a larger change, and that is the best circumstance connected with it. The Government reckon that they shall gain £800,000 of revenue by the additional quantity of corn which will be annually imported under this new scale. I have also been told that they have found out frauds upon the Customs and Excise, the correction of which will in future add about £800,000 a year to the produce of those duties, and they further expect a general increase in all branches of the revenue, and therefore, as the deficiency will only be about two million and a half, they will trust for the present to those means to make it good, and will not now propose any new taxes. On the other hand, some people still maintain that a tax of 3 per

cent. will be proposed upon income arising from property, and not to affect income arising from professions. Such a tax would be very hateful to the bulk of the supporters of Government, and might perhaps be hard to carry. In about a fortnight or three weeks from this time we shall see what the Government really mean to do.

“The French Government have got themselves into a nice hobble about the Slave Trade Treaty. They cannot ratify without disgusting their deputies. They cannot refuse to ratify without bringing dishonour upon the Crown of France; and even by withholding their ratification they do not exempt themselves from that mutual right of search which is permanently conceded the by treaties of 1831–33. All this comes from Guizot’s pitiful spite towards me for our success in the Syrian affair.

“When we signed in July last the treaty about the Dardanelles, by which France re-entered the ‘Concert Européen,’ I asked Bourquency to sign the Slave Trade Treaty. He made many shuffling and evasive excuses for not doing so, alleging that he had no instructions or power. I desired Bulwer to ask Guizot to send him power. Guizot said that there were some forms to be gone through about the treaty before this could be done; that it would give him some days’ trouble to get those forms gone through, and that he did not think that I was entitled to expect that he should take any trouble *for me*. In other words, he intimated that he should

reserve the conclusion of this treaty as an offering to the Tories on their accession to office. Thus he delayed till the end of the year that which might have been done in July or August last; and whereas if he had signed in the summer, the ratification would have been exchanged long before the French Chambers met, and he never would have heard a word upon the subject, the delay in the signature postponed the period of ratification till after the meeting of the Chambers, and thus afforded an opportunity for cabal and intrigue. I have no doubt, however, that as soon as the French session is over the French ratification will arrive, for to withhold it altogether would be utterly disgraceful to the French Crown. The treaty was signed by St. Aulaire in December by special authority and instructions from his Government, and his Government is therefore bound in honour to ratify that which they deliberately and advisedly sanctioned. In the meanwhile our Government have shown more firmness and vigour in this matter than I gave them credit for. They followed the example we set them in 1832, about the Belgian Treaty of November 1831, by mentioning the treaty in the speech from the throne, although it had not been ratified by any of the parties; and they also followed our example in regard to the same treaty, by laying their treaty before Parliament as soon as the English ratification had been exchanged with that of any of the other contracting parties. This is, as it were, throwing

down the gauntlet of defiance to the French Government. Some think that the Americans have intrigued at Paris to prevent France from ratifying, in order that France might be free to join America if America quarrels with us about the right of ascertaining, by inspection of papers, the nationality of merchant ships at sea ; but this is a miscalculation, because France is as much bound to the principle of mutual search by the Treaty of 1831-33 as she would be by the Treaty of 1841. I have heard, and from pretty good authority, a different story, and have been told that Cass has declared at Paris that the pamphlet which he wrote and printed, and which was distributed among the deputies against the right of search, was written by him at the request of Guizot, and was revised and corrected by Guizot before it went to the press. I am afraid that (Guizot is by no means above such a petty intrigue.) But England is strong enough to brush through all such cobweb work if her Government is only firm enough, and sufficiently conscious of the power and influence of the country whose affairs they direct.

“I do not expect this session to be a long one, and I think that after spending a couple of months in the country we shall very likely start for the Continent in October.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., March 15, 1842.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“There is a storm getting up against the Income Tax, but I think Peel will carry it notwithstanding; a few days more, however, will show more fully how this will be. He will probably be obliged to make some modifications in it. The landed gentlemen are angry. Malmesbury said to me two days ago, “Peel hit us a right-hander with his Corn Law, and a hard left-hander with his Income Tax, but this measure about timber is a regular facer. My father and grandfather have not touched a stick for forty years, and now I was thinking of doing some good with my elms and firs, when down comes Peel with his free importation of Canada timber, and my trees will not be worth a farthing.” Many Tories hold the same language, and abuse Peel most vehemently. I think these measures will greatly shake the Government, though they will not this year overthrow it. But people will now begin to see that our plan of last year would have been a much better bargain for the agriculturists and landed interest than Peel’s is. He forgoes the £700,000 we should have had by foreign sugar; he gives up on Canada timber £600,000, now paid upon it, and £600,000 more which we were going to make it pay, and thus at once he loses £1,900,000, which our plan would have produced without Income Tax. Then we reckon upon £400,000 by corn, which would have made £2,300,000, and we

should only have had £200,000 more to have scraped together from some source or other to have obtained the £2,500,000 requisite to fill up the deficiency. Adieu : I have no time to write more.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ C. T., March 22, 1842.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ I send you two or three copies of my speech the other day on the Corn Laws, which was generally approved. The Government have an awful prospect before them, as to labour in getting their Corn Law, and Income Tax, and Budget through the two Houses. They will no doubt carry them all ; but it will be a most tedious operation, especially the Income Tax. It is not quite impossible that the general feeling of aversion to the Income Tax may be so strong as to cause serious embarrassment to Peel. But he has declared that if he cannot carry it he will resign ; and we should be still more embarrassed if he were to do so just now ; and therefore it is probable that somehow or other he will be allowed to carry it through. This measure, however, coupled with the rest of his scheme, will shake the attachment of a great body of his supporters, and will shorten the duration of the Tory Government. Peel himself looks harassed and careworn, and well he may ; and if his health were to fail, there is nobody else in the party who would

supply his place, even for a time. For my own part, I wish the Government to last for two or three years. Opposition gives one quite interest enough in public affairs; and I should much like to have two good years' holiday, if holiday it is for those who have to attend Parliament regularly. But indeed that is an amusement, and not a labour, for those who are out of office. The last accounts from Stephen are quite satisfactory. I fear that he had for a long time past been in the habit of eating and drinking too much, and taking exercise too little. Bacon says a man ought to make exercise a religion, and be punctual in the observance of it.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“HON. WILLIAM TEMPLE.”

Lord Palmerston also spoke in the debate arising upon a series of resolutions proposed by Mr. Wallace, as an amendment on going into Committee of Supply. The purport of them was to affirm the existence of distress, to declare that the alteration of the corn laws and the tariff, coupled with the income tax, could not afford relief, and to propose an address to the Queen not to prorogue Parliament until inquiry should have been instituted into the causes of the distress.

Lord Palmerston could not support the motion, as it was open to technical difficulties; but said Government ought not to content themselves with mere

expressions of regret and sympathy, and praises of the people's patience under suffering. Members should not go off to their grouse shooting, partridge shooting, pheasant shooting, and cock shooting (laughter) until Government had opened their views in respect to practical measures for the relief of the fearful distress that prevailed. The remedy would be found in the removal of the duties on corn and sugar. He did not expect any great increase in European commerce, but advised Government to look to North and South America (especially Brazil for sugar), to Africa, Arabia, but above all, to China and India. In India, the great measure taken by the late Government in Affghanistan had opened a wide field for British commerce.

On the 8th of July, Lord Palmerston's generous sympathy with the oppressed poor was shown again in his support of Lord Ashley's bill for restraining the employment of women and children in mines and collieries. On the third reading, he said he hoped the measure would pass into a law, without any alteration that might affect its principle; and he was convinced it would pass, if it received the cordial and sincere support of the Government in the House of Lords. In the House of Lords, however, Lord Wharncliffe announced that the Government had determined to be perfectly passive respecting the measure.

Though the general principle was affirmed, several

amendments were made in its passage through the House of Lords, which considerably altered the original plan proposed by Lord Ashley. On the House of Commons considering the Lords' amendments Lord Ashley acceded to them; for the bill, as it stood, still affirmed a great principle, though the amendments removed the security against the employment of women. Lord Palmerston taunted ministers with not having given that cordial support which Sir James Graham had promised. He would not accuse them of backing out of their intentions; but their reluctance to object to these amendments proved that there was a power greater than their own which exercised a sort of coercion over them. When the members of the present Government were in opposition they were in the habit of taunting the late Government with allowing themselves to be coerced by a portion of their supporters; but it appeared that the present ministers were subject to the same species of coercion. The late Government, however, only yielded to such pressure for the sake of forwarding the progress of improvement, while the present Cabinet were driven to abandon improvement by coercion.

Another subject that for some time occupied the attention of the House of Commons during this session was that of bribery at elections, and consequent compromises entered into by sitting members to avoid election petitions. Mr. Roebuck moved for a Select Committee to inquire into these matters. After a

debate, in which none of the ministers had spoken, Lord Palmerston taunted them for their silence, but said he could not support the motion, for he did not perceive the illegality of the alleged compromises. If an Act of Parliament were Mr. Roebuck's object, he might at once take public notoriety as a ground for it, without waiting for an investigation, and Lord Palmerston would vote for such a bill as that of Lord J. Russell in 1841, or for rendering the inquiry into bribery imperative on election committees. If anything, however, could make Lord Palmerston support the Ballot, which he opposed on principle, as tending to aggravate every existing abuse, it would be a refusal of Government to support a remedy for the evil.

Mr. Roebuck's motions, however, were negatived; but although the House of Commons thus refused to affirm Mr. Roebuck's conclusions, the investigation did not prove wholly devoid of practical result. Lord Chelsea, one of the M.P.'s for Reading, was under an obligation to vacate his seat, by acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds, within a limited time, under a pecuniary penalty of £2,000, this being one of the terms on which the petition against his return was compromised. When, however, the time arrived for carrying this stipulation into effect, an unexpected difficulty occurred—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, now made aware of the purpose for which the application was preferred, declined to grant it (the office being in his gift); and Lord Chel-

sea, who had bound himself to resign his seat, found it beyond his power to do so. On the 6th of August, Lord Palmerston brought the subject before the House by moving for "copies of any correspondence which had taken place since the 1st of July between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and any member of Parliament upon the subject of the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds."

He objected to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's refusal on two grounds. First. It was a clear and distinct understanding that if the parties implicated should make (before the Committee) full disclosure and full admission of facts, they should be completely indemnified and saved from injury. The refusal of the Chiltern Hundreds must have been considered as an inconvenience or punishment to some one—either to Lord Chelsea, or to the person who was to succeed Lord Chelsea. Lord Chelsea, moreover, would have to forfeit £2,000; and the Chancellor was violating the understanding on which the Committee had proceeded. Secondly. If, when a member of Parliament wished to retire from his seat, Government were to take upon itself to inquire into his motives, an entirely new principle would be introduced, and one that would give the Government a most inconvenient control over public men; *e.g.*, an Opposition leader might have been defeated at a general election, and another member might be willing to vacate his seat for him. Suppose, then, the Government chose to say, "We will not be par-

ties to such an arrangement; and, to prevent its being carried out, we will refuse the Chiltern Hundreds."

Mr. Goulburn (Chancellor of the Exchequer) seconded the motion, and defended his refusal, "as he felt that he was bound to consider how far, by complying with the application, he should be making himself a party to transactions which the House of Commons had declared to be of an improper character." The House agreed with him, and the motion was agreed to.

"C. T., July 18, 1842.

"MY DEAR WILLIAM,

"I was very glad to receive your two letters of the 27th and 28th of June, as it was certainly a long while since I had heard from you; but I have not myself been a much better correspondent, and have no right therefore to complain. Nothing could be better than your answer to Aberdeen, and I am very glad that you stated fairly to him the applications which the Neapolitan Government have made for the recall of other ministers: as to demands for recall, I had plenty of them when I was at the Foreign Office; and whenever an English minister did his duty faithfully and firmly in difficult circumstances, the government to which he was accredited, or some other government whose plans he thwarted, was sure to ask for his recall. My answer invariably was that we were the only judges of whom we chose to employ, and that we never permitted foreign govern-

ments to prescribe to us who we should or who we should not employ. I am not sorry, however, that Parish is associated with you in the negotiation. The chances are that the negotiation fails, or will at least not lead to our obtaining all we want; and if such should be the result, it will be quite as well for you not to have been the sole negotiator.

“Our session is drawing to an end, and will be over in about a fortnight or three weeks. The Government is divided in itself; its supporters are divided among themselves; and the Government and its supporters are at variance upon many matters. But they will all rub on together for a good long time. Peel is necessary to the party, and the party is necessary to Peel; and necessity makes strange bedfellows. The distress in the manufacturing districts is great. It arises, not from scarcity of corn, but from want of employment, and want of wages wherewith to buy corn. I do not at present foresee any early termination of this distress. The Government, it is evident, think it is exaggerated, and imagine that it is magnified in order to force them to a further alteration of the Corn Laws. There may be some truth in this; but there is still enough of real distress to give cause for serious apprehensions. If once a disturbance begins there is no saying how far it may spread, or what degree of irritation may be produced by the employment of force which will be necessary for suppressing it. The Government evidently imagine that by letting corn out of bond, if the

distress becomes worse, they can apply a remedy. But this would be good against famine, but is not so against want of employment; such single measures cannot restore permanent commerce, and that is what is wanted at present. When Parliament is up we shall go to Broadlands, and as we have no plans this year either for the Continent or for Ireland, we shall make Broadlands our head-quarters during the whole of the recess.

“The death of the Duke of Orleans is a great misfortune; for a regency which may last some years is a bad, because it is a weak, government for France. If the Duke had left no children, the case would not have been so bad; for those who knew him had not a very favourable opinion of him, and the Duke of Nemours is said to be in all respects a better man. However, it is a dreadful affliction for his family, and a calamity for France and for Europe. It seems to have been the result of over-confidence in his own activity and a forgetfulness of the different momentum belonging to different velocities. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Before the House was prorogued Lord Palmerston made a long speech, described in the last chapter, reviewing the foreign and domestic policy of the Government, and as soon as it was up he went down to pay visits to Lord Melbourne at Brocket and Lord Cowper at Panshanger.

“ C. T., September 1, 1842.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ This has been the most magnificent summer I ever remember in the whole course of my life. I never recollect so long a continuance of beautiful sunshine; and the wind having generally been east or north, the heat has never been oppressive. Some people have talked of eighty-eight or ninety in the shade, but I have a thermometer always standing out of my window which faces the park and looks south east, and has the sun upon it till twelve o'clock, and that thermometer—which is a register one—has never been up to ninety even with the benefit of the direct radiation of the sun upon it.

“ We have been for ten days at Bocket and Panshanger; Melbourne, the Beauvales, the Cowpers, the Ashleys, Milbanke, the Jocelyns, and all the Ashley and Cowper children. We are all charmed with Lady Beauvale; she is really a most amiable and pleasing person. Beauvale has made an excellent choice, and she speaks English so well that one almost forgets the only fault she has, which is the being a foreigner. We are going to-morrow to Broadlands, but we shall be obliged to return to town about the 20th. I hear a very good account of our partridges and pheasants.

“ The disturbances in the manufacturing districts are over, and the people are gradually returning to work. They must do so or starve, and I presume that in the long run they would prefer labour

to death. There are many hundred prisoners, 500 in one gaol alone (Stafford I believe), and the Government are going to send down a special commission to try them all. There are no cases of treason, all are merely sedition or rioting. Many will probably be set at liberty without being put on trial at all. Under the new sliding scale more than a million of quarters of wheat have come in in one week at 8s. or 9s. duty, and this just before harvest, and when it was least wanted. Whereas if our fixed duty had been adopted, this quantity would have been flowing in gradually at the time when it was wanted, and we should not have had the high prices which have existed. This new law will be found just as bad as the old one.

“We seem to have made a most disgraceful and disadvantageous arrangement with the Americans; but how could it be otherwise when we sent a half Yankee to conduct our negotiation? Lord Ashburton has, if possible, greater interests in America than in England. He thinks the most important thing to England, because it is the most important to himself, is peace between England and America; and to preserve that peace he would sacrifice anything and everything but his own private and personal interest. He moreover holds the opinion that the loss of Canada would be rather a gain than an injury to England; and that was the man the Government chose to negotiate a matter, the chief importance of which to us was its bearing upon the security

of Canada. It quite makes me sick to think of it.

“I fear our affairs are going ill in Affghanistan from the folly of Ellenborough. My hope was that the Cabul territory would have been recovered just about the time he arrived ; that he would have taken to himself credit for the success, would have identified himself with it, would have prided himself upon holding the recovered country, and that we should thus have gained from his vanity what could not have been got from his wisdom. I am still not without hopes that this may ultimately turn out to be. There is some difficulty in getting camels and drivers, but this is a difficulty which may surely be overcome if there be a determined will to surmount it. Auckland is looking very well, and hardly a day older than when he went. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., September 30, 1842.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Politics here are much as they were. The Tory party are indignant with Peel and the Government for having deceived them and thrown them over in every matter which the Tories thought most important ; but these same Tories will still rally round the Government whenever it is attacked, rather than have the Liberal party again in power. Sidney Herbert told me yesterday that one of the

Peers, speaking of Peel the other day at Wilton, said : ‘ If a highwayman stops me on the road and robs me, I have him apprehended, tried, and hanged, and at least I have my revenge to make amends for my loss ; but here I am robbed by Peel of far more than the highwayman would take from me, and I can get no redress.’ Our foreign affairs are getting into the most miserable state, and the country is fast falling from the position in which we had placed it. This Ashburton treaty is a most disgraceful surrender to American bully, for I cannot even give Ashburton and the Government the credit of having been outwitted. They must have known the value and extent of all the concessions they were making ; and the provoking part of the matter is, that those concessions have been made without any real necessity whatever, and instead of finally closing our account with the United States, will only be looked upon by them as a first instalment. These things, however, will afford us some matters for debate next session. The young Austrian Archduke, who was at Acre, is now here ; I saw him yesterday, and was much pleased with his manner and appearance. Adieu.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

Lord Palmerston, during the greater part of his earlier career, was no favourite of the Whig or Radical leaders. He did not belong to one of the privileged families, and his sturdy independence was

distasteful to both, while his "unaccountable apathy" to mere party politics kept him aloof from their sympathies and councils when out of office. The following letter relates, among other things, to representations supposed to have been made to some of the principal Whigs as to the mischievous tone of the articles in the *Morning Chronicle*, which was then supposed to be greatly under Lord Palmerston's influence :—

"Brocket, November 14, 1842.

"MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

"I return you, with many thanks, the inclosed letter from your brother, which is interesting.* I have no doubt that, as he says, Metternich was right glad to have got rid of us as directors of public affairs in this country. It is true that latterly, and after the end of the struggles in Portugal and Spain, he found himself in the same boat with us about Turkish affairs, and was, on the whole, pleased with our proceedings; but he never felt confidence in us; he never knew what we might be at next, and he

* Lord William Russell, from Vienna, November 1, 1842:—"We have quite lost the position taken for us by the late Ministry. The low tone taken by Peel, the concession in America, the vacillation in India, and the distress in England, have led to the belief that we are in a declining state. However, there is no fear of war. Public opinion is against it, and no government is strong enough to fly in the face of public opinion. The French alone could carry public opinion with them (in making war), yet they got such a lesson from Palmerston that they will not try it again. I said at the time, and told the King of Prussia, that Palmerston had secured to us ten years of peace, and so it will turn out if the Tories do not mar the matter."

could never forget that the principles of political liberty which form the creed of our party, are tenets the practical application of which in any country on the Continent of Europe he dreads as a danger to Austria. He looked upon us as tamed wild beasts, whose natural waywardness might at any time break out again.

“There can be no doubt that England does not now enjoy the same consideration and exercise the same influence abroad as in our time, for besides the low, submissive tone taken on all foreign questions by our Government at home, it is impossible that the great change which has been made in our diplomatic agents at the principal Courts of Europe should not have a most injurious effect. We had at all those Courts men of talent, energy, and enlightened views. The present Government has substituted for those agents a set of dotards and fools. Those who have not lost their understanding by age or infirmity have only escaped that loss by never having had any understanding to lose. Stratford Canning is an exception. He is certainly clever and active.

“What you say of E—— confirms what I had heard of his underminings for some time past. But indeed it is no exception from his natural course. Cabal and intrigue are as natural to him as party spirit (or, as O’Connell said, eating and drinking) to the Corporation of Dublin. I believe that all parties in this country, and everywhere else, have been beset by intriguers; and therefore one ought not to regard

as a peculiar grievance that which is a general dispensation. E——, however, has invariably bestowed upon me perhaps more than my proper share of his sapping and mining activity. What Wm. Russell says of Russia is equally true of him, ‘He is always working like a mole underground, and no one knows where he will come up next.’ He set out in the days of Durham’s ambition to endeavour to turn me out of the Foreign Office, in order to get Durham in; and well punished he was for his treachery, by the bitter disappointment which he felt at its failure. He was furious, and has never forgiven me, and despite his wish to be cautious, he even now, from time to time, exhales his wrath, by swearing on his honour that I shall never return to that office in the event of our party regaining power. I am not, however, much moved to anger by this hostility; because, thank Heaven, I know I am a stronger man than he is; and he knows that too, which does not make him love me the better.

“It seems, however, according to what you say, that some of our party, Radicals and old Whigs, are disposed to take their views of our foreign relations from E——; God help them, say I. But they have a right to choose for themselves; only I must claim for myself equal liberty of judgment and of action. And I happen to think I understand our foreign relations better than he does. I conceive that, without any inordinate vanity, I may imagine myself to possess as much good sense and judgment as he does;

and if for ten important years you set one to employ the whole of his time in gossiping and caballing in clubs and drawing-rooms and country-houses, and if you put the other to toil night and day in the practical and detailed administration of our foreign relations, the chances, I take it, will be, that the opinion of the latter upon our foreign affairs will be of more value than that of the former. Nor have events run counter to this theory. For upon every great matter which we have had to deal with in our foreign relations while we were in office, he was strongly against me, and was always trying to get up a cabal to thwart me ; and upon every one of those matters, whether in regard to Belgium, Portugal, Spain, India, Syria, or any other, he was proved by the result to have been wrong. Now one of his most approved methods of cabal is to write away every day to all the leading members of the Whig party, to instil into them or to extract from them opinions adverse to what he thinks my opinions to be. He practised this method very extensively, and with much momentary success, about the Syrian question. But several of those whom he misled for a time acknowledged afterwards that they had been wrong ; and you cannot, I am sure, forget the very handsome and manly declaration to that effect which Spencer made in the House of Lords in 1841, when seconding the Address.

“ Now, as I have no respect whatever for E——’s opinions when coming straight from himself, I am

not prepared to defer to them a bit the more because they come echoed back from others. But if those others choose to follow him in these matters, let them do it. I pretend to guide nobody, except as far as reasons which I may give in Parliament, and arguments which I may there employ, may influence the minds of fair and impartial men. All that I claim for myself is freedom of action according to the best judgment I can form of the interests of my country ; and that freedom I shall always exercise as long as it may please Heaven to continue to me my faculties, whether Radicals or old Whigs are pleased or displeased with the line I may think it my duty to take. If I am right, I am quite sure that my arguments and reasonings will have weight in the country, even if not in the House of Commons. If I am wrong, I shall be proved to be so, and perhaps then I may alter my own opinions.

“I quite agree with you that we ought not, as an Opposition, to provoke or irritate either America or France, or indeed any other foreign power ; but, on the other hand, I do not see why we should truckle to them. It seems to me that the straightforward course of an honest opposition is to look to the real interests of the country in respect of its relations with foreign powers, and to uphold those interests, whether by so doing it may support or attack the Government of the day. If the Government is doing its duty in this respect, it ought not to be thwarted by the Opposition ; if it is neglecting or

violating its duty, it ought to be rebuked or admonished.

“With regard to the *Chronicle*, I am inclined to doubt the expediency of endeavouring to exercise too minute a control over a paper whose general tendencies are right. A horse sometimes goes the safer for having his head given to him. But I do not recollect having seen any articles in it about France to which fair objection could be taken; and while all the French papers are teeming every day with abuse of England, it cannot be surprising if now and then a newspaper writer’s blood should boil over, and his indignation should vent itself in some few remarks; nor, I confess, does it appear to me that such little occasional raps on the knuckles, even if they were given, would have an injurious effect upon our international relations.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“LORD JOHN RUSSELL.”

“Brockton, December 6, 1842.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We have been here, except for a few days, ever since the 23rd of October, attending upon Melbourne, who, however, is now so well that it is only to keep him company till he is able to receive people as usual, that we are now staying here, and I trust that in ten days’ time we shall be able to get back to Broadlands. A variety of untoward circumstances have kept us away from it the whole year, so that

since January last I have been there only a week at Easter, a fortnight in September, and a week the other day. This has been a great privation to me, after having been kept away from it so much by public duties during the preceding ten years. But Lady Palmerston's company has been a great comfort to Melbourne during his illness, and of course all other considerations gave way to this.

“ December 8.

“ Since I wrote the above I have received your letter of the 22nd, and am glad to hear you are making some progress in the commercial negotiation, though you do not at present see your way to an arrangement about tariffs. I never had much hope of success on the latter point. You say the King of Naples is liberally disposed, and takes enlightened views as to commercial matters; I hope this may be the case; but if this is so, how happens it that being a despotic, and within his own dominions an all-powerful sovereign, he is unable to carry his own views and opinions into practical effect? It is strange that people should not everywhere understand that commerce is a transaction which must benefit both parties, or it would cease to be carried on. No nation would continue to carry on commerce with another solely for the benefit of that other; both parties must find their account in the transaction, for if one party lost by it, that party would, of course, soon leave off a losing game.

“ Our successes in India and China have produced a great effect in England, and must, I conclude, have done the same on the Continent. They show, that if now and then we suffer checks when our affairs happen to fall into the hands of weak and incapable men, as seems to have been the case last year in Affghanistan, and as was to a certain degree the case at first in China, yet as soon as we put able and vigorous leaders at the head of our concerns, the energy of Englishmen and the power of England overbear all resistance and infallibly conduct us to triumph and success. Ellenborough, however, seems to have had but little share in the merit attaching to these events. As to India, all the troops lately employed in Affghanistan had been got together and sent thither by Auckland before he left India; Ellenborough had ordered them to retreat, and it was owing to the remonstrances of the generals that they were allowed to go forward and accomplish what they have achieved. Ellenborough has, however, again stepped in, and has thrown away the fruits of victory by ordering an immediate retreat, without effecting any political arrangement with the country which we have thus re-conquered. Moreover, he would have left the prisoners to their fate, as clearly appears by his various proclamations. First, by his order to retreat in May, next by his order of September for an immediate retreat, before he knew that the prisoners had been released. As to China, all that has been done has been accomplished by the

three men, Pottinger, Parker, and Gough, whom we appointed and sent out ; has been the consequence of specific instructions given by us as to the nature of the operations to be carried on ; has been effected by troops and ships ordered by us to the station, or prepared by us for that service ; and has been concluded according to the particular conditions which, as far back as February 1840, we instructed our plenipotentiary to obtain. I shall take good care, when Parliament meets, to put all this publicly on record, in order that there may be no mistake in future on the subject.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

He had an opportunity on the 1st of March, on Mr. Roebuck's motion for a committee to inquire into the causes of the war in Afghanistan, publicly to vindicate the conduct of the late Government. He said : “The honourable and learned gentleman did not intend, I am sure, to have done that which I think he has done, that is, to speak in a complimentary manner of myself as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He stated a fact, and he coupled that fact with an epithet. In doing this, he certainly did not mean to be complimentary ; but I throw the epithet aside, and look only to the statement of the fact, which I consider to be complimentary to any one in the situation which I had the honour to hold. The honourable and learned gentleman accused me

of a 'mischievous and restless activity' in the discharge of my official duties. Now, with regard to the term 'mischievous,' I must take the liberty of saying that the honourable and learned gentleman appears to me to have peculiar notions of what is, and what is not, mischievous; and, therefore, he will pardon me for saying, that his opinion that my official conduct was mischievous will not disturb the conviction of my mind that it was of a contrary tendency. That there was 'activity,' the honourable and learned gentleman declares; and we have his unequivocal testimony to the fact. I thank him for that compliment. He says, that my 'restless activity encircled the globe.' The sun never sets upon the interests of this country; and the individual whose duty it is to watch over the foreign relations of this country would not be worthy of his position if his activity was not commensurate with the extensive range of the great interests that require his attention. That was my position; the honourable and learned gentleman admits my activity, and I thank him.

"I shall not, after the admirable way in which my noble friend* near me has touched on the general course of the foreign policy of the late ministry, proceed to any defence of myself, from the attacks which have been made upon me. I only say, that the policy of which I was the organ was, as my noble friend has stated, the policy of the Government of which I was a member. The labour, indeed, and

* Lord John Russell.

toil, and restless activity attributed to me, belonged to the head of the department, and so fell to my share. But with respect to that policy, I will say, that in the ten years during which we held the seals of office, it was eminently successful. I say, Sir (and I am glad to inform those honourable gentlemen, who will, no doubt, be greatly delighted at hearing this piece of historical information), that our foreign policy was eminently successful; that we engaged in many great and important transactions; that those transactions were invariably brought to a conclusion according to the views of the British Government; that although at many periods there was great danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe, yet we—endowed, as the honourable and learned gentleman has sneeringly said, with miraculous power of running near the brink of danger, but never into it—succeeded in maintaining the peace of Europe; and though we have not been so fortunate as to meet with the approbation of gentlemen opposite who are so loud in their cheers, yet I greatly suspect, that if the result of our policy had been the reverse of what it was—if we had supported and established despotism in Spain and Portugal—(Cries of ‘Oh, oh!’ from the ministerial benches)—if we had employed a military force in crushing the independence of the Belgian people—though we might have been ashamed of the results of the policy, we should have been greeted by the acclamations of those who now heap on us their vituperation and censure.”

“C. T., May 29, 1843.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I and my lady are both very well and prosperous, and we enjoy being out of office greatly, though this last year we have been much shackled by being obliged to spend a great deal of time at Bocket in consequence of Melbourne’s illness. He is, however, getting rapidly well, and I hope with care and patience will in a few months be as well as he was before his attack, or rather, I should say, better than he was then.

“Public affairs are in a strange state. Scotland is in a flame about the Church question; Ireland is in confusion about repeal; and all England is in a fury about the education clauses in the Factory Bill and the provisions of the Canada Corn Bill. The present Government thought they should have no trouble in managing the country, and they can neither keep the country quiet nor carry their measures through Parliament; and yet it is not the Reform Bill that stands in their way, for they have overwhelming majorities in both Houses. Their difficulties arise from their own want of dexterity in governing, or, as their friends complain, from their preference of dexterity to plain dealing. Still, though the Tories are furious and abuse Peel up and down and in all directions, they go on voting for him whenever there is any question that can involve the stability of the Government; and they are too wise to sacrifice their interests as a party to their personal

resentments. Accordingly, I expect no change at present, nor for some time to come. It will take two or three years more to alter the feelings of the country, and I should be very sorry to have my holidays cut short before that time. We think of making an excursion into Germany this summer, but I fear that our time would not be sufficient to enable us to get down to Italy. If we can manage Munich, Vienna, and Berlin, it will be the utmost we shall accomplish, and I am not sure that we shall cross the Channel at all. But I should like to see Germany, the greater part of which would be quite new to me. I have not been at Munich since we passed through it on our return from Italy in our boyhood.

“I have been busy reading books on agriculture and horticulture, and trying to acquire some knowledge on those matters, which are now become sciences. If one does not know something of them oneself, one can never hope to get one’s estate or garden well managed. I have let all my farms at Broadlands that were out of lease, and tolerably well, in spite of the badness of the times. I had a shocking set of bad tenants, but have got rid of most of them, and have brought in people with skill and capital. Our new gardener does pretty well, and understands the theory of his department, but he is a Methodist and goes preaching about the country every Sunday, and I fear he thinks too much of his sermons to be very successful in his garden. I must try to put a stop to his preaching. Iliona, the mare I had last year, is to run at Ascot, and may perhaps

win me a good stake there ; that is to say, about £400. But Lord G. Bentinck puts all such trifling matters into the shade ; he has a horse to run for the Derby next week, and if the horse wins, Lord George is to win upwards of sixty thousand pounds ; how much he is to lose if his horse is beat I know not, but I presume he has hedged so as not to be a great sufferer even in that case.

“London has been thin and dull this year. Income tax, and distress, and political discontent, have kept many people out of town, and those who are here have given fewer balls and parties and dinners than usual. The Queen’s confinement has tended to the same effect, but she means, it is said, to give some smart balls and parties in July for the marriage of Princess Augusta of Cambridge.

“All people who come from Naples speak highly in praise of your kindness and hospitality.

“I suppose you have found the Neapolitans hard to deal with in the matter of treaty. I remember foretelling this to you, and saying that it was a lucky thing for you that Parish was associated with you to treat, because if you had been alone there would not have been wanting people to endeavour to throw the blame of failure upon you ; whereas now, even the Tories will have their mouths stopped by the name of Parish. Let me hear from you.

“My dear William,

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“The Hon. WILLIAM TEMPLE.”

About this time much discussion took place in the House of Commons on Lord Ashley's proposal for limiting the hours of labour in factories. Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, had two years before, with a generous sympathy for the welfare of the poor, supported Lord Ashley's bill for restraining the employment of women and children in mines and collieries, and he did not fail to enter warmly into this further question of protection to the unprotected. The following dramatic extract is taken from a 'History of Factory Legislation,' by Mr. Philip Grant, of Manchester, one of the delegates from the factory workers :—

“It was now getting on for two o'clock, and, with cheerful hearts, the pair made off for Carlton Gardens, the then residence of Lord Palmerston. On arriving in front of the house, they observed the carriage standing at the door, and Lady Palmerston promenading the balcony. On presenting themselves at the door, the footman, in answer to their inquiry, said, 'His Lordship was not at home.' Their reply was, 'Not at home to visitors.' The man smiled, and was leaving, but they persisted. It was the last opportunity they might have before the division; and Palmerston was of great importance to their clients. They urged the footman to take in their cards, but he refused, saying, 'It is more than my place is worth.' Whilst the altercation was going on, the noble lord happened to be passing from his dressing-room to the dining-room, and seeing the two at the door, inquired who and what they were. The servant at once handed him their cards, and returned, smiling, bringing with him the gladful news, 'His Lordship will see you.' They were at once ushered into the large dining-room, at that time so much famed for the even-

ing parties of Lady Palmerston, and the munificent dinners given by his Lordship. They found the member for Tiverton in excellent temper, and as lively as a cricket. Without ceremony the subject was entered into, detailing some of the hardships to which the factory children were subject. The statements at first appeared to puzzle the noble viscount, and after a short pause the veteran statesman said, 'Oh, the work of the children cannot be so hard as you represent it, as I am led to understand the machinery does all the work without the aid of the children, attention to the spindles only being required.' To carry conviction to a mind so strongly impressed with the ease and comfort of factory labour for a moment staggered the deputation, when a lucky expedient at once occurred to the writer, who, seeing a couple of large lounging chairs upon castors, called them to the rescue. Removing them into the centre of the large room, they were made to perform the operation of the 'spinning mule,' Mr. Haworth being placed, as it were, at the 'wheel handle,' and with arm and knee pushing them back to their destination, or to what is technically called 'the roller-beam,' whilst the writer performed the duties of the piecer, trotting from one side of the room to the other, following up the carriage, leaning over the imaginary advancing 'faller,' and piecing up the supposed broken ends. To complete the explanation of the mule, and to show the part the engine performed, they were about to explain by what power the carriage was caused to advance slowly, whilst the 'stretch' was being made, and the yarn twisted. The noble lord at once caught the idea, and ringing the bell, the footman was ordered into the room, and directed to run up one of the chairs slowly to its appointed place (or what is called the end of the stretch), whilst the noble lord catching hold of the other chair performed a similar office. Thus the imaginary spinning and piecing was carried on for several minutes. Lady Palmerston, who by this time had become impatient for her drive before dinner, entered the room, and appeared no little sur-

prised to see her banqueting-room turned into a spinning-factory. Her Ladyship, however, appeared to enjoy the illustration, good-humouredly remarking, 'I am glad to see your Lordship has betaken yourself to work at last.' The veteran statesman, who appeared a little fatigued by performing the duties of 'Old Ned' (the engine), with a significant look and shrug of the shoulders, said, 'Surely this must be an exaggeration of the labour of factory workers.' Mr. Haworth, who had come fresh from the wheel-handle in Bolton, and bearing indelible marks of the severity of his daily toil, exhibited the large 'segs' upon his hands, at the same time pulling up his trousers, he said, 'Look at my knee, my lord,' pointing to the hard substance produced by 'putting up the carriage.' This victory over the mind of the great statesman appeared complete; the illustration given had deeply impressed his Lordship's mind, and he hastily exclaimed, 'If what you have shown me, and what you have stated, be a fair illustration of the labour of factory-people, and the statements you have made be a fair detail of the hardships to which they are subject, I can no longer withhold my support from your cause, nor can I resist the belief that the children, as stated by Lord Ashley, have to walk or trot twenty-five or thirty miles a day. I will speak with Lord Ashley on the points you have this day raised, and if your story be even half corroborated by his Lordship, you may rely upon my support.' A promise which that great man ever afterwards kept, and on all occasions when the subject was before Parliament, he diligently performed by speaking and voting in favour of the 'poor factory child.'

CHAPTER IV.

LETTERS AND SPEECHES, 1843-45.

“ Broadlands, December 25, 1843.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ It is an age since I have either written to you or heard from you, and I cannot choose a better day than this to break this long silence and to send you from this house the warmest wishes that this returning season may often find you in the enjoyment of that health and happiness which, I trust, are now making your Christmas agreeable to you.

“ I wish you were here ; we have a very pleasant party—Melbourne, the Beauvales, the Cowpers, the Jocelyns, William and Spencer Cowper, and James Howard, who was my private secretary at the Foreign Office, and we expect Lady Ashley for a day or two to-morrow.

Our weather is remarkably mild, the thermometer ranging from 40 to 50, and we have had

very little rain for a long time. Hunting and shooting go on successfully, though the latter amusement not quite so well as usual, as the breed of birds has been scanty this year. But in hunting we have had several good runs, and we have generally a choice between the foxhounds, Assheton Smith's and a pack kept at Hursley by two sons of Cockburn, the Dean of York, the Castor and Pollux of this country. We have splendid fields with the Forest hounds under Sheddon, their new master; seldom less than fourteen or fifteen red-coats, and often more. Martin is in good force, and I have a new keeper on the Yew Tree side who will get me up some game there; his name, Cross, indicates that he is not to be trifled with by the poachers. We have begun to make a flower garden on the lawn to the south of the house, towards the greenhouse, and you can imagine how it adds to the general cheerfulness of its appearance. Our new little gardener, who has now been with us a year and a half, is a clever, intelligent fellow, and when we have taught him the management of fruit and flowers, and how to plant trees, he will, I doubt not, prove an excellent gardener.

“As to public affairs, the newspapers tell you all I could say, and more into the bargain. . . . The great event which people are all waiting for is O'Connell's trial. Most men think that there will be evidence enough to convict him, and Catholic jurymen enough to acquit him, or, at all events, that there will be no

verdict against him. If that be the result, the Government will be in a difficulty, because agitation will begin again, and they might as well hope to get a slice of the moon as laws of greater stringency. I think Peel will hardly venture to propose a grant of money as a provision for the Catholic priests, because a great many of his own supporters would be against it, and the Dissenters, as a body, including the Scotch Church, mean to set themselves against it. Perhaps he would be able to carry such a measure by the aid of the most devoted of his own friends, and of the most liberal and independent of ours, but I doubt his being bold enough to face such difficulties. The most likely thing is that he will propose some measure similar to that which I suggested last year, by which the Statute of Mortmain would be so far modified as to allow private individuals to endow Catholic parishes with land for glebe not exceeding for each parish a stated amount, perhaps thirty or forty acres. I believe that the Catholic priests would like this better than a provision in money from the state, because such glebes would leave them more independent of the Government, and would give them a more secure provision than a grant of money, which might at any time be diminished or withdrawn by the same authority by which it would be granted. On the other hand, the Dissenters and high Protestants could make less objection to such an arrangement. Still, a direct payment by the State would be the best plan; and though the

Catholic bishops have objected to it, Peel ought to meet their objection by producing the consent and approbation of the Pope. Good-bye; the dressing gong has sounded, but I will write to you soon again.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON”

“Broadlands, January 5, 1844.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We are staying on here till the meeting of Parliament. Melbourne left us yesterday; George Bowles is here, remarkably well. He came yesterday from Heron Court, where he says that game is so scarce that four of them walked for nearly four hours without once firing off their guns. Here, we are better off, though nothing to boast of. The season has been remarkably mild, and I have had a great deal of hunting, and some very good runs both with the Forest hounds and with Assheton Smith, who hunts the country above Stockbridge.

“The approaching session will be interesting and animated. O’Connell’s trial comes on, and it is said that the evidence to be given on behalf of the Crown will disclose a systematic organization or combination calculated to lead to the separation of the two countries. I have no doubt that the priesthood are the moving power, and that they think, and with some reason, that, if the Union was dissolved, they should become the Established Church;

and however they may deny such a wish, it is impossible to suppose that they do not entertain it. If O'Connell should not be convicted, it is probable that the Government will prepare some more stringent law, and if that proposal is accompanied by measures of conciliation, it will most likely be carried. In fact, the Government have so great a majority in both Houses, that, as far as voting will carry a bill through Parliament, they are certain of success. But then, the experience they had about the Irish Arms Bill, last year, must have shown them that a compact body of opponents, though few in number, may, by debating every sentence and word of a bill, and by dividing upon every debate, so obstruct the progress of a bill through Parliament that a whole session may be scarcely long enough for carrying through one measure; and of course the Irish members on our side, and all the English and Scotch Radicals, would sit from morn till eve, and from eve till dewy morn, to prevent any more stringent law being enacted. The line which the members of the late Government would take in such a case would depend upon the nature of the measures taken as a whole.

“I hear that our revenue is increasing, and that the excise, in particular, is becoming more productive. This was to be looked for; a tolerably good harvest this year and the last must at length begin to tell; and foreign trade begins to revive, and must of course bring with it renewed employment for the

manufacturers and increased means of consuming excisable articles.

“It would be a great thing for Peel if he was able to announce, before the end of this session, an intention of allowing the income tax to expire with the three years for which it has been exacted. As to our foreign affairs, they go on as usual: we yield to every foreign state and power all they ask, and then make it our boast that they are all in good humour with us. This is an easy way of making friends, but, in the end, a somewhat costly one. Adieu, my dear William; many happy new years to you.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., April 27, 1844.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“... We are all much surprised at the recall of Ellenborough by the Court of Directors. It is a great slap on the face to the Government. People say that the immediate cause has been some insolent letters written by Ellenborough to the directors in reply to certain remonstrances made by them to him on his various proceedings. It remains to be seen whether he will have had time to conquer the Punjaub before his recall will reach him. If not, he will never forgive the directors for having deprived him of his expected laurels. I imagine that the

directors disliked the heavy expense attending his military measures.

“The Government is certainly going down fast in public opinion and esteem, but the country is not yet ripe for a change. As to legislation, they are not able to do much in that line, and this session is likely to be as barren in that respect as former ones have been.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“Broadlands, May 30, 1844.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“The way in which the House of Commons went to the right about upon the ten hours question took us all by surprise. I thought the Government would carry their twelve hours, because the moment they declared to their friends they should go out if beat it was quite sure that beat they would not be; but nobody expected they would have had such a large majority. However, its excess beyond their usual amount was owing to a great number of our people voting with them.*

“This result, however, shows that there is no likelihood of any change of government at present,

* Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, had introduced a twelve hours' Factory Bill. Lord Ashley had carried an amendment in Committee by a majority of 9 in a house of 349 members, virtually affirming the principle of ten hours. The Government then withdrew the Bill and introduced a new one, when the House of Commons reversed its former decision by voting for twelve hours by a majority of 138.

and, to say the truth, I am much inclined to think that even if Peel were to resign, and we were to dissolve, the result of a general election would not give us at present a majority sufficient to enable us to carry the Government on, even if it did not leave us in a minority. There will not be much done in the way of legislation this year; but the new arrangement about the Bank is a good one, and will tend to make the value of money steady, which is a great advantage. As to O'Connell, I suppose he will at last be brought up for judgment, and, if so, he will infallibly be imprisoned. Probably, after some months' confinement, the state of his health will afford sufficient reason for letting him out again. The Government have carried their point; they have put down agitation.

“London, 5 June, 1844. I did not finish this the other day at Broadlands. You see O'Connell has been sentenced and imprisoned. The writ of error will be brought to a hearing in the House of Lords as soon as possible: the case in favour of O'Connell must be strong indeed if the decision is given in his favour. The court will certainly be against him. The Emperor of Russia is arrived, but stays here only till Sunday evening. Monday is fixed for the annual ball in aid of the Poles. That may decide him to go on Sunday; but probably not, for Clanricarde offered him a ball on that night, which he declined on the ground that he had settled to go on Sunday. I should not be surprised, however, if he was to stay

till Tuesday. The Queen had only one day's notice of his coming, though it has not been talked of. He has come at an unlucky time. The Queen is near her confinement, and the Court still in the deepest mourning for Albert's father; so that there is nothing brilliant to look at, and little that is gay to do. They are now all at Ascot, and he was on the course to-day, and much cheered by the people, and he has given a large sum, they say £500, to be run for annually at Ascot races. I hope he will be pleased at his reception. It is important that he should go away with a favourable impression of England. He is powerful, and can do us an ill turn or a good turn upon many occasions, according as he is ill or well-disposed towards us: and if we can purchase his good-will by civility, without any sacrifice of national interest, it would be folly not to do so. I daresay, however, he will be very well received, for his person and carriage and manners are known to be prepossessing. I have not yet seen him. He arrived on Saturday night, and I went off on Monday to Windsor. I believe the Queen will give him a ball on Friday.

“I send you ‘Coningsby,’ D’Israeli’s novel, well worth reading, and admirably written. The characters are, many of them, perfect portraits. You will recognise Croker in Rigby, Lord Hertford in Menmouth, Lowther in Eskdale, Irving in Ormsby, Madame Zichy in Lucretia, but not Lady Strachan in Countess Colonna, though the character is evi-

dently meant to fill her place in the family party. Sidonia is, I presume, meant as a sort of type of the author himself, and Henry Sidney is Lord John Manners, the Duke of Rutland's second son, Beaumanoir being clearly Belvoir.

“Bowles, you see, is Lord of the Admiralty, and M.P. for Launceston.* I am very glad of this, and it is highly complimentary to him, as it can only be for his own merit that he has been so chosen while there are so many staunch political partizans who have claims upon the Government. I am also glad on public grounds, for I am sure that he will be of great use at the Admiralty; and the Prince de Joinville has taught us by his pamphlet that we ought not to relax in our endeavours to put our Navy upon the best possible footing.

“Lady P. and I think of making a short excursion this year to the Continent, but we shall not have time to cross the Alps; we may possibly get as far as Vienna, but that is doubtful. Our session, however, will probably not last longer than the beginning of August. Louis Philippe is to be here in September. Good-bye.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.

“I think Hardinge a good selection for India; but this choice shows that the Government think

* The late Admiral Sir William Bowles, who married one of Lord Palmerston's sisters.

the military question the most pressing and important, and that military skill is more likely to be required than civil knowledge.”

Before the House broke up, Lord Palmerston brought before it the general policy of the Aberdeen Government in its relations with foreign powers. The implied contrast between the careful thought for the interests of foreign administrations on the part of the Tories and the sole care for the interests of England on the part of the Whigs was very effective in debate.

“I am anxious to call the attention of the House and the Government to the inconvenient consequences which have arisen from the system of policy pursued by Her Majesty’s present advisers—a system which appears to be one of resistance at home and of concession abroad. When the right honourable gentlemen opposite came into office, they adopted a course which they probably thought would lead to a state of tranquillity abroad, and secure to them the good-will of foreign Governments. I doubted at the time the success of that line of policy, and affairs which have arisen since must have convinced ministers, as they have convinced the country, that it is not a system calculated to advance the interests or to uphold the honour of the country. They commenced by making a great concession to the United States, in the hope, no doubt, that by such means they would restore perfect harmony

between the Governments of the two countries ; but the result was, that after the cession of the greater portion of the disputed territory, another question arose, namely, that concerning the Oregon territory, which promised to lead to as many difficulties as that respecting the north-east boundary. Then there were the questions of the right of visit and the annexation of Texas to the United States, which were of great importance to the interests of England, and which yet remained to be resolved. In like manner with regard to France ; the policy thus adopted towards that country was of the same character and tendencies. In Spain, shortly after their accession to office, there occurred questions of considerable difficulty, the embarrassments connected with which were fomented by French intrigue, and ministers, out of deference to the French Government, counselled the Regent of Spain to submit to great indignity in the question which had arisen with M. Salvandy, the French Ambassador, and also in the affair regarding the conduct of M. Lesseps, the French Consul at Barcelona. The consequence of this was that the Spanish nation thought that the Regent had lost the moral support of this country, and his enemies were allowed to prevail. He fell, and British interests, in my opinion, were sacrificed in his downfall. In Otaheite a question arose as to whether France should accept the protectorate of the island, which had been refused by England—which, indeed, had been twice refused by England ; but, be

it always remembered, that the former Government who had declined the offer, had assured the Government of Tahiti that England would always give it the support of her good offices in any difference which might arise between Tahiti and any foreign power. When that question presented itself, Her Majesty's Government again acquiesced, and that acquiescence in French aggression led that power to take another step which may not be productive of very serious consequences. No doubt that line of policy was undertaken for the purpose of obtaining temporary quiet, and without foresight or regard as to what the eventual consequences might be, putting aside all care for the ultimate sacrifices which must be made in following such a course. Ministers, in fact, appear to shape their policy, not with reference to the great interests of their own country, but from a consideration of the effect which their course may produce upon the position of foreign Governments. It may very well be a desirable object, and one worthy of consideration, that a particular individual should continue in the administration of affairs in another country, but it is too much that, from regard to that object, the interests of this country should be sacrificed, and that every demand of foreign powers should be acceded to. The same course, indeed, was pursued by the party opposite on former occasions. In 1810, the French were allowed to obtain possession of Algeria. The right honourable gentlemen opposite were then in office; they remained

quiescent, in order that the ministry of Prince Polignac might be maintained in power, and we are all aware of the consequences which have arisen from their acquiescence on that occasion. No doubt it is for the interest of this country, it is for the interest of France herself, as well as for the interests of the world, that M. Guizot should remain Minister of France, but the Government of this country has no right to sacrifice either the honour or the interests of England in order to continue M. Guizot in power.

* * * * *

“It seems to me that the system of purchasing temporary security by lasting sacrifices, and of placing the interests of foreign ministers above those of this country, can never be other than a fatal one to the country, or to the Administration which pursues such a course. Since the accession to office of the right honourable gentlemen opposite, no one can have failed to observe that there has been a great diminution of British influence and consideration in every foreign country. Influence abroad is to be maintained only by the operation of one or other of two principles—hope and fear. We ought to teach the weaker powers to hope that they will receive the support of this country in their time of danger. Powerful countries should be taught to fear that they will be resisted by England in any unjust acts, either towards ourselves or towards those who are bound in ties of amity with us. But after the abandonment of Spain by her Majesty’s Government, what weak

power can retain any hope of moral support or of effective aid from this country? And after we have ceded and given up the disputed territory in North America, what powerful country can entertain any apprehension of our resistance to encroachment? Although her Majesty's late advisers had sometimes the misfortune to be in a minority in the House of Commons, still in their foreign policy they had the good fortune always to be in the majority on the Belgian negotiation. When the Dutch were untractable, we had the assistance of France and Belgium, and we controlled the Dutch; when afterwards the Belgians grew unreasonable, we had the support of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and we restrained the Belgians. In Portugal, when we wished to establish the constitution and Donna Maria, we had France and Spain on our side, and we carried our point. In Spain, when we were desirous of upholding Isabella and liberty, we had France and Portugal with us, and we carried our point. When we desired to effect an arrangement in the Levant, which we thought essential to the peace of Europe, as well as to the interests of England, we had Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey with us, and that arrangement was carried into execution. In all these great questions, her Majesty's late Government had the concurrence and co-operation of all those powers which were nearest to the scene of operation, and were, from their local position, the best informed upon the subject, the most able to co-

operate, and the most interested in the policy pursued. What may be the interest of, the present Government I know not; but while it is exercised upon the system I have pointed out, and where important and prominent interests are sacrificed for the temporary convenience of foreign Governments, it can never be exercised in a manner which can be satisfactory to this country. I am most anxious that the House, the country, and the Government itself should direct their attention to the results which have already arisen from the mistaken system on which Ministers set out, and which they appear still to pursue. It is a system, of all others, the most likely to lead the country into serious difficulties, and which has already produced occurrences which may involve us in war."

In the summer, Lord and Lady Palmerston went for the tour on the Continent referred to above.

" Wiesbaden, August 29, 1844.

" MY DEAR WILLIAM,

" We left London on the 13th of this month, spent a day or two at Brussels, and came on to this place by Ems, where we found the Beauvales. He had been plagued a little by gout, and so we brought him on here, and have been here now a week. We shall start again the beginning of next week for Berlin, and thence continue the route we originally intended by Dresden, Prague, Vienna, and Saltzburg

to Munich. We were very graciously received at Brussels by King Leopold and his Queen, with whom we dined one day at Lachen, and the next day at their palace in Brussels. Railways much expedite travelling in these parts, and we got to Ems in three days and a half actual travelling from London. We started by half-past three train one afternoon to Dover, went the next day to Brussels; in one day from thence to Cologne, and in another day from thence to Ems. We have here the Lansdownes, Clarendons, Pollens, Orfords, Gosford, and several other English. In fact, every German bath becomes an English colony in summer, and the accommodation has in consequence become everywhere much better and much dearer also. Our weather at first was rainy, but has lately been dry, though cold. The crops hereabouts, as well as in England, are good, but the grapes have not ripened, and there will be little or no wine made this autumn. This concerns us English but little, for we have almost all of us nearly left off drinking wine, and the greatest toppers are those who take half-a-dozen glasses. The great question which occupies all minds is that of peace or war between England and France; but I cannot believe that there will be war. Upon the affairs of Morocco the two Governments have no doubt come to a fixed agreement; and I conclude that we have agreed to let the French cannonade some of the Moorish seaports, and defeat some of the Moorish armies, on the condition that France shall

not even for a moment occupy any portion whatever of the Morocco territory. This matter is of such great and paramount importance to our interests that no government, not even the present one, could give way one inch about it; and however much the French may covet Morocco, they would not risk all the inconveniences and certain evils of a war with England for the chance of making acquisition in Morocco. It would indeed be grasping at the shadow and losing the substance, because the result of a war with us undertaken by France for the conquest of Morocco would infallibly be that they would lose Algiers, to say nothing of their ships, their colonies, and their commerce. Tahiti is a question more likely to lead to a rupture, because there is pique on both sides, and angry feeling, and we want France not merely to abstain from something, as in the case of Morocco, but actually to do something, and that something is to make an apology. However, an apology they must and will make, because they are quite and entirely in the wrong, and because our Government has pledged itself in Parliament to obtain one, and they cannot fly from their pledge. The French try to represent Pritchard as an intriguing agitator, but he is no such thing. I saw a good deal of him three years ago, in the winter of '41-42, when he was at home, and on a visit to Reynolds, the Dissenting minister at Romsey, and found him a quiet, well-conditioned, sensible man, but endowed with much firmness and energy of character, without which a

man is wholly unfit to go as missionary to convert the savages and cannibals of the Pacific Islands. Even so long ago as then he warned Aberdeen of what the French were about, and foretold all the results that have since happened ; but Aberdeen was deaf to his warning, and could not be persuaded to think that the French would do anything anywhere but what the English Government wished. In the meanwhile, there is an extreme degree of irritation against France spreading far and wide in the public mind in England. In proportion as people had persuaded themselves that the French liked us, and wished to be friends with us, in the same proportion are all men indignant at the undisguised hostility expressed by the French towards us, and at their systematic endeavours to undermine our interests in every quarter of the globe. We, the late Government, knew all this very well ever since 1835, when France began to change her policy towards England, and turned it from conciliation and friendship into enmity and aggression ; but in our time, excepting always the Syrian affair in 1840-41, this undisguised war was carried on by them out of the public view ; and the good people of England were induced to believe that the burst of enmity against us in 1840-41 was occasioned by some discourteous proceeding of ours about the treaty of July 1840. But now that the English people see that they have had for nearly three years a Government who have been constantly yielding on every point to France, and

almost licking the dust before their French ally, and now that, in spite of all this, France becomes every day more encroaching, more overbearing, more insulting, and more hostile, even the quietest and most peaceful among us are beginning to look forward to a war with France as an event which no prudence on our part can long prevent, and for which we ought to lose no time in making ourselves fully prepared. In such a war the Government would receive the unanimous support of the whole nation, and any new burthens that might become necessary for the purpose would be cheerfully borne. However, I expect that the present dispute will be settled; but what has passed will leave a feeling of resentment in the mind of Peel, and in that of the nation at large, which it will require a long course of good conduct on the part of France to efface. Peel feels things deeply, and does not forgive quickly, and what he forgives least easily is an attack upon his dignity; and this Tahiti affair is a question of dignity more than of national interest. Neuman, the Austrian, is going to marry Lady Augusta Somerset, daughter of the present Duke of Beaufort, and he is to have the mission to Florence. There is a talk of the Queen going to Ireland in September, after her confinement, and it is said that O'Connell is to be let out, to smooth the way for her visit. I suppose that now that the Government have been compelled to look at a war with France as a possible contingency, they think they may as well turn over a new leaf in

regard to Ireland, and try what conciliation will do for them in that country. I wish we could extend our tour, so as to get to see you at Naples, but we have not time for this; another year, perhaps, we may accomplish it. I should like of all things to spend a winter in Italy.

“Ever yours affectionately,
“PALMERSTON.”

A short extract from Lord Palmerston's Diary during this tour may not be uninteresting:—

“*Ems, Tuesday, August 20.*—Duchatel,* who was in the same inn, called. He said they had 100,000 men in Algeria, who cost them 100 millions of francs. Marseilles was strongly for occupation; but some of the adjoining French provinces not so, as they feared that corn and other produce from Algeria would come in and undersell them. The whole expense of the French army is about 12 millions sterling for 350,000 men. A contest is going on between the Government and the clergy about education in the higher colleges, which the clergy want to be confided to the Jesuits. The Government is in advance of public opinion on this and on other subjects. The Radical party in France are against the trade and freedom of education, and against the principle of carrying on railways and other public works by individual enterprize. They

* One of Louis Philippe's ministers.

wish such works to be carried on by the Government. They inherit these doctrines from the Convention. The clergy have little influence over public opinion. They are ill-paid and chiefly drawn from the lower classes of society. Their education is bad and scanty. The subdivision of land goes on rapidly. The peasantry buy little bits whenever they have saved up money; and many people buy land from citizens and others who have lived beyond their income and got into distress, and they then make considerable profit by selling the land out in small lots. Open field cultivation is preferred, on account of the smallness of the lots, and because then there is no loss of land by fences. This subdivision renders land chiefly corn land, and cattle are imported in large quantities from Germany.

“*Frankfort, Saturday, 21.*—Found General Jacqueminot in the railway carriage—an agreeable, intelligent man, Commander of the National Guard at Paris, and one of the Deputies for the capital. In course of conversation he said that no French lawyer had succeeded in Parliament: Berryer has nothing but a good voice; his speeches contain little matter; he works himself up to such excitement that he has sometimes been obliged to be helped out of the Chamber after a speech of much exertion. Odillon Barrot is so dull that people all leave the House when he gets up. His speeches are all the same; he has spoken nearly the same speech every year for the last seven or eight years. If any

man had Berryer's voice and manner, with the matter of Thiers or Guizot, he would be irresistible.

"This account of Berryer does not tally with what Peel told me when I met him at the Derby Station last winter, when I was coming from meeting the Queen at Chatsworth, and he was going to meet her at Belvoir. I told him I had made acquaintance with Berryer, who passed a couple of hours at Broadlands on his way up from Portsmouth, and whom I afterwards met at dinner at Lady Holland's. It was during his visit to England to see Henri V., with regard to which he had afterwards to defend himself in the Chamber, and broke down in doing so. Peel said he once asked Tallyrand who was the best French speaker whom he had ever heard. Talleyrand said the best decidedly was Mirabeau, and the next best Berryer.

"Dined in the evening at Anselm Rothschild's. He was very anxious to know everybody's opinion whether there would be peace or war between England and France. I told him that the English were very angry, the French in the wrong, and that an arrangement would be sure to be made. He laboured to prove that such a war would hurt us, and only benefit Germany. I said that if we acted on such calculations there would never be war; that no nation in its senses would go to war with a strong power in hopes of gaining by it; that with us it is a question of wounded honour, for which reparation is necessary. I told him that Lady Palmer-

ston had yesterday received a letter from Lady Holland, fond of France and hating war, who said that everybody in England were making up their minds to war, and were prepared to endure even a 10 per cent. income tax—adding, what infatuation! what wickedness! I said she lived with Whigs and Liberals, and the peace party; and if such were their feelings, what must be those of the rest of the country? I said that the French Government, if they wanted peace with England, had made three great faults: First, in Spain, they had attacked our political influence; this few people understood, and, therefore, comparatively few cared about it. Next, they attacked our commerce by their operations in Africa and elsewhere; this was understood by all the manufacturing and commercial people, and caused extensive irritation. Lastly, they attacked our religion through our missionaries in the Pacific; this was deeply felt by all the middle classes and by all the Dissenters, and produced a burst of furious indignation. The French ought to have known that religion is a thing not to be meddled with with impunity. I said that, however this may end—and no doubt it will be settled amicably somehow—the deep exasperation which has been excited in England towards France will not soon or easily subside.

“Fiquelmont was there. I complimented him on the great moral support which Austria had given us in regard to the Treaty of July 1840. He was aware that such support helped us, not only abroad

but at home. He argued, erroneously, I think, that Russia cannot really desire to extend herself to the south, because her real strength, military and commercial, lies to the north. The bulk of her nobles are in the north, and the distance from Petersburg to New York is not much greater than from Odessa to Gibraltar, and there her commerce is only half-way to its market; besides which, the expense of transport in Southern Russia is so great that to carry grain more than 250 versts costs the whole value of the grain. All this is specious, but utterly fallacious. All governments, and specially arbitrary ones, covet extension of territory for political more than economical considerations, and to say that Russia does not covet extension to the south, is to deny the records of history.

“*Berlin, Wednesday, September 9th.*—Went at ten to call on Cornelius, the fresco painter, who introduced me to the German Minister of Instruction, a very intelligent man. Cornelius said that the English school of painting had a style which, though full of merit in itself, is not adapted to fresco, and is, indeed, the very reverse; that we excel in the management of colours, and in chiaro-oscuro, and in density of effect, while fresco requires simplicity, grandeur, correct outline, and effect, to be produced by conception and composition. In short, he implied, though he did not say it, that which is true, that our painters are too fond of running before they have learnt to walk, and do not bestow thought

enough upon their works, which are more the works of their hands than of their heads. He said that to form a good school of fresco painters is a work of time. He particularly urged that in executing frescoes each artist should have the whole of a side of a room, so that there might be unity of conception, style, and manner in that which is seen at the same time.

“He showed me a magnificent design, which he is making for a fresco decoration of the interior of a camposanto which the King is going to build in the great square, on the site of a church which is to be pulled down. The subject is an illustration of the leading points of the Old and New Testaments. The execution of the work will take him, as he says, the rest of his life.

“Mr. Bruggeman, the Minister of Instruction, walked out with me, and in our walk said that in Prussia national education is entirely directed by the Government, who do not permit any interference of the clergy, and that this is a fundamental principle. They find schools of Protestants and Catholics mixed do not answer, the parents being always fearful that their children will in such schools be brought over to the opposite creed. That, in general, the schools are wholly Catholic or wholly Protestant, and that in each religious instruction is given by the clergymen of the respective creeds. Everybody in Prussia is obliged to go to school, and if the children do not go the parents are fined. But, in general, they are anxious for education; and thus all the common

people can read and write and know the rudiments of arithmetic.*

“ Wiesbaden, September 11, 1844.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ Here we are still regularly *waterlogged*, for the waters have brought out divers pains and aches, and have given me a touch of gout, though a very slight one. We are off, however, positively to-morrow. We shall be in about six days at Dresden; stay there three to see it; then go up to Berlin by railway; stay there three or four days. Then go down through Dresden to Prague, and thence to Vienna, which, I suppose, we shall reach in about ten days after we leave Berlin, making due allowances for stoppages to see sights in our way. At Vienna we shall remain about a week, and then go on by Saltzburg to Munich. We have the Lansdownes and Beauvales still here, with Wm. Bathurst, Trench, and others.

“ So at last our differences with France are amicably settled, but I do not think that Guizot will like the passage on this subject in the Queen’s speech. The speech says that the events therein mentioned, which must be those at Tahiti, threatened for a moment to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries, but that the justice and moderation of the two Governments have averted that calamity. This is as much as to say that the French committed

* Thirty years have passed since this was written, and yet the question here is still, How soon will it be possible to say the same of England?

an outrage; that we demanded redress; that they refused to give it; that we threatened war, and that then satisfaction was afforded us. Peel says in his speech that the matter has been settled in a manner satisfactory to both parties, but that, as far as depends upon him, neither country shall know one word about the matter till our Parliament meets again in February next. The ending of the O'Connell trial has surprised us all; but the man the most surprised is Chief Justice Tindal, who, having given the opinion of the majority of the judges in the House of Lords, thought the matter settled, and set off the same night for his summer excursion. Upon arriving at Frankfort the day before yesterday he met Bellenden Kerr, one of our commissioners for digesting the criminal law, who immediately made an experiment on his legal digestion by telling him the decision of the House of Lords. Tindal could hardly believe it possible. I agree with the *Times* that it would only be fair by O'Connell to allow him to stay in prison a few days longer to consider what he is to do next. He will be in a considerable puzzle. Monster meetings are out of the question. To call a volunteer parliament in Dublin, as he announced his intention of doing last year, would be dangerous; to do nothing would be wholly unbecoming a great liberator who has just been himself liberated. He will be in the condition described by—

‘What to avoid does no great knowledge need,
But what to follow is a task indeed.’

But the Government have announced some very liberal intentions about Ireland, and O'Connell may tell the Irish to wait to see how these intentions are carried out, and to employ themselves in the meanwhile in a liberal payment of the O'Connell and repeal rent.

“I like very much what I have hitherto seen of the German character; the people are civil and obliging, good-natured and independent. There does not seem to be a single fence of any kind from one end of this duchy to the other, and anybody might take anything if they had any inclination to do so. They must be honest towards each other, though they do cheat travellers out of kreutzers when they can do so with success. We have had lately beautiful weather, and the thermometer at 78 in the shade. They hope that they may yet have a tolerable vintage. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

In the following letter, Lord Palmerston, with remarkable sagacity, describes the awakened mind of Prussia and foretells her coming history.

“Dresden, October 13, 1844.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We arrived here the day before yesterday from Berlin, having performed the journey in one day by means of railway, starting at half-past seven

in the morning and arriving here at half-past seven in the evening. We stayed ten days at Berlin, which was longer than we intended; but the people there were so civil and kind to us, and we had so many invitations, that it was difficult for us to get away. We dined with the King, the Prince of Prussia, Prince Charles, and Bulow, and with several others; and nothing could be more courteous than the royal family were. They are really a very remarkable family, and would be distinguished persons in any rank of life. The King is a man of great acquirements, much natural talent, and enlightened views; and there can be no doubt that under his reign Prussia will make great and rapid advance in improvement of every kind. The greater part of the nobility in Prussia spend most of the year on their estates, and do not live much at Berlin. The King makes up for this by surrounding himself with men of science, literature, and art, and Prussia is accordingly making great progress in intellectual development. The late King endeavoured to keep everything stationary and stagnant; the present King is all for improvement. He was a great patron of Shinkel, the architect, and is himself full of taste in that way, and he is going to pull down an old ugly church in the great square before the old palace, and to build in its stead a camposanto for the royal family, to be ornamented in the inside by frescoes, for which Cornelius is making a magnificent design. They have already completed a very fine composition in fresco

in the colonnade of the Picture Museum, the design by Shinkel, the architect, and the execution by some good painters working under the direction of Cornelius, who has been brought back to Berlin by the King, and permanently fixed in his service.

“ Nature has not been bountiful to Prussia, at least to the district round Berlin, as regards soil, and perhaps climate ; but she has been more liberal as to mental endowments, and one cannot visit the country without being struck with the great intellectual activity which shows itself in all classes. There is scarcely a man in the country who cannot read and write. In short, Prussia is taking the lead in German civilization ; and as Austria has gone to sleep, and will be long before she wakes, Prussia has a fine career open to her for many years to come. One is the more struck with the activity of the people in these parts of Germany in intellectual development because they are so far behind in most of the mechanical arts connected with the habits of domestic life. In a country where the winters are very severe there is not such a thing as a window-shutter to be seen ; doors and windows never shut, locks are such as were made in England a century and a half ago, and all things of this kind are still a hundred years behind what exists now with us. Then, to be sure, their palaces are magnificent ; but that is characteristic of imperfect civilization : the middle ages and half-civilized countries have combined splendid palaces with comfortless habitations

for private individuals; not, however, that the German houses are uncomfortable, for, on the contrary, we have met everywhere with very good inns. We spent yesterday in taking a hasty view of the splendid Picture Gallery here, and in seeing the Green Chamber, as it is called, and the wonderful collection of carved cups, gold and silver vases, &c., and precious stones of all kinds and sizes. We dine to-day with the King at Pilnitz, and remain here to-morrow and Tuesday; and I think we shall then persevere in our original plan, and push on by Prague to Vienna, and return home by Munich, Nurnberg, Ratisbon, and Cologne. We had at one time given Vienna up, but the weather has grown fine, and we have both shaken off the bad effects of the Wiesbaden waters, and being now so near Vienna, we feel tempted to give an additional fortnight for the completion of our original scheme. I shall be very glad to make acquaintance with Prince Metternich, and one shall of course see him more in his natural state and position at Vienna than at Johannisberg. If you write to me, you might direct to *Poste Restante*, Cologne, but only for a week after you receive this, and then, as usual, to London, where we shall be in the first ten days of November. If we do all we intend, we shall have made a tolerably complete tour of Germany, and a very interesting tour it is. They are making such progress in railways that English people will in future become better acquainted than hitherto with Germany.

“ At Berlin I met several diplomatists who claimed acquaintance with you as former colleagues, and spoke of you with great regard, and the Princes of Prussia, as well as the King, inquired very kindly after you.

“ 14th October. We had a very agreeable dinner yesterday at Pilnitz; all the royal family were there, and they were extremely civil and gracious. The Picture Gallery here contains nearly 2,000 pictures; many, of course, of little value, but many first-rate. They are ill-arranged, and in very bad order, and many much damaged for want of hot-water pipes in winter to keep the rooms dry. Lady P. desires her best love to you.

“ Yours affectionately,

“ PALMERSTON.”

“ Bocket, November 10, 1844.

“ MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“ We arrived safe and sound in London on Monday last, the 4th, after a cold and tedious journey from Prague by Leipzig, Frankfort, Cologne, Lille, and Calais. We had, however, a good passage over to Dover, though we had to embark at three in the morning, having got to Calais at half-past seven the preceding evening through sleet and snow all the way from Lille.

“ The Belgian railways certainly shorten one's journeys, but the arrangements upon them are so

inconvenient, and involve so many stoppages and such frequent changes from one set of carriages to another, that one is tempted to suppose that the government, or those who have the management, were afraid that they had done too much for the convenience of travellers, and determined to make the railways as inconvenient as the nature of things would allow.

“Here we have found much milder weather than on the Continent, and I am confirmed in a long-entertained opinion that there are few climates in Europe which, taken for the year round, are better than our own.

“There is nothing much going on in regard to public news, except that Ellenborough is to have the Admiralty, and it is said that Haddington will go to the India Board instead of Ripon. I am glad of Ellenborough’s appointment; it will be doubly advantageous. First, it will give us an efficient navy; and, secondly, it will render the Government unpopular. It is lamentable to think how low our naval force in commission had been reduced, at the moment when we were at the verge of a quarrel with France about Tahiti. If we had really come to a rupture, the French might have struck some very awkward blow before we could have been prepared to resist them.

“We are going to town to-morrow, and to Broadlands the end of the week; and we shall remain there quietly till Parliament meets. I see the

Augsburg Gazette has a stupid story about my having lectured the Turkish minister at Berlin about the means of defending Constantinople, and of his having sent off a messenger with the advice I had given. There is not a word of truth in it. I never met Talaat Effendi except at dinners and evening parties, and our talk was entirely ordinary topics.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

In the debate on the Address at the opening of the Session of 1845, Lord Palmerston spoke on the Tahiti question and the treaties conceding the right of search, which had been concluded under his auspices. He owned that as to the Pritchard affair, there was no great ground for the country to complain as things turned out at last, although if we had had a stout frigate or two on the station, they would have passed in a manner more decorous; but as to the Commission appointed to examine the treaties of 1841, he felt it necessary to say something. “To appoint a Commission to inquire whether the right of search is essential for the suppression of the slave trade, is just about as rational as appointing a Commission to inquire whether two and two make four, or whether they make anything else. I know that some projects have been spoken of as substitutes for it; that we could have, for example, a foreign naval officer to cruise in our cruisers, and that there should be a British officer on board every French cruiser; and

then, I suppose, if it is to be done for one Power it must be done for another; so that there would be a perfect little Noah's ark sailing about—naval officers by pairs in these slave-trade cruisers! The idea is perfectly absurd, and any man who intends seriously to propose such measures as that means nothing less than to get rid of the treaty altogether.”

The great Parliamentary controversy of the session, however, was not a foreign but a domestic question, namely, the proposal of Sir Robert Peel to increase the grant of public money to the Roman Catholic College of Maynooth. Lord Palmerston voted for the bill; and the following letter addressed to one of his constituents explains his reason for so doing:—

“C. T., April 12, 1845.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I received yesterday morning the letter which was signed by yourself and several others of my constituents, requesting me not to vote in favour of the Maynooth Bill. I am sure you and the other persons who have signed, as well as others who, if there had been further time, would have signed that letter, will believe me when I say that it must at all times give me great pain to find myself differing on an important public question with friends whom I so highly esteem, and unable, consistently with my sense of paramount public duty, to comply with any request which they may convey to me. But I look upon the matter in question as involving

considerations so important in a national point of view, that there is but one course which I can conscientiously pursue in regard to it.

“As the matter will be amply discussed in Parliament before the debate ends, I will not trespass upon your time by stating in detail all the arguments and reasons which may be adduced in favour of the vote which I shall give, seeing that you will find those reasons and arguments fully stated and explained in the speeches which have been and will be made in support of the bill. But I will shortly say that it seems to me that the measure may be regarded in two points of view. First, as affecting spiritual, and secondly, as bearing upon temporal interests.

“Now in regard to the first point of view, it is alleged by the opponents of the measure that a grant of money to Maynooth tends to encourage the propagation of the religious errors of the Catholic Church, and thus is injurious to the spiritual interests of the Catholics, whom it may confirm in those errors.

“Now, first of all, this is an objection resting, not upon principle but upon degree, as applicable to the present measure, because the principle of affording pecuniary aid to Maynooth has been sanctioned and carried into practice for the last fifty years by the Parliaments of Ireland before the Union, and by the Parliament of the United Kingdom since the Union. The first, an exclusively Protestant Legislature up to the end of its existence, and the second equally so

up to the year 1829. The only question, therefore, now to be determined is, whether the sum allotted for this purpose is to be £9,000 a year or £26,000. But I fear that resistance to the bill upon this spiritual ground seems to have too much affinity to that most objectionable doctrine of the Catholic Church, held by the more ignorant, but disavowed by the more enlightened Catholics, that none can look with hope to an hereafter but those whose religious opinions shall in this world conform to a particular and prescribed creed. For if we were of opinion that the errors of the Catholic belief are fatal to future hopes, then indeed we might perhaps determine that it is better for the Irish people to be left in the utter darkness of complete religious ignorance than to be led into paths which must bring them to certain destruction.

“But I presume that no Protestant holds such an exclusive and uncharitable doctrine, and however important the spiritual errors of the Roman Church may be, I must venture to think that the points to which those errors relate are of infinitely less importance than the great and fundamental truths in regard to which both Catholics and Protestants agree. But still we who are Protestants think certain doctrines of the Catholics erroneous, and so thinking, we cannot wish to propagate an erroneous belief. But I do not consider this measure as calculated to do so. You will not have one Catholic priest the more or the less in Ireland whether this bill passes

or is rejected, but the Irish priests will be better educated and more enlightened if it passes, and more ignorant and narrow-minded if it is rejected : and observation and experience show that the Catholic religion may be much modified by instruction and knowledge ; that the most ignorant Catholic nations are the most bigoted, and that the most enlightened are the most charitable and tolerant.

“ Thus it is that while in Spain and some parts of Italy Protestants are still from time to time exposed to persecution, in Austria the Government, in some of its provinces, endows the Protestant ministers of Protestant parishes, and in Belgium the Catholic Congress votes in the annual budget stipends for Protestant chaplains at several Belgian cities where British subjects are in the habit of residing. Therefore I am of opinion that by affording to the Irish priests a better education, we shall lay the ground for an abatement of the superstitious bigotry which is at present too prevalent among the lower classes of the Irish people ; and this, you may depend upon it, is the only way in which it is possible to work any change in the present religious condition of the Irish nation.

“ There is no use in entertaining delusive expectations and in aiming at impossibilities. To proselytize the Irish people and to convert them to Protestantism, is in the existing state of things impossible. Our only choice is between leaving six millions of men in comparative ignorance, and in consequent bigotry

and superstition, or endeavouring to enlighten them, and at least to make them good Catholics if we cannot make them Protestants; and in making this choice we must not forget, as some men in their zeal seem to do, that Roman Catholics are Christians.

“Now as to the second point, namely, the bearing of the bill upon temporal interests. I can hardly conceive how any person who has attentively considered the state of public affairs can, in this respect, entertain a doubt of the propriety of the measure. For, first, let us consider its effect upon the Catholic Church in Ireland, viewed as a temporal and political organization, and without reference to the spiritual considerations which I have already discussed. We can neither deny nor put an end to the existence of that organization; we cannot prevent the Catholic priesthood from exercising an immense influence over six millions of the Irish people; but we may, by showing a kindly feeling and a liberal spirit, enlist that influence as an active auxiliary in the cause of good order and of submission to law; or we may, by harshness, by repulsion, and by a display of hostile feeling, render that influence at least motionless for good, if not occasionally active for evil. I cannot hesitate between those alternatives. But in the next place, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that a most mischievous and dangerous opinion has of late been extensively propagated in Ireland, that the English feel no kindness for or sympathy with the Irish; that

we look upon them as conquered serfs ; and that we are on all occasions ready to trample on their rights, and to insult and persecute their religion. They who think that a separation between the two countries would be fatal to the British empire, and that a civil war for the prevention of that separation would be a calamity less great only than the separation itself, must feel, as I do, the greatest anxiety to assist in carrying any proper measure which can tend to undeceive the Irish as to the true feelings of England towards them, and which may have the effect of cementing those ties which I trust may long, for the benefit of mankind, bind the people of the two islands together. I think this Maynooth Bill is well calculated to produce this effect ; and on that account, as well as for the other reasons which I have mentioned, I feel it my duty to vote for it. In fact, the rejection of this bill would do more to forward the cause of repeal in Ireland than all the monster meetings for which O'Connell was brought to trial.

“Such is a short outline of the general arguments in favour of the Maynooth Bill ; but as to myself in particular, I have in former sessions of Parliament repeatedly urged the Government to increase the grant to Maynooth, and to place that institution upon a more becoming footing, and I am sure you will admit that it would be impossible for me now to turn round upon the Government, and, after having reproved them for their omissions, withhold from them my support, when at last they are proposing to do

the very thing which I so often have urged upon them.

“In conclusion, perhaps you will permit me to say that it is a source of much regret and pain to the Liberal party in the House of Commons to see the Dissenters on this occasion making common cause with, and unintentionally furthering, the schemes of that party who have invariably been the enemies of civil and religious liberty, and who, in this instance, have conceived a hope that, by the aid of the Dissenting Body, they may be able to expel from the Government the small infusion of liberality which it contains, and to reconstruct an Administration more entirely imbued with the bigotry and prejudice of the old Tory school.

“My dear Sir,

“Yours very faithfully,

“PALMERSTON.

“THE REV. W.-H. HEADECOURCK.”

“C. T., February 12, 1845.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Our session has begun piano, and is likely to go on so, excepting always the little civil war which will arise between Peel and some of his supporters about Irish education and his increased grant for Maynooth, and his new colleges at Cork and Belfast. Gladstone’s resignation seems only a temporary retirement.* He will support Peel’s Irish measures out

* Mr. Gladstone had resigned on the Maynooth question.

of office, which he thinks he can do more decently than in office, and then, when the session is over, Ripon will probably retire into private life, and Gladstone will go to the Board of Control.

“Sidney Herbert is an acquisition to the Cabinet, and I think higher of Lincoln* than people in general do. Knatchbull certainly goes out, and is live lumber thrown overboard. On the whole, I think Peel strengthening, because he is liberalizing, his Government. If he would but shift Aberdeen to any other less important office, and put to the Foreign Office some man of more spirit, energy, and sagacity, it would be a great gain for the country, but that seems now hopeless.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., March 16, 1845.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“I send you a circular from the Welsh Slate Company. We have, I believe, finally settled our loan, and I trust we shall get our affairs into good order, and possibly in 1847 we may be able to make a dividend. The rage for railways is in our favour, because railways create station-houses, and station-houses beget villages, and little towns are springing up everywhere upon the lines of railways. The number of schemes this year for railways amounted to about 240; more than half of these will be thrown

* Afterwards Duke of Newcastle.

over for the present, but as many will probably spring up again next year. The Irish are suddenly gone railway mad, and forget agitation for repeal in their speculations in shares, and, wonderful to say, Irish capital comes forth in great abundance to provide means for their adventures. There is to be one line from Dublin to Enniskillen, perhaps another from Dublin to Longford, and in all probability one from Enniskillen to Sligo by Ballyshannon, Bundoran, and Mullaghmore. This would be a grand thing for my little harbour at Mullaghmore, and for Sligo also; but Sligo is sure to have a railway either from Enniskillen or from Longford, and probably will have one from each of those towns.

“We have had the most severe winter, at least as to duration, that I ever remember. The frost began in the early part of November, and it has gone on more or less, and on and off, till now. Four nights ago the thermometer was down at 13° , even upon the window-sill of this house, and I daresay it would have been four or five degrees lower if quite in the open and away from any house. To-day we have a decent fall of snow of two or three inches deep, and the wind north-east, with no immediate prospect of change, but, on the contrary, the barometer rising.

“Reventlow told me yesterday that the Sound is frozen hard, and that they go over the ice to Sweden, and that there is a halfway inn established on the ice, and that they have not had such cold weather in

Denmark for thirty years : but it did not begin there till February, so we are likely to have it here fresh and fresh from them.

“The Government here are as strong as ever, in spite of the undisguised discontent of many of their followers ; but these people fear us more than they hate Peel, and they know that by throwing him out to bring us in they would, in all matters of trade, monopoly, and bigotry, fall from the frying-pan into the fire, and so they abuse him with all their might, and vote for him steadily whenever they are really wanted.

“Miles is going to make another sham fight on Tuesday about agricultural protection, but of course it will lead to nothing.

“We cannot here make out whether Louis Philippe means Guizot to stand or to fall : he will do whichever of the two his master may determine ; and it seems of little importance to us which event takes place. Guizot is just as unfriendly to us in his heart as every other Frenchman is, and he is driven by the opposition to give vent to his hostile feelings oftener and more strongly than perhaps other men might do. Louis Philippe wants the Queen to visit him at Paris this next summer, and offers to return the visit with his Queen the year after. He says that in the present state of the relations between the two countries the sovereigns ought to meet every year. The Queen, however, must go to Ireland this year, but she might take Paris afterwards if it was

thought desirable and safe for her to do so. All this, however, you need not mention unless you hear it from other quarters. Sidney Herbert's first speech was praised, his second was thought not good. I happened not to hear either, but no doubt he will, with practice, make a very good speaker, and the Tories look upon him as the future leader of their party, either in office or in opposition.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., August 8, 1845.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“Our session is at last at an end, in fact at about the usual time. It has been one of business. Several good measures have been passed : the Maynooth Bill, the Irish Colleges Bill, the Bill for better care of Lunatics, the Bills taking off the glass duty and the duty off 340 small articles. Provision has also been made, though scantily, for increasing the defences of our dockyards, and beginning harbours of refuge. Most of these measures have been, at one time or another, suggested by us, and this will continue to be the state of things, that our measures will be carried into execution by our opponents. Well, if we can do good in this manner, we are content, and I do not from present appearances see any great likelihood of our being able to do good in any other way ; for, to judge of the result of a General Election by what happens from day to day, when single seats become

vacant, we should not gain a majority by a dissolution, whenever it might happen; though probably Peel's majority may then be brought down from a hundred to fifty. I am not sure that I should like that state of things so well. Now that his majority is overwhelming, and any attempt to oust him hopeless, we, who are the sober part of the Opposition, are at liberty to support him when he proposes good measures, and to leave our violent partisans when they make bad motions; but when numbers approach nearer to equality, the whole party will become more factious, and the leaders will find more difficulty in holding a straight course. The Parliament might last till July 1848, and will probably go on till August 1847; that is to say, for two sessions longer.

“The Queen embarks to-morrow afternoon, as soon as she has taken her fine clothes off, after proroguing Parliament. She will, no doubt, enjoy her tour of all things. The Ministers wanted her to appoint a Council of Regency, but she would not, I believe, because Cambridge must have been at the head of it, and probably she thought he would be making a parade of himself in her absence, and also she did not like there to be any Regency of which Prince Albert was not a member. Cases may arise which would render the want of a Council of Regency inconvenient. ✓

“There was one in 1821, when George IV. went to Hanover: in fact, the only precedent for not

having one is the visit of Henry VIII. to the Field of Gold, to meet Francis of France.

“I think there will be some changes in the Government before the next session. Gladstone will probably come back into office. The Government feel the want of him in the House of Commons.

“Bickers* is about to retire on a farm, and I have found an intelligent man, who has been recommended to me by Lord Spencer, as a successor. This will be an improvement, for Bickers, though honest and sensible, is not quick or brilliant, and was brought up in days when reading and writing were not considered to be indispensable accomplishments. We have an excellent gardener, and if we get an equally good bailiff we shall be well set up. Your *protégé* Persico begged and prayed that I would sit, or rather stand, to him for a bust. I have done so, not without a good deal of inconvenience, just as I was about to leave town and had all sorts of things to do: I believe he has made a good one. He is a clever man and a good artist.

“Lady P. and I have been remarkably well all this year, and though Wiesbaden made us ill at the time, perhaps it may have done us good in the end. Lord Caledon, our landlord, is going to marry Lady Jane Grimstone, but he has not yet decided whether he will turn us out of our house or not. I imagine, however, that he will do so. There is another house

* His bailiff.

on this terrace, not quite so good as this, to be had, and if obliged to flit, we shall probably take that.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. T., September 6, 1845.

“MY DEAR WILLIAM,

“We are here in London for a day or two on our way to Ireland, having taken the Tiverton races in the way from Broadlands here: at those same races, the wind being cold from the north-east, both Lady P. and I contrived to catch bad colds, which have detained us in London these last few days, but we start on Monday quite recovered.

We shall be about a month in Ireland, and on our way back I shall visit our slate quarry, which is going on well. We are gradually paying off our heavy debt, and in two years from this time I hope we shall be thinking of some sort of dividend. Our summer by the almanack has been autumn by the feelings; no hot weather, August resembling October; but the crops here have ripened all the same, for there has been plenty of sun for them, and they care not much about east wind. On the whole, we shall have a plentiful harvest. In some places in England the potatoes have been blighted, but in Ireland they have been abundant and good. The manufacturing districts are in great work, thanks to India and China, and in spite of all hostile tariffs in Europe, and the country in general is in a flourishing

condition. The only ground for uneasiness is the multiplication of railway schemes ; there cannot be money for them all, and there must be some failures by-and-by.

“ Sir John Easthope, member for Leicester, and proprietor of the *Morning Chronicle* told me the other day that he and some other parties are in treaty with the Neapolitan Government for making a railway in the Neapolitan territory, and he requested me to authorize you (which I can safely do) to say, if you should be asked about him, that he and the parties with whom he is acting are persons of substance and integrity, and able and willing to make good any engagement which they may enter into.

“ Easthope is a most honourable man ; an excellent man of business, and rich. He has the merit of having carried through the Southampton Railway, having taken it up at a moment when the original planners were on the point of giving it up in despair. Whatever he undertakes he will do well, but he will expect to be dealt with in good faith, and that all promises made to him shall be kept, which perhaps may not always suit the Government of Naples.

“ Our Government is at last beginning to think that, in spite of all the friendly professions of France, it is as well that we should be able to defend ourselves, and they are going to fortify our dockyards. I believe that next year they will bring forward some plan for organizing a Militia force ; and they are turning their attention in good earnest to the steam

navy. ‘*Fidarsi e bene, ma non fidarsi e meglio,*’ ought to be our maxim in regard to France. She is preparing most assiduously the means of invading us, and it is not enough for us to rely upon her assurances that she has no present intention of making use of those means. Adieu.

“Yours affectionately,

“PALMERSTON.”

Lord Palmerston did not take much part in the excited discussions on the Corn Laws, which occupied the early part of the Session of 1846.

The Corn Law Bill passed the House of Lords the very same night on which Sir Robert Peel’s Government were defeated in the House of Commons on their Bill for the Protection of Life in Ireland. The work for which the existence of the Administration had been prolonged for another year had thus been accomplished, and nothing remained for them but to resign. Accordingly, on the 29th of June, Sir Robert Peel in a memorable speech took leave of the country. In the course of his remarks he affirmed his opinion that there ought to be a complete equality of civil, municipal, and political rights between Great Britain and Ireland, so that no one on comparing Ireland and its franchises with Great Britain and its franchise should be at liberty to say that a different rule was established in the two countries. He also incidentally mentioned, that on that very day news had reached him that the Oregon Boundary question had been

satisfactorily settled by the adoption of the 49th parallel of latitude.

Lord Palmerston, addressing the House, said that he thought that Sir Robert Peel had shown a proper deference to the House in thus bowing to its opinion, and that he had stated very correctly, that the present was not an occasion on which he could properly have recommended the dissolution of Parliament. He was glad to hear him announce the principles on which he thought the Government of Ireland ought to be conducted in future. Declining to follow him into many of his other observations, he remarked, that he could not pass by one of the topics of his speech without expressing the deep pleasure which he (Lord Palmerston) had received from Sir Robert Peel's announcement that the unfortunate differences which had existed for some time past between England and the United States had been brought to a termination which was equally honourable to all parties.

Sir Robert Peel had well said that the success of the great measure just passed was not so much due to the Whigs on one side of the House or to the Tories on the other, as to the talents, perseverance, and eloquence of Richard Cobden. In the language which he had used, Sir Robert Peel had paid a deserved compliment to his honourable friend; but the House and the country would look beyond that compliment, and would see in Mr. Cobden not only a great improver of our commercial code, but also a

great result of parliamentary reform—that reform which was the source of Sir Robert Peel’s recent power, and which had enabled him, though he had opposed it, to pride himself on having carried his present policy through the House of Commons.

Lord John Russell’s Administration was formed, and Lord Palmerston went to the Foreign Office for the third time.

CHAPTER V.

RETURN OF THE WHIGS TO POWER.

NEVER was a government apparently more strong than Sir Robert Peel's in 1845, when, unexpectedly to all outside observers, it suddenly dissolved. There was one cause for that dissolution, independent of public affairs, which had not been sufficiently counted upon. No two men could be more dissimilar than the two under whose joint auspices the Conservative Government had been formed. Lord Stanley, though his removal to the Upper House took him out of the immediate sphere of Sir Robert Peel's action, was antagonistic to his chief in every propensity derived from nature, habits, and position. Reckless in his language, aristocratic in his tendencies, rather courting than avoiding contention and strife; above all, haughty and domineering in character, though gay and playful in manner, it was impossible that he should move in comfort under the shadow of a leader circumspect, sprung from the middle classes, and having a certain sympathy with their thoughts and

feelings, inclined to conciliate opponents, and accustomed to receive from his followers implicit obedience. But, what was worse than all, was the eternal habit of quizzing, or, to use the modern word, "chaffing," which the inconsiderate noble indulged in, and which the somewhat prim and stately commoner could not endure. If private stories are to be believed, the Premier, indeed, had determined—at a shooting-party, early in the autumn, and at which the dignified calm of his countenance had been unwillingly ruffled by a volley of bad jokes which he could neither tolerate nor resent—to take the first occasion of shaking himself free from a colleague whose familiarity had become insupportable to him. The immediate cause of events, however, which came so suddenly on the political world, was a scarcity of the Irish potato crop. The population of Ireland had to be provided for; and after two or three meetings with his Cabinet, and propositions made by him and rejected by Lord Stanley, the Prime Minister declared that he saw no satisfactory course to adopt, short of the total abolition of the Corn Laws, which it had been hitherto only proposed to modify, and the Administration broke up, Lord John Russell being entrusted with the construction of a new Ministry. This task, after a short effort to fulfil it, he resigned, giving as his principal reason for not forming a Government the refusal of Lord Grey to join it. If, as it was generally said, Lord Grey's refusal was because the Foreign Office was to be placed in the

hands of Lord Palmerston, this would prove that all his former colleagues were not his friends, but that he still remained more powerful than his opponents. At all events, Sir Robert, exalted by the thought that he had a high duty to perform, once more sacrificed his past life to what he believed the future of his country, or, perhaps (to speak more correctly), to the exigencies of the hour; and it was this disinterested conversion of an old, experienced statesman that gave to the Manchester doctrines the unquestioned authority they have exercised from that time.

The appearance of Adam Smith's work was a great epoch in politics. People had been, generally speaking, so ignorant of the principles of political economy, that they were startled by their novelty, simplicity, and truth. The few became proselytes from admiration and conviction; the many, after a time, from vanity and fear. Vanity, wishing to be thought before their age; fear, lest they should be thought behind it. But the fashion of the moment had, like fashion at all times, its exaggerations. The art of making a nation rich, which is what Adam Smith undertook to teach, is a great branch in politics, but it is not the whole of politics. To conceive it to be such is the mistake of our time.

Adam Smith wrote on the wealth of nations, and laid down principles calculated to make nations wealthy. But the wealth of a nation is only one element in its greatness, content, and prosperity, and

there are also a variety of circumstances that intervene between theory and practice, which disturb the general calculation of political economy, or introduce evils which destroy or counterbalance the advantages you are taught to expect from them.

It is easy to say that as the trade in one town is destroyed by competition, the capital invested in its ruined manufactures will migrate to another town, and be employed in a more productive industry; but the population, which cannot migrate, starves. Besides, unlimited competition in articles produced by labour must, after a time, depend in a great degree on the price of labour; you cannot undersell the manufactures of other countries, but by making the men employed on your fabrics work harder or receive less wages than other men elsewhere. Peculiar advantages that you enjoy at starting may, for a time, enable you to surmount this consideration; but in the end it must prevail, and the amount of the goods that you sell and the profits you make depend greatly on the lowness of the wages you pay—a conclusion not gratifying to the artisan, who will not be satisfied by the assurance that a paltry compensation for his labour is necessary for the prosperity of his country; nor is it to be forgotten that whenever, by law, violence, or intimidation, any question of wages is settled without the free co-operation of both parties—the principles of your system are deranged, and the wheel of your theory no longer turns. It is evident, moreover, that in going to

markets which you can control, or with which you are thoroughly acquainted, there must be a greater regularity between demand and supply than there can be when you are speculating over the whole world for customers who may be affected by circumstances that you cannot always know or appreciate, and can never pretend to govern. But nothing generates discontent so much as fluctuation in profits and wages ; for human nature is so constituted that a man will expect to have always what he has once received.

It is usual to treat these doctrines as a general system, of which the abolition of the corn laws formed a part, and to speak of that system as one which no one acquainted with the principles of political economy can dispute.

There is not above one individual in a thousand who has any opinion that he has not borrowed, without inquiry. As the country dandy has his clothes cut after those of a London acquaintance, the ordinary politician will take his political notions from some politician who is in fashion ; and half the ignorant men who call themselves free-traders, do so because they are afraid of being thought ignorant.

But the time is come, when a man, who has read and thought, and who respects himself, may assert that there are many questions embodied in the question of free trade, each of which requires more consideration than it has yet received.

As to the general question of free trade, there can be no doubt that if your sole desire is to make a

nation *wealthy*, and that society will submit itself to be governed by general laws independently of temporary or individual convenience, there are no arguments capable of refuting the doctrines of Adam Smith. But if you consider the wealth of nations as not the only source of strength or happiness to nations; if you regard political economy as merely a part of political science; and if you find that people will not submit passively to temporary and individual inconvenience, in order to carry out a general law for the convenience or interest of others, then there is more to say than many persons at present suppose on the opposite side.

There are other effects more indirectly and gradually produced by the axiom of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets, which escape the unthinking observer but which attract the attention of the reflective scholar or statesman. When you lay it down as a principle, that pecuniary interest should be the dominant motive power of a nation's life, you destroy many of the nobler emotions which should also preside over its vitality. To tell your fellow townsman that it should be indifferent to him whether he puts money into the pocket of his neighbour and friend, or into that of an unknown stranger in Kamschatka, lays the foundation for a series of ideas which tend to destroy a special feeling for his own country, and consequently for his own countrymen.

It is more especially necessary that an empire

composed of various parts should be held together by habits and ties of a more intimate intercourse between its separate portions than are allowed between any of them and foreign states. Such particular relations, moreover, foster and extend general patriotism, as the destruction of national and imperial privileges tends to annihilate it. We had boundless territories, rich with every product, and situated in every clime—territories over which we could graft a superabundant population, to become, instead of a useless burden on our industry, useful consumers of our manufactures; and I repeat my observations in a former volume when I state that, instead of the commercial independence of the mother country from the colonies, which it now became the fashion to preach, many considerate statesmen were inclined to believe that a great plan of emigration and colonial commerce might have been attempted, for which steam and electricity would have furnished every year new facilities.

I remember Lord Lyndhurst once saying to me that the abolition of differential duties in favour of our colonies was a measure far more serious than the tax upon tea which produced the American war; and, in fact, we thereby exchanged throughout our vast dominions a system of assimilation and union for a system of division and individuality. Whether such policy was wrong or right will be judged by our grandchildren, when the British Empire shall have been contracted into the Island of Great Britain, con-

tending with Ireland as to her right to the separate existence which has been granted to all the other possessions submitted to our rule. It is telling an old story to say that people never sufficiently appreciate the advantages they possess, and over-estimate those they have lost; and the power and prestige which our generation negligently gives away to-day may be regretted by another generation to-morrow. At all events, I have said enough to show that the code of Mr. Cobden and his disciples admits of dispute, or perhaps I had rather say of exceptions and qualifications; but, at the same time, no men, in my opinion, can make a greater mistake than the landed proprietors as a class made when they sought to maintain, for their own interest, a tax which was held to be opposed to the interest of the great bulk of the community. The odium they thus incurred was no doubt unjust; the country gentlemen of England did not act more selfishly than the ribbon manufacturers of Coventry, or the glove-makers of Worcester, who asked protection for their manufactures quite as loudly as the country gentlemen asked protection for their grain; but the difference between the landed gentry contending for their interest, and any other more isolated body contending for theirs, was that the landed gentry formed a political body in the state and society, and had to maintain its popularity in order to retain its power. Its policy, therefore, was to make a timely sacrifice of what it could not keep, in order to preserve what it was ruin to

lose. It was not Sir Robert Peel who destroyed the Conservative party—it was that party which destroyed itself by separating from him, and hence bringing on itself the imputation of being the poor man's enemy—an imputation which has ever since crippled its utility, slurred its prestige, and hung like a weight of lead about its heels whenever it has endeavoured to lift itself into power.

In the meantime the defection which Lord Stanley headed rendered the existence of the Peel ministry for any length of time impossible ; and in fact it had hardly carried its Corn Law measures when, by a discreditable union of opposite parties, and an unprincipled vote which any Government that respected life and property would ere long be obliged to reverse, the great member for Tamworth was expelled from the benches which Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston were again to occupy.

It was Lord Palmerston who—Lord Russell having been sent for by the Queen—was the spokesman of the Whig party on this occasion ; and it is to be noticed that Lord Grey's opposition was not repeated. One of the causes for this change I may here notice. There were many persons who, not understanding that the minister who makes the power of his country respected is the minister whom foreign governments respect, imagined that the return of Lord Palmerston to the Foreign Office would endanger our peaceful relations with France. Lord Palmerston himself had none of these misgivings, but he felt that they

existed in others, and that it would be well to show, before he came into power, that he should be on perfectly good terms with King Louis Philippe when he did so. One of his characteristics was, when he thought a thing should be done to do it. He went then to Paris during the Easter holidays of 1846, and the French Government being quite as anxious to be on good terms with one who was soon to be in office as he was desirous to be on good terms with the French Government before he came into office, a series of parties were arranged by mutual friends, at which he met and conversed intimately with the leading men of the Chamber. At Madame de Lieven's there was a dinner at which he met M. Guizot; at Lady Sandwich's, a dinner at which he met M. Thiers and M. Roger du Nord; and being presented to the King by Lord Cowley, he was naturally asked to dine at the Tuileries. People crowded round the minister, whom they admired for not being afraid of them. Thus his gay and easy manners, not the less appreciated by being seen in combination with the grace and charm of the lady he was accompanied by, had in two weeks rendered him the most popular man in Paris. And when he met M. de Montalembert, who had just been making a violent attack upon him, at Madame Delmar's, and crossing the room, went up to him, and holding out his hand, said, "*Je suis charmé de vous revoir*"—setting the hostess and her company, who had been fearing an awkward rencontre, perfectly at their ease—Paris rang with praises of his

good-breeding, and “*ce terrible Lord Palmerston*” became “*ce cher Lord Palmerston* ;” and before he returned to England all idea of there being anything to apprehend from his reappointment as Foreign Secretary had disappeared on both sides of the Channel.



CHAPTER VI.

LORD PALMERSTON AGAIN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

THE following letter is amongst the first private papers of Lord Palmerston after his return to office. It is interesting because we see in it the germ of his policy as to Italy, which found so many detractors and defenders. He foresaw that if Rome remained as it was, this would eventually bring a French army into it. He foresaw also, that if Italy remained as it was, a war between France and Austria was inevitable.

“ Foreign Office, July 30, 1846.

“ MY DEAR JOHN RUSSELL,

“ I send you a copy of the memorandum which, in 1831, was presented to the Pope on behalf of the five Powers, and which was defeated by adverse influences, although the recommendations which it contains were entirely approved by Cardinal Bernetti and others in authority at Rome.

“ The matter is really one of great and serious

importance, and has bearings much more extensive than at first sight might appear. Italy is the weak part of Europe, and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian affairs. The government of the Papal States is intolerably bad; nothing can make men submit to such misrule, but physical force and despair of external assistance.

“ These States had formerly municipal institutions of great antiquity, which gave them much civil security. These institutions were swept away by the French invasion, and were not re-established at the peace of 1815. Outbreaks and insurrections and conspiracies have followed each other in rapid succession, sometimes when there was, often when there was not, a prospect of succour from without. The French revolution of 1830 produced an explosion in the Roman States, and that explosion led to the conferences out of which the mem. arose. Nothing was done, and discontent has more than once been since manifested by overt acts. Leave things as they are, and you leave France the power of disturbing the peace of Europe whenever she chooses. Two or three millions of francs, properly applied, will organize an insurrection at any time, and the ascendancy of the Liberal party at Paris, whenever it may happen, either by the result of an election or by the death of the king, will soon be followed by an outbreak in Italy. That is the point to which the French Liberals look; they know that if they tried

to get back to the Rhine they would have against them all Germany united, Russia, and more or less England; but in supporting an insurrection in Italy against Papal misgovernment, they would stand in a very different position. England would probably take no part against them; Prussia would not stir a foot; Russia would not be very active, and, perhaps, secretly not displeased, at anything that might humble and weaken Austria. But Austria *would* interfere, and could scarcely help doing so, even though not very efficiently backed by Russia; France and Austria would then fight each other in Italy, and France would have all the Italians on her side. But the war, begun in Italy, would probably spread to Germany, and at all events, we can have no wish to see Austria broken down and France aggrandised, and the military vanity and love of conquest of the French revived and strengthened by success. If these things should happen, and they may not be so distant as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig Government of 1846 was about, and why they did not take advantage of the liberal inclinations of the new Pope to encourage and induce him to make reforms, which, if then made, might have prevented such events. I own that I for one should be altogether at a loss for any answer to such an interrogation. If, on the other hand, we take the step which I propose to take towards the other four powers, we shall either succeed or fail. If we succeed in getting any one or more to join us,

I believe we shall be doing a thing agreeable, as well as useful, to the Pope, and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reforms which every enlightened member of the Roman Government has long seen and acknowledged to be necessary. If, on the contrary, we fail, and if all four should refuse to do anything, we shall at least stand justified, and shall be able to show that we are wholly absolved from the responsibility of any misfortunes which may hereafter arise from that quarter.

“ My dear John Russell,

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ Lord JOHN RUSSELL,
&c. &c. &c.”

Far from being animated by the passions of the revolutionist—as it was the fashion of party then to describe him—Lord Palmerston wished to turn revolution everywhere aside by compromise.

His error, if error it was, consisted in thinking that a government of priests would willingly resign any portion of their power to laics; and that men of the stamp of Mazzini and his disciples would care two straws about moderate constitutional government. I own, also, that I am little inclined to believe that the lessons preached by a cool, steady, long disciplined people like the English can ever find much sympathy with, or exercise a strong moral influence over, a passionate, impressionable, and but recently

politically educated people like the Italians, Portuguese, or Spaniards, who may pretend to accept our theories, but never adopt their practice. The first idea was to open diplomatic relations with Rome, and send a regular ambassador. No regular ambassador or minister, however, was ever named, for the bill which passed for regulating diplomatic relations with his Holiness denied him the right to name an ecclesiastic as his representative at our Court, which he took as an affront to an Ecclesiastical Government; and thus Lord Minto was ultimately sent on a special mission, which will presently be spoken of. The affairs of Italy were not the only ones demanding attention at this time. In Portugal, the intrigues of France and Spain to undermine the traditional influence of England had created a confused variety of factions; whilst the want of tact and judgment on the part of the Court, both as to the measures it adopted and the men it employed, had produced dissatisfaction, terminating in insurrection, which the Liberals initiated and the Miguelites supported; and as the Crown could neither subdue the rebels, nor the rebels triumph over the Crown, the country was in a state of anarchy, amidst which the Queen was not unlikely to lose her throne, and Portugal its last chances of reviving prosperity.

As long as the Moderados (become anything but moderate) ruled in Spain, hopes were entertained by the Portuguese ministers—who, with the royal sanction, were imitating Spanish policy—of an armed

Spanish intervention in their behalf; which intervention we would not admit: but during the short domination of a more liberal party at Madrid in 1847, Spain, England, and France united to establish peace, by arms if necessary, between the rival forces, the one governing at Oporto, the other at Lisbon; and succeeded, though not without the entry of a Spanish army, acting in co-operation with the French and English fleets.

A more glaring violation of the Whig principle of non-intervention could hardly be cited; but it was a useful one, and served to add to the many proofs that might be given of the absurdity of establishing general theoretic rules to be practically applicable to every variety of case. In the mutable condition of human affairs there is but one universal doctrine that a statesman should preach to a sensible people—the necessity of acting in such a manner as, according to circumstances, may be the best for the particular country he governs, and most advantageous to mankind at large.

This was not the only case in which—non-intervention being laid down as the Whig rule—intervention was the exception. The war between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres had long been the curse of La Plata, and not only injurious to the belligerents themselves, but to the trade of the world. The speech from the throne, while Sir Robert Peel was still in office, announced an alliance between the French and English governments for the purpose of suppressing

it. This alliance was for this object maintained by Sir Robert's successors; and though the agents of the two governments differed wherever their instructions enabled them to differ—the French showing a decided partiality for the Monte Videans—the final result was successful, and peace and commerce once more expanded their wings in that quarter of the world.

Even from quiet Switzerland came sounds of discord and strife. The Jesuits had for some time past been gaining a power in the Catholic cantons which offended the sense of the Catholic laity and excited the jealousy of the Protestant portions of the Confederation. In 1846 this state of things had not broken out into actual conflict, but in 1847 it did. The one party determined on expelling from Switzerland the intriguing and ambitious fraternity, and suppressing the convents, which, in order to give their party the supremacy, had provoked civil war in certain cantons: the other resolved, under the pretext of standing up for cantonal rights, to support the ultra-Catholic faction, which was also the champion of the aristocratical privileges which had been unable to resist the democratic spirit that had in later times been gaining ground. Seven states, with Lucerne at their head, formed an armed league, which the remaining states raised a force to put down. As Austria took part with the Sonderbund, or seven cantons, and France leaned to the Austrian view of the case, these two great military states would

probably have thrown their swords into the scale, but for Lord Palmerston's resistance, which reduced the question of interference into a question of mediation, the terms of which were just agreed on when a decisive action, in which the forces of the Sonderbund were worsted, made the will of the Diet authoritative, and thus ended a struggle which, but for Lord Palmerston's attitude, might have broken up the Helvetian Republic. ✓

With respect to Greece there was—as, alas! there still is—little satisfactory to say since the assassination of Capo d'Istrias showed how little of gratitude or wisdom there was to expect from the clever, foolish people of that distracted nation.

Of all the races of Europe, none is more interesting than the Greek. It is singular to observe how many of its ancient characteristics have remained immutable amongst the varying misfortunes with which two thousand years have afflicted it. The same enterprising, speculative, and brilliant intellect which causes us to linger over the records of those three hundred years that enoble the history of the world is still alive, though scattered over the country-houses, and dispersed amidst the professional celebrities of Europe. It can hardly be denied that, amongst the men engaged in political affairs in Greece itself, have appeared gentlemen who, alike distinguished for their manners and their ability, might take place amongst the accomplished statesmen of their time. In the people are still found the virtues of industry and hos-

pitality. But by a singular contrast, whilst the Greek nation may be esteemed and admired, the Greek Government has never, during its varying vicissitudes, obtained or merited either esteem or admiration. The assassination of the illustrious citizen who had dedicated his life to her service; the refusal to acknowledge as a debt the money which, in her most desperate need, was advanced to rescue her from despair, commenced a series of events that have tarnished the lustre of a revolution which an undeniable right had sanctioned and an unquestioned heroism achieved. From the moment, in short, in which the agony of her glorious struggle was passed, and she had it in her power to realize the generous dreams of those whose hearts and hopes had accompanied her throughout it, Greece, or, at least, the rulers of Greece, seemed bent on converting expectation into disappointment.

We have seen that, when the question of establishing Greek independence was being agitated, Lord Palmerston was amongst the first to feel the generous sentiments which animated the last days of Canning and Byron. Nor did his interest in the cause cease when it appeared triumphant. Although he did not accept the young Bavarian prince as a desirable candidate, he still entertained hopes that, aided by the counsels of Europe, he would be able to establish a government sufficiently just and stable to permit the fortunes of the country to grow up gradually under it. It was, perhaps, as a compliment to his patronage

that it was determined that the newly-elected sovereign (ætat. 18) should land in his dominions from an English ship of war; and the vessel selected was the 'Bellerophon,' commanded by Captain Lyons.

Of all the men I was ever acquainted with, I know none whose manner and appearance were more calculated to captivate those whom he was desirous to please than this officer, then in the prime of life. His countenance (a fact of which he was conscious and proud) bore a marked resemblance to that of Lord Nelson, which it typified and beautified. Frank, gay, natural, happy in showing an easy respect to superiors, and exacting it with the same unstudied facility from inferiors, he was equally liked by those above and below him, which is the surest way of being esteemed by equals. He had good natural abilities—which, however, had not been much improved by education—and he was very ambitious. His profession at that time did not seem likely to offer those chances of distinction which the heroic in his character would have preferred to any other. It struck him, then, that to be British minister at a court which was certain to concentrate on itself much of the attention of Europe, would be a desirable post; and with this idea before his mind, it is easy to conceive how he insinuated into the mind of King Otho the idea that he was precisely the man who, in such a situation, would be most agreeable and useful to him. A request was made in his behalf, and complied with.

By this transaction the king expected he had got a staunch supporter, and Captain Lyons a docile pupil. Both were soon disappointed, and very angry at being so.

It is no use disguising the fact; Captain Lyons, though a very good officer, and a very clever as well as agreeable man, was a very bad diplomatist.

The position was a false one, since each was likely to expect too much from the other. It was rendered more false by the character of the king being slow and cautious to a fault, and that of Captain Lyons being in the same degree hasty and impetuous. The king's natural counsellors were, moreover, Germans; and German statesmen could not be expected to entertain the same views of government that were likely to be entertained by English statesmen. Add to this, that as all Greeks who had the slightest pretension to places, expected to have them, there was certain, whatever party was in power, to be a strong party in opposition.

It has been the fashion of late years to consider, in the Foreign Office, that the country is made for the diplomacy, and not the diplomacy for the country; and that a minister's duty is to see that so many thousands a year are divided with as much impartial indifference as possible, between so many gentlemen, who are presumed, by having passed certain examinations, to have acquired a claim on the fund. It was not long ago that a friend of mine asked a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs why he did

not appoint a very able and experienced diplomatist, then receiving a pension, to an important post that was then vacant, instead of another man much his inferior. "Oh," he said, "your man has had his innings; it is another man's turn now!" It never struck the minister that the question was not which man had been employed, but which was best for the public interest to employ. So an unthinking cry has been raised as to what is called "a block in the service;" that is, as to pushing some men out of their places, and others into them, with a more rapid movement; and a Committee of the House of Commons has just recommended that no minister or ambassador should be left more than five years in his post.

Yet any one who has reflected on these subjects knows that the knowledge of most value in any profession, but especially in diplomacy, is that which you acquire daily, hourly, without being sensible that you acquire it, by practice and experience. It is quite true that a very clever man is more useful with a year's experience, than a very stupid one with twenty years', for there are men so stupid that experience is thrown away on them. But take two men of equal ability, and the man who has been five years minister or ambassador at any place, is at least twenty times more fit for it than the man who has been wishing five years to be minister or ambassador at that place. It is not merely that one learns to do things better by habit in a particular calling—one learns what not to do.

Let us exercise but a little common sense. Would any great banking or mercantile house lay down, as a rule, to be always shifting its agents, and remove an agent who had been doing his business well at a particular place, to put another man, who perhaps had never seen the place, in his stead?

The folly of such a system is too apparent to need proof; but if it were wanted, Captain Lyons was a capital instance of it. Captain Lyons was an active, able, ambitious, astute man; a man of the world, too; but he wanted experience in the business he had been plunged into, and consequently he was often firing off very big guns at very small affairs. Nevertheless, that his language and conduct in the main, as the representative of a state which had bestowed its countenance, given its assistance, and lent its money to Greece, were no more violent in their reprobation than circumstances fully justified, may be amply proved by the following exposition of the Finance Minister at Athens in 1846.

“GENTLEMEN,

“Some days ago you sent for me to give you some account of the state of our finances; and I excused myself on the plea of having just taken office. I now come down to this House to tell you that the finance department is in a complete state of disorganization and paralysis: that no accounts exist either as to the revenue or the expenditure, and that it will be utterly impossible to furnish you

with anything in the shape of a correct budget. In consequence of the dishonesty and incapacity of the public functionaries, the public accounts are in a state of chaos. All that M. Provilegio and others have told you respecting every honest man having been dismissed, and of the spoliation of the public money at Syra and elsewhere, is perfectly true. Millions are due to the State; and we do not know our debtors, as the revenue books have disappeared. This is the financial statement I have to make.”*

This was surely enough to account for all that could be thought of or said to the Government of Greece by the British minister. But a diplomatist is frequently perched on the horns of a double dilemma. He strives by the courtesy and amiability of his personal relations to soften the character of official communications; and it is said of him, “You will never do anything with that man: he is too polite: they don’t believe him in earnest;” or, on the other hand, he seeks, by a somewhat stern and severe manner, to give additional weight to the observations he is charged to make use of; and then the good-natured critic of the Foreign Office shrugs up his shoulders, and says, “That fellow renders himself so cursedly disagreeable; who would do anything to oblige him, if he could help it?” However, the great crisis in Greek affairs took place not under the warlike *régime* of the naval captain, but under the mild one of the library philosopher.

* ‘Annual Register,’ 1846, p. 303.

CHAPTER VII.

QUESTION OF THE SPANISH MARRIAGES AND OUR
RELATIONS WITH SPAIN.

VARIOUS questions were now arising on which the relations between France and England were again about to be tried. In Switzerland, where the Protestant and Catholic parties were at issue, our policy was not the same. In Greece we likewise differed. In South America, though professing to act together, our agents, Lord Howden and Count Walewski, were not agreed. In Portugal, the French had been lately trying to support a faction hostile to the traditional influence of Great Britain, though the two Governments at last united with Spain to quell an insurrection which, if continued, might result in democratic confusion, or the resurrection of the Miguelite cause. But the foreign question which concentrated the most attention at the time, and which led to the gravest consequences, referred to that country, in which, as

it has been said in the preceding volume, Lord Clarendon (then Mr. Villiers) had been the representative of the Progressista party; and M. Torreno, supported by France, the head of the Moderado one.*

The Duke of Wellington said it was the only country in which two and two did not make four; and the events which are constantly startling us, as forming the history of the land where Don Quixote, Sancho Panza, and Gil Blas are still living characters, justify the assertion.

In an article from the 'Quarterly Review,' Jan. 1868, on the biography of M. Guizot, the writer observes: "It must have been by a singular fatality that, after having rescued their country with skill and dignity from the Egyptian difficulty; having scrambled with dexterity and good fortune out of the Pritchard outrage, Louis Philippe and his minister, who we really believe desired to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain, entered on a policy in the Spanish peninsula which could not fail, a little sooner or a little later, to produce serious disagreement with our Government, and to shock the moral sense of all Europe by its cold-blooded immorality and injustice." I adopt this sentence.

The question was not one between France and Spain, but between the French and English sove-

* Lord Russell once said, the Moderados seemed to be so named on account of their violence, and the Progressistas from their making no progress.

reigns and cabinets ; and in regard to such a question the Spaniard shrugged his shoulders.

In other questions where a good understanding between the two countries had been threatened, the King of the French exhibited a prudence which had procured him the title of the “Modern Ulysses,” and his influence had rather been exercised to restrain than to excite the somewhat contentious spirit of his people. In the question, however, which I have now to allude to, he appears personally concerned, braving, rather for a family than a national interest, the difficulties which might arise to his country and his crown by the assumption of a hostile attitude to the only Government which had cordially accepted his position and felt an interest in his dynasty.*

I was myself so mixed up in the story I am about to relate, that what I say may in some wise have an historical interest, and I shall therefore, with an effort not to be prolix or tedious, enter upon a narrative of events sufficiently romantic to be appropriate to the scenes where they passed.

The departure of Mr. Villiers from Madrid had not altered the state of things which had grown up during his mission. The mantle that dropped from his shoulders had fallen on those of Mr. Aston, who succeeded him.

The Progressistas considered him as their ally ; the Moderados, as their enemy ; and he was praised

* As M. Odillon Barrot said to Reschid Pasha about Louis Philippe, “Le père de famille a dominé sur l’homme d’état.”

and abused just as his predecessor had been. In a party struggle which took place between the opposite factions, that had both supported the pretensions of Queen Isabella, the victorious general, Espartero, threw his sword into the scale of the Progressistas; and on Queen Christina quitting the direction of affairs she could no longer control, this general became Regent in her place. An honest, but neither a very firm nor a very capable man, he could neither put down his enemies nor long satisfy the contending ambitions of his adherents. A couple of years wore out his prestige, and an insurrection—the French Government aiding it with little disguise—put an end to his authority: Queen Christina returning to Madrid under the protection of Narvaez, whose keen grey eye and fiercely expressive countenance were now seen for the first time in the foreground of Spanish politics. The constitution, recently reformed, was again, under these new auspices, re-reformed, and a law which necessitated the consent of the Cortes to the marriage of the queen repealed. This last act was a prelude to what followed. The French Court found the ground cleared for its matrimonial manoeuvres, and commenced them. In its communications with ours it professed its readiness to renounce all intention of marrying the heir to the French crown with the young queen, but it set forth, at the same time, the monstrous pretension of confining her choice to a member of the Bourbon family. This pretension was the more tyrannical,

since the candidates thus selected were singularly ill-adapted for securing the happiness of Queen Isabella, or contenting the pride and advancing the interests of the Spanish nation. The sons of Don Carlos could not be agreeable to the party which had recently put down by arms a civil war raised by their father. Of the two sons of Don Francisco de Paulo, the late king's elder brother, the one was considered peculiarly effeminate; the other wild and unmanageable. These circumstances were so well considered, that the candidate the least objectionable was Count Trapani, a younger brother of Queen Christina, without any particular qualities or defects individually, but having against him the fact of being a Neapolitan—inasmuch as that the Spaniards had inherited from their former rule over Naples a bitter contempt for Neapolitans—such contempt being almost a national characteristic. Our Government, I venture to say, should have boldly stated from the first that the Bourbon principle could not be admitted for a moment by Great Britain, and would, on the contrary, be strenuously opposed. Had this course been adopted, it would probably have extinguished at once the absurd and iniquitous pretension to dictate to an independent sovereign the choice on which the happiness of her private life, and the destinies of her country depended. But ministers in England can rarely pluck up sufficient resolution to face the responsibilities which a courageous decision requires; and Lord Aberdeen, who had many

merits of no ordinary kind, was by nature disposed to compromise differences rather than to run the risk of wrestling with them; so that he satisfied himself with saying that, though he did not recognize the right of France to confine the choice of the Queen of Spain to any particular family, the English Government would feel satisfied if her Majesty should select for her husband a Bourbon prince, who was not the heir to the French throne.

At this time I was sent as English minister, and Count Bresson as French ambassador, to the Court of Madrid.

M. de Bresson was a man of considerable ability, with a clear intellect when passion did not overcome or vanity obscure it; but his temper was violent, his self-esteem excessive. He belonged by birth to the middle class, and was consequently vulgarly preoccupied with his position as ambassador—given to play the part of *grand seigneur*, with the punctilious pretensions which no real grand seigneur ever displays. Yet, take him all in all, he was precisely the man whom an unscrupulous and able minister would choose as an unscrupulous and able agent in a difficult affair. His tall person and somewhat severe countenance were suited to the character in which he appeared.

It had been agreed between M. Guizot and Lord Aberdeen that there was no longer to be an English and French party at Madrid, and that the two representatives were to act together in support of a mode-

rate and impartial policy. Whether a moderate and impartial policy was possible in a country distracted by passions and parties, is a doubtful matter; but at all events, M. de Bresson made it pretty clear that it was not one he was likely to adopt, by saying with a haughty sincerity, on the first occasion on which I proposed a joint action in favour of the course we had been told to pursue, "Voici, mon cher! Toutes ces théories sont belles et bonnes; mais le parti anglais a été dernièrement au pouvoir, et M. Aston faisait la pluie et le beau tems. Maintenant le parti français est au pouvoir et je suis Ambassadeur de France. Eh bien! je ferai de mon mieux pour maintenir ce parti au pouvoir, et d'agir d'accord avec lui. Allez donc votre chemin comme j'irai le mien; nous serons toujours de bons amis, car je ne crois pas que vous plairez à votre gouvernement si vous faites une révolution pour mettre M. Olozaga dans la place de M. Martines de la Rosa; et vous savez aussi bien que moi que rien ne se fait dans ce pays-ci que par des révolutions."

This was not said with *bonhomie*, but rather with an air of supercilious decision; and everything day by day convinced me that what M. Guizot called an impartial policy was the policy of his own country and his own party in Spain; which party, however, he was disposed to treat rather as a vassal than an ally. Under such circumstances, I saw pretty clearly that the only course to adopt was that of letting French vanity and Castilian pride knock against each

other; and before a year was well over there was a considerable number of the most respectable men belonging to the party called "French" anxious to assure me that they resented the high-handed arrogance of the French ambassador, and the selfish endeavours of Queen Christina and Louis Philippe to place a Neapolitan prince on the Spanish throne. Nothing, however, was decided as to this alliance when in the summer of 1845 I went to England to take my place in the Privy Council—a favour which Lord Aberdeen procured for me in recognition of a service I had rendered in the preceding autumn by preventing a threatened invasion of Morocco by French and Spanish forces. I saw M. Guizot on my way to London, and it was in an apartment which he then occupied in the Bois de Boulogne that he first mentioned the projected marriage of the Infanta with the Duke of Montpensier. He did so at that time very modestly. He did not say that the two princesses must marry two Bourbons, but that King Louis Philippe and Queen Christina were desirous to settle this marriage for private personal reasons into which the Infanta's fortune entered: adding that it would not take place for some time, nor till the queen had children, but that he wished Lord Aberdeen to be apprised of it. I mentioned this conversation to Lord Aberdeen, on my arrival in England, who noticed the information by one of those "hums!" accompanied by a thoughtful and half-satirical smile, which, when anything was told him which he did

not much like, was usual with him. The meeting at Eu between the Queen and Louis Philippe took place in the autumn.

The substance of the understanding which was come to at this interview is contained in a letter addressed by M. Guizot to M. Bresson,* the French Minister at Madrid in 1845, of which the following is an extract:—"Je suis plus que jamais en train de maintenir dans cette question la politique que j'ai exprimée à Paris, et que vous avez si bien appliquée à Madrid. Je viens de m'en expliquer complètement avec Lord Aberdeen. Je savais très-indirectement, mais certainement, que le gouvernement anglais était fort préoccupé de la crainte que notre conduite ne fût pas, au fond, d'accord avec nos paroles, et qu'en déclinant le mariage avec un fils du roi, nous ne fussions sur le point d'épouser l'infante pour nous emparer, par un détour, de ce trône. Ce serait, de notre part, aussi peu sensé que peu honorable. Quand nous avons adopté sur cette question la politique que vous savez, quand nous avons déclaré notre parti pris de ne pas vouloir du trône d'Espagne pour un fils du Roi, et en même temps de ne pas admettre que ce trône pût sortir de la maison de Bourbon, nous avons parlé et agi sérieusement et loyalement; non pour éluder une situation embarrassante, mais pour satisfaire à l'intérêt vrai de la France. Nous suivrons cette politique, soit qu'il

* M. Guizot to M. Bresson, Sept. 19, 1845. See 'Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps,' par M. Guizot, vol. viii. p. 225.

s'agisse du mariage de la reine Isabelle ou de celui de l'infante Doña Fernanda ; car la question peut se poser sur l'un comme sur l'autre. Tant qu'à défaut du mariage de la reine et d'enfants issus d'elle le trône d'Espagne sera suspendu au mariage de l'infante, nous nous conduirons pour ce mariage comme pour celui de la reine elle-même ; nous n'y prétendrons pas pour un fils du Roi, et nous n'admettrons pas qu'aucun autre qu'un prince de la maison de Bourbon y puisse être appelé. Ni l'une ni l'autre des deux sœurs ne doit porter dans une autre maison la couronne d'Espagne. Quand la reine Isabelle sera mariée et aura des enfants, le mariage de l'infante aura perdu le caractère qui nous impose, envers l'un et l'autre, la même politique ; et dès lors, quelles que soient les chances inconnues d'un avenir lointain, ce mariage nous convient, et nous ne cachons point notre intention de le rechercher et de le conclure s'il convient également aux premiers intéressés. J'ai dit cela à Lord Aberdeen. Le Roi le lui a dit et redit. Il est maintenant bien entendu que telle sera notre conduite. Et elle est trouvée fort sensée, naturelle et loyale."

I have good reason to believe that towards the spring of 1846 it was seriously meditated to effect the *mariage Trapani coûte que coûte* by General Narvaez, then suddenly brought into power, with the suspension of the Constitution and the French ambassador. I may now say that I had the information of this design from one of the parties, who told me that he had

been privy to it. Against this is to be placed M. Guizot's denial : but this denial is hardly consistent with his own narrative. In his memoirs, he says : "Le général Narvaez se releva et rentra au pouvoir seul, avec quelques-uns de ses amis personnels, accepté comme un homme fort par les deux reines alarmées et promettant de conclure en trois mois le mariage napolitain."

If M. de Bresson had nothing to do with this return of Narvaez to power, it is evident he at least knew the plans and plots with which he did return : for, having had an interview with him shortly after he was in office, he says : "Narvaez est bien supérieur aux autres et bien plus capable de nous mener au port." M. de Bresson also relates that he told Narvaez that although the French Government could not support the illegal proceedings by which he had suppressed the Constitution, nevertheless, "Le fait accompli sans nous, nous n'avons d'autre pensée que de l'aider à gagner la périlleuse partie qu'il venait d'engager."

That I was not mistaken in the statement I made is still my conviction, but the national sentiment was too strong to be faced by an intrigue. Thus violence and General Narvaez were both ere long abandoned, and a new ministry under M. Isturitz formed, which was to deal diplomatically with the disposal of the young queen's hand.

The difficulties of doing this were laid before Lord Aberdeen in a memorandum which the French ambassador, Count de St. Aulaire, read to M. Guizot in

February 1846, and of which I owe my knowledge again to M. Guizot himself: "Voici quelle est maintenant la situation des princes descendants de Philippe V et prétendant, ou pouvant prétendre, à la main de la Reine de l'Espagne. Le Prince de Luynes est marié. Le comte Trapani est fort compromis, par l'explosion qui a eu lieu contre lui, et par la chute du général Narvaez. Les fils de l'enfant Don François de Paul sont fort compromis par leurs fausses démarches, par leur intimité avec le parti radical, et l'antipathie du parti modéré: par le mauvais vouloir de la reine-mère et de la jeune reine elle-même."

"Les fils de Don Carlos sont, quant à présent, impossibles; par l'opposition hautement proclamée de tous les partis; par leur exclusion formellement prononcée dans la constitution: par leurs propres dispositions toujours fort éloignées de la conduite qui pourrait seule rendre quelques chances. La situation actuelle des descendants de Philippe V dans la question du mariage de la Reine d'Espagne est donc devenue mauvaise."

It is singular that M. Guizot should have taken so much pains to show the injustice of forcing a Bourbon on Queen Isabella and the Spanish nation, at the same time that he urged Lord Aberdeen—I am able to say vainly—to be his accomplice in it: but so it was.

In the meantime the Spanish Court itself had become irritated by the overbearing tone and manner of the French ambassador, and the continued pre-

tension of the King of the French. The queen-mother, with too much good sense to attempt the impossible, would still have been glad if a marriage between her daughter and her brother had been possible; but a marriage with her nephews was by no means agreeable to her. Between her and their mother there had been a constant rivalry: the two boys had been brought up with feelings of enmity towards her: Don Enrique displayed them openly, Don Francisco might be disposed to conceal them hypocritically, for he was already in the hands of the mysterious agents of the order of Jesus. But to both these princes her dislike was strong, and unequivocally expressed. In the meantime she did not openly quarrel with her uncle, but she prepared with that quiet determination which marked her character for a conflict with him. M. Donoso Cortes, the young queen's private secretary, and a gentleman on whom (it would appear from M. Guizot) Count Bresson implicitly relied, was the first person to speak to me of her resolve to break loose from the thralldom in which France traditionally assumed to hold the Spanish nation. He expatiated with an eloquence for which he was remarkable on the dictatorial manner of the man who believed him to be his instrument; on the paternal avidity of his master; on the unhappy position of the poor young queen; on the natural feelings of her mother; on the part which England ought to play under such circumstances. By degrees he introduced the sub-

ject of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, whom Queen Christina had once met somewhere; said that the choice was neither English nor French, since the young prince was allied to both the French and English Courts; adding that he was charged by the two queens to speak to me with respect to him. I was guarded with Donoso Cortes, who occupied no responsible post, and who did not disguise that he was apparently intimate with the person of whom he most complained. In M. Isturitz, however, a man of the strictest personal honour, and whom I had always found courageous and sincere, I had greater faith; and he soon held to me similar language. Finally came the Duke of Rianzares, Queen Christina's husband, who said that Spain was not strong enough to stand up alone against Louis Philippe; but that if England would promise her support, the young queen would not submit passively to have her destiny subjected to foreign dictation, and to be treated with supercilious indifference. What was I to say? The language of our Government was, as I have said, ambiguous; it had no objection to a Bourbon prince; it had no candidate of its own to propose; it recognized no right in the King of the French to impose one, and had declared that if he attempted to prevent by force any marriage which the Queen of Spain and the Spanish nation determined on, such a course would, it believed, be resisted, not merely by Spain, but by Europe. This implied that England would sup-

port Spain in an independent choice, but it did not clearly say so, and I knew that Lord Aberdeen would not like me to say so. On the other hand, to leave it to be understood that the Spanish Government had no resource but to submit to the hard fate that the pride and family interest of a neighbouring potentate prepared for her, would expose me equally to censure. The affair was more complicated by Queen Christina's selection of a Coburg prince—such a selection would be a matter of indifference to the English Government and people; but it was not indifferent to the family of the English sovereign.

The minister of the King of the Belgians did not disguise the interest which his master took in a Coburg alliance. The Portuguese minister, who had recently been staying at Coburg and had passed through England on his way to Madrid, told me much—no doubt with exaggeration—as to the wishes of our own Court. Such confidences were not, I allow, wholly without effect on me: but what had more effect was pity for the young princess about to be so hopelessly sacrificed; resentment to the haughty heartlessness with which this sacrifice was demanded; interest for the fate of the Spanish nation itself, and dislike for the somewhat pitiful manner in which we resisted in words what we seemed willing to submit to in fact. I also entertained a belief which has made me not unfrequently pass—most unjustly—for an enemy of France, that her

ruin as well as the ruin of our good understanding with her lay in the road of those attempts she was constantly making to obtain a preponderating influence in European affairs, and that the policy of every good Englishman and every wise Frenchman was to resist them. I was, therefore, I confess, altogether opposed to the Bourbon pretensions; but I was in one of those positions in which success is almost impossible, because decided action is not allowed. Had I been able to guide the conduct of the Spanish Court, I should have tied its tongue and confined its endeavours to getting Prince Leopold to visit Madrid when a marriage taking place suddenly, with the approval of the Cortes and amidst the acclamations of the army, would have been irrevocable. A scheme of this kind suited the Spanish character, and I could easily have got it adopted; but the general spirit of my instructions—though it did not command me to oppose a marriage without the Bourbon pale—prevented me from assuming the character of promoting one; I could listen, but not advise; and consequently, when Queen Christina informed me she had determined on addressing herself to the head of the Coburg family, and communicated to me, confidentially, the letter she had written, and of which she said she should not inform her uncle until she received an answer, I did not think myself called upon to express an opinion on the course she had adopted. I did, however, fully explain that a Coburg marriage would not be considered in Eng-

land as an English one ; that no support could be expected from us on that ground ; but I allow that I also stated, it appeared to me that a marriage so reasonable and unobjectionable could not be persistently opposed by the King of the French if the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, the young prince, and the queen, with the approval of the Cortes, were bent upon it. The obstinacy on one side would give way, I said, to the obstinacy of the other.

In this the queen-mother agreed : she regretted exceedingly, the Duke of Rianzares told me, any difference with her uncle ; stating she was disposed to make any reasonable concession to him ; but adding, that what he insisted upon was unreasonable, and that she would oppose it if she could do so with any chance of success. The duke, moreover, continued, in her majesty's behalf—that she had given her word with respect to the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier and the Infanta, and that consequently, whatever took place about the young queen, she considered that promise binding if King Louis Philippe claimed its fulfilment ; but that if, on account of the queen's espousals, the King of the French withdrew his demand for the hand of the Infanta, then she should consider herself free to dispose of it in the manner most accordant with the interests of the family and those of the Spanish nation. Her language and her conduct throughout the whole of this stage of the proceedings were frank and consistent, and did not deserve the suspicions of duplicity which were

entertained concerning them by some of our statesmen.

The communications between myself and Lord Aberdeen on the Spanish marriages had chiefly consisted in the general declarations of principle which I have described, and which perhaps were mainly intended for the eyes of Parliament.

According to them, our first object was Spanish independence; our second, a marriage which gave France no cause for complaint; but it was possible that in reality the precedence in these considerations was reversed, and that the desire not to discontent the French Government overruled the desire to preserve the independence of the Spanish one. At all events, I did not feel certain as to the course Lord Aberdeen would pursue. I thought he might prevent the proposal having any result by a communication with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, or with the Spanish minister in London; but it seemed to me as likely that he would either let matters take their course, confining himself to a confidential despatch, of which I should be instructed to give M. Isturitz a copy, setting forth fully the neutrality of our Government in this matter, and the views it entertained concerning it. But I confess it never entered my mind to conceive that when the Spanish Court complained to me of the persecutions of the French ambassador, and its plans of escaping from them, that I should have gone to him who had been avowedly acting throughout all these transactions without concert

with me, and betrayed the confidence I had received. Such conduct would have appeared to me—excited as perhaps I was by the feelings and passions of the place in which I was residing—rather that of a French spy than of a British minister. As little did it seem to me likely that Lord Aberdeen would now reveal to the French Government what I had been told confidentially by the Spanish Government, and communicated to him under the same reserve.

I was, however, wrong in both particulars; for as I was under the influence of M. de Bresson's actions, so Lord Aberdeen was under the influence of M. Guizot's professions, who indeed by his magisterial manner, and clear, sententious style, exercised an almost unlimited control over those who did not rebel absolutely against his authority. Lord Aberdeen then at once informed the French Government of Queen Christina's proposal, and reprimanded me severely for not having made it known to Count Bresson.

I at once tendered my resignation, and had only time to receive Lord Aberdeen's courteous but peremptory rejection of it, when he himself quitted office.

This is not the place to justify my own conduct; but I am bound to say, since it subsequently added to Lord Palmerston's difficulties, that Lord Aberdeen's complaisance at this juncture, though dictated, no doubt, by the most honourable motives, had a mischievous effect on future transactions; for it was pleaded subsequently by King Louis Philippe as a

reason for declaring that we had bound ourselves to support the Bourbon alliance; whilst it persuaded the Spanish Government and Court that no solid reliance could be placed upon any assertions we made as to our perfect independence on the subject.

The French, at all events, had little hitherto to boast of in their Spanish campaign: they had commenced it with their own plans and their own party; the first had failed, the second had deserted; and the intrigues for the one with the other had so notably recoiled on their authors, that when Lord Aberdeen told M. Guizot of the offer to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, he replied by saying it must be a mistake; whilst M. de Bresson, on receiving the news, bounded—he himself says, from his bed—in mingled surprise and indignation.

The disclosure of Lord Aberdeen frustrated the endeavour which had been prepared against Louis Philippe's tyrannical interference, but it had not reconciled those whom it had disconcerted. When the Whigs came into power the Spanish Court, the Spanish Government, and the Spanish nation were all ready to unite with any minister in England who would boldly join with them in resisting the unwarrantable dictation of the King of the French. Lord Palmerston was precisely the minister likely to take this course. But he came into office with strong prepossessions. When he previously directed our foreign affairs the Progressistas were in supreme authority, and the party which now conducted them

discredited. That party had been brought into power by France, and up to a late period had been French as far as any Spanish party could be so.

Lord Palmerston did not realize the change which had recently been produced. The leading Progressistas were exiles in London, and encouraged the views which were hostile to their antagonists. Lord Clarendon, then a Cabinet minister, and a reputed authority in Spanish politics, had been, to a certain extent, the Progressista leader, and peculiarly subject to personal antipathies and predilections. All these circumstances combining conduced to proceedings which lost us the advantages we possessed.

One of Lord Palmerston's first despatches to me denounced the Moderado party in the strongest terms; and this despatch was communicated—I could never understand why—to the French Government. It set forth at the same time the different candidates to the queen's hand, placing Prince Leopold first on the list; though a private instruction, not communicated to the French Government, was sent to me, saying I was not to support Prince Leopold, but to press for the selection of Don Henry, then exiled, and taken up as their leader by the Progressistas—also, as I have stated, in exile. This public despatch was calculated to alarm Louis Philippe as to a Coburg, and the private instruction to alarm Queen Christina and the Moderado party as to Don Henry, whom they both looked upon as an avowed enemy. In pursuing such a course Lord Palmerston thought

that Louis Philippe, anxious to escape from a Co- bourg, would support Don Henry, a Bourbon; and that Queen Christina and the Spanish Government, pressed both by France and England to adopt this prince, would end by doing so. I judged, however, from the first differently. Alarming the two Courts at the same time was, in my opinion, to bring them together. If we did not mean to oppose in earnest Louis Philippe's schemes, which were evidently to have a Queen of Spain without issue, or, at all events, a discredited Spanish throne, and a powerful French prince by the side of it, it was better, as I thought, to endeavour to come to some friendly understanding, and make the best bargain we could with him. If we did mean earnestly and really to oppose these schemes, our only legitimate allies were the Queen of Spain and her Government for the time being. An attempt to bring a party that was out of power into power, and to place a prince whom the queen-mother—naturally looking out for her own security—considered as her enemy, in a position where his hostility would be fatal to her interests, could not succeed but by a revolution; and for a revolution—even had that been a suitable mode of issuing from the dilemma we were placed in—there was no reasonable probability. As to the idea of Louis Philippe joining with us to place a Bourbon who did not suit him on the Spanish throne to the destruction of the party which he preferred, if he could place a Bourbon that did suit him on the throne

with the aid of that party, simply to satisfy our views, which were in opposition to his own, I could not but regard it as a delusion. It seemed to me, in short, that in attempting an union with Louis Philippe against the Spanish Government, instead of an union with the Spanish Government against Louis Philippe, we were doing just the reverse of what it was our policy to do. These views I expressed with great earnestness to Lord Palmerston; but they were counteracted by the Progressista party in London, who represented me as devoted to the queen-mother and her friends because I was not disposed to be blindly devoted to them. In vain, then, I represented that the moment the party in power were thoroughly convinced we were bent on their overthrow, and determined in favour of their rivals, they and the French Government would unite as against a common foe. I ventured, notwithstanding, to delay the delivery of a communication, which cut off all chance of an understanding, till I had endeavoured to make its consequences fully understood at home, begging our Government to place confidence in my advices: but Lord Palmerston replied to me characteristically, that the best title of an agent to the confidence of his chief was that of obeying him; and Lord Clarendon wrote a private letter to M. Isturitz, with whom he was personally acquainted, stating, in the strongest terms, that Don Henry was the only proper candidate for the young queen's hand.

M. Isturitz brought to me the letter and said, "Are your ministers mad? They wish for the independence of Spain—so do we: and we are in power: and instead of uniting with us, they say in reality, whatever they may say in words, that their only conditions of an alliance are our surrender to our opponents. Supposing I was really willing to make this sacrifice, would the Court do so? would my political friends do so? would the officers now in command do so?"

I argued as well as I could against this reasoning; still I saw it was just; and in executing my orders, which were positive, and putting forward Don Henry's claims, in terms I was instructed to use, did not feel surprise when, not many hours afterwards, the double and simultaneous marriage was agreed upon and announced. It is true that this was a clear breach of good faith with us; but the queen-mother required this sacrifice, since in giving her daughter to Don Francisco, the brother of Don Henry, she felt she was in nowise secure, unless the interests of the French Court were bound up with her own; whilst neither Count Bresson nor M. Guizot were men to be perplexed with doubts or to hesitate before measures which were requisite to carry out a design they had determined upon. Excuses could be found; excuses can always be found. Those put forward by M. Guizot were, first, that Lord Aberdeen had promised that neither of the Spanish princesses should marry out of the Bourbon line;

and, second, that Lord Palmerston had tried to make the queen marry a protestant of Saxe-Coburg. The first declaration, always denied by Lord Aberdeen, M. Guizot utterly failed to prove. The second is not only untrue, but is directly contrary to the truth. Our legitimate complaint then was chiefly against the Government of France, for that of Spain violated no promise; but its consequences to Spain were so evident that I felt justified (though without instructions) to remonstrate. I say "though without instructions," for the French Government had admirably chosen its time. The Queen and Lord Palmerston were absent on a marine excursion; and when the intelligence of the double marriage reached Downing Street, there was no one there to express an opinion upon them.

I have not hesitated to describe what I think were Lord Palmerston's errors, but it is just to say that the sentiments which caused them were indicative of his liberal views and of his noble nature. He honestly believed it was for the interests of Spain and of England that the Progressista party should be placed in office; he thought they could be so by the policy he pursued; he unhesitatingly believed the declaration of the French *Chargé d'Affaires*, who asserted that his government would support ours in its views respecting the prince we patronized. His fault at this time, as at other times, was the strong predilections or prejudices he took for and against persons, not so strong as that they could

not, by proof that they were wrong, be removed—but strong enough, during the period they lasted, to warp his judgment; for he made no allowance for the mixed nature of most characters. If he had a bad opinion of a man, he was never to be trusted; if a good one, he was thoroughly to be relied on. Of the queen-mother then—who, as I have said, had, with many defects, many great qualities, and who was perfectly capable of playing a great part in a great cause—he would not, under any circumstances, credit the sincerity; and of the Progressista leaders, who, as party men, gave party advice, he too implicitly trusted the assurances. But at all events, whatever had been the turnings and twistings in these affairs, the French Cabinet, which had a clear plan which it had resolved to carry out, was certain to triumph over our own, which had no particular plan, and was only prepared to give a limited resistance to the views of its antagonists. We should either from the beginning have taken a resolute stand against Louis Philippe's pretensions, or been prepared, without a useless struggle, to submit to them.

They soon bore the fruit that might have been expected from them.

The young queen did not dislike her husband so much as she disregarded, and, in a certain degree, despised him. She had married to please others: she looked out with little delay for an attachment that pleased herself: and rumour (pretty correct in

Madrid as to those matters) said that General Serrano—who at the overthrow of Espartero had been for a short time her minister, when she had distinguished him by the title of “*El Bonito Ministro*”—was supposed to have attracted her attention. A correspondence was, in fact, detected, and the general—a young officer remarkable for his good looks and his courage—was ordered by the ministry, who undertook the somewhat difficult task of the duenna, to quit Madrid and assume the command of the Basque Provinces. He was encouraged, however, to conceal himself, and disobeyed. The events which succeeded, and with which I was unintentionally mixed up, are so romantic, that I regret it would carry me too far from my subject to relate them. Suffice it to say that suddenly, at three o'clock one morning, a new ministry was formed, consisting chiefly of General Serrano's personal friends, but having at its head a gentleman of high character as a lawyer, an orator, and a statesman, M. Pacheco. Don Francisco, the queen's husband, retired from the palace to the Prado, a royal residence near Madrid. General Serrano, no longer pursued by the police, had his antechambers crowded with postulants for offices and favours. General Narvaez went to Paris. There was a complete change of scenery and decoration on the ever-eventful stage of Spanish politics: and I found myself in one of the most disagreeable situations in which a British minister could be placed.

Lord Palmerston, looking at the young queen's conduct as the natural result of the alliance she had been more or less compelled to contract, regarded her rather with interest and pity than blame or reproach, and was for taking advantage of the attachment she had formed for the purpose of dissolving her own marriage, which, it was said, had never been consummated, for setting aside the Montpensier succession, and bringing his favourite Progressistas into power. All this could only be accomplished by the influence of General Serrano. He occupied a peculiar position; he professed Progressista opinions; but he had taken, like General Prim, part against General Espartero. His personal friends, on the other hand, were Moderados, and though but of the most liberal fraction of that party, did not like deserting it.

The leading Moderados, now set on one side, spared no pains to get affairs again into their own hands. They intrigued with two or three of the ministers, and promised them largely; they conveyed friendly messages to the ruling favourite, and gained persons at the same time about the queen who might undermine her majesty's inclinations towards him.

The dissolution of the queen's marriage was the only chance for her happy life or creditable reign. But the Spaniards are a decorous people. Some very respectable and respected men discussed very gravely the propriety of putting the king quietly out

of the way by a cup of coffee ; but the scandal of a divorce shocked them.

To an interdict on the Duchess of Montpensier's succession neither the queen, nor her ministers, nor Serrano, were opposed ; but the Government, as composed, could not hope to achieve nor venture to attempt so great an enterprise. If it would and could form an alliance with the Progressistas it might.

This alliance therefore became our policy. But it was not easy to bring about.

The stake they were playing for was a large one, and they played it skilfully, whilst the French minister was encouraged to back them boldly.

An English agent must be most scrupulous ; and many, who think that everything is to be done and can be done in foreign countries as in England, were even displeased at the legitimate intimacy which Lord Palmerston wished me to cultivate with the young queen and her powerful favourite. But General Serrano was an honest man, and a good patriot, and the queen had a good heart and noble instincts ; and much might have been done at that time if her attention had been awakened to public interests, and an administration formed with the more liberal of the one party and the least violent of the other.

My influence so far prevailed as to procure for the Duke of Vittoria the permission to return to Spain ; and had he returned immediately, and in a concilia-

tory spirit, many of the calamities with which, I fear, Spain was inflicted in succeeding years might have been spared to her. He did not do so, however, but sent an aide-de-camp, who, if he was charged to disgust all those who could have aided his chief and his party's return to power, executed the commission admirably. He declined calling on General Serrano, saying it was no farther from the general's house to his than from his to the general's. He declined equally visiting the British minister because his house was not shut to Moderados. He let every one know who listened to him that if the Esparterists regained power they would put their foot on the neck of every one who was not an Esparterist, and especially on those who were at that time in office. In short, he managed so well that there was a smart reaction against the favourable dispositions already produced, and General Narvaez was summoned from Paris to protect from the Progressistas the men who had been inclined to place them in power. A palace intrigue hastened the catastrophe which was thus impending, and by one of those abrupt jerks in Spanish politics which make exiles ministers and ministers exiles, Serrano got thrown into the Captain-generalship of Madrid, the queen-mother brought back from Paris, where she had retired, and Narvaez, at the head of the Moderado party, with his heel on the young queen, installed *nemine contradicente* in unrestrained authority.

Espartero, now that it was too late, made a

wretched and momentary appearance in the capital, without venturing to encourage the enthusiasm which his presence for a moment created. He had lost the game that was in his hands : and Lord Palmerston himself was convinced that he had lost it by his own fault.

In another country the fact that both our Government and its agent had been doing their utmost to overturn their policy, and keep them out of office, would have created an awkward position with the Moderados when they obtained power ; but it had been so long admitted in Spain that foreign governments took part with national parties that I found no difficulty, as I was on good terms personally with most of its members, in getting on with the new Government, which was the more easily satisfied as it felt itself perfectly secure.

The state of things, however, that then existed placed the British minister in a very false position, and one which, up to that time, I had avoided. The death of the queen and the birth of a child, the offspring of Doña Fernanda, might at any moment raise the question we had brought forward. A party was already formed which would in such case support that child's claim to the Spanish throne—it followed almost as a matter of course, that we had to form or support a party against it. Thus the British Embassy became naturally an object of suspicion to one party as it was of hope and reliance to another. I

acted with as much prudence as it was possible to observe in this difficult position, until the sudden overthrow of the Orleans throne brought about increased complications. A revolution had taken place in France; Louis Philippe had resigned, and a regency was appointed. A republic was declared.

The confusion was great. No government in Europe had been so closely connected with the overthrown dynasty as that of Spain, and the natural thing to suppose was that the overthrow of one Government would lead to the overthrow of the other.

This was so much the general conviction in Spain itself, that all parties there seemed at first inclined to prevent violent results by prudent and moderate courses. The Government, requesting extraordinary powers from the Cortes, declared that that body should be kept sitting, in order to judge of the manner in which these powers ought to be exercised. The opposition leaders, on their part, believing by the natural current of events they should shortly come into office, deprecated revolution and violence above all things, as likely to carry matters beyond the point at which men of reputation could engage in them.

The French party, or, speaking more correctly, the party of the King of the French, had then lost all natural protection. The shock to established authority in Paris had given an impetus to the force of every party elsewhere professing liberal principles and struggling for power. General Narvaez was

alarmed. He sent one of his friends to me to say, that if I would break with his opponents and give him my unequivocal countenance and support, I should have a position in Spain that no foreign minister had ever enjoyed. He added that the monarchy was in danger, and that his cause was that of the throne.

All of a sudden, however, affairs took an entirely new aspect. General Narvaez appeared one morning in full uniform before the Legislative Assemblies, and declared them to be prorogued, in spite of the promise recently given, and without assigning any cause for breaking so solemn an engagement. The consequence was certain: on the 26th of March (the Cortes had been prorogued on the 22nd), an insurrection broke out at Madrid. The Minister of the Interior described it as a disturbance occasioned by groups, few in number, and of the lowest class and vagabonds. But no sooner had tranquillity been restored, than arrests of all kinds took place. Two of the most eminent of the opposition deputies, Señores Olozaga and Escosura, were seized, imprisoned, and sent off to Cadiz, to be there embarked for transportation to the Philippines. They were never tried nor sentenced, nor even accused of any particular crime; nearly all men of mark in the same party underwent somewhat similar treatment. The Spanish ministry avowed and justified its conduct, on the ground that a Government has on these occasions the right to deport beyond the seas, not merely those guilty of revolutionary designs, nor even those suspected of

being guilty, but all who, however innocent of all intentions to promote disturbances, might by their popularity or importance give strength to an insurrection if they joined it.

General Narvaez had, in fact, come to the resolution to remain in power at all events. He thought that force alone could preserve him there. He provoked a rebellion in order to give him an excuse for using it; and, according to the maxim of Machiavelli, that you should never be the tyrant by halves, he used it most unscrupulously.

I was not disposed to enter into any cabal, or encourage any movement against him; but neither did I think it prudent, or politic for the interests of the Crown, to give him that ostentatious support which he desired.

In the first place, his conduct was such as it was impossible for an Englishman representing his country to appear to sanction. Every man of any weight in the party that had been constitutionally opposing him was, without any pretence of culpability, seized, imprisoned, or exiled. Every journal that was not eulogistic of this policy was suppressed; all law was despised, and a system of unsparing despotism boldly avowed and installed.

One might be silent at such things, but one could not be, or appear to be, their advocate. Even their success was doubtful. The middle classes murmured, the army hesitated. A special force was deemed necessary to guard the capital, from which the regular

army was withdrawn. In the meantime a republic had been established in France. It was difficult to foresee the course it would adopt, or the partisans without the French frontier that it would find.

The most essential thing for the monarchy in Spain was to keep the Liberal party, always a powerful one, from becoming republican, the most dangerous to link the monarchy with desperate men and the desperate measures that wished to make this alliance.

Shortly after the overthrow of Louis Philippe, Lord Palmerston instructed me to advise the queen-mother to make her peace with the Liberal party, and to counsel the ministry itself to conciliate opposition by the adoption of liberal measures, and by taking into its ranks, if possible, liberal men.

Under ordinary circumstances, such advice to a foreign Government is better left alone. But we had aided that Government in its struggles against a despotism less violent than the one it was exercising. We had an interest in maintaining constitutional monarchy against despotism or republicanism. We had for years been in the habit of giving advice to the Spanish Government in moments of difficulty.

On the other hand, I was desirous after the appeal that had been made to me, to show the Spanish monarch that I was not acting under personal feelings or impressions; that the course, whatever it might be, which I took, would be dictated by the sentiments of my Government and my country. Nor was this

all. Whilst the ministry wished me to sanction its illegalities, the opposition thought I ought to aid revolution. It was necessary to show the one party and the other the exact position that I stood in, and that that position was the one which was authoritatively traced out for me. It was, moreover, necessary for me to be able to show, if the Government and the Queen fell in any of the insurrections now daily taking place, that I had done my duty in warning both of the peril they were invoking. To the queen-mother I spoke on this subject confidentially and seriously, because I thought it the interest of the Crown to prevent the Progressista party from becoming a republican party; and for the same reason, though against a party policy in general in Spain, I thought it important for England at this time to obtain and maintain such an influence with the opponents of the Government, as to be able, in any crisis that might arrive, to preserve the monarchy. It was possible that Queen Christina might appreciate this reasoning; and at all events, no great mischief could attend trying.

With the ministry, and the man at the head of it, the case was different; and as long as the Government declared itself opposed to violent measures, I judged it officious to proffer unnecessary counsel. But when a course of violence that nothing could justify, and by which I thought public opinion would be strongly excited throughout Europe, and especially in England, commenced, I felt it would be impossible

to leave my instructions unfulfilled. The extremities to which matters were brought made it almost certain either that the most odious tyranny would be established, or that the throne would be overturned. In either case, it was probable that Lord Palmerston would be questioned in Parliament as to what he had done; and when he published his instructions to me, it would be asked if I had executed them. Such instructions, in fact, are frequently given by a minister with reference to Parliament, and rather intended to satisfy the public opinion in England than to produce an effect elsewhere.

I had, moreover, an important object in view. There appeared every probability of the ultimate triumph of the Liberal party; the only chance of maintaining the monarchy in such a case would be that of doing so by the influence which at the critical moment the British minister could exercise over it; and protesting against the course that was then being pursued, I should strengthen that influence. The only question, then, that admitted a doubt, was as to the manner in which I should convey the sentiments I was told to express. To do so in a personal interview, even in the most courteous terms, was by no means unlikely, with a man of General Narvaez's character, to lead to some personal affront, which it would be undignified to tolerate, and embarrassing to resent. Moreover, there would remain no record of my proceedings, and I might be charged with using language I had never employed. On the other

hand, to address a personal admonition to such a person as the Spanish prime minister, would be received as an impertinence, and moreover, according to the usual practice of Spanish diplomacy, treated as an act of a British minister, and not of the British Government.

I deemed it better therefore, on all accounts, to inclose Lord Palmerston's actual despatch, which not only excused, but explained the necessity of my conduct. The following was the despatch:—

“F. O., March 16, 1848.

“SIR,

“I have to instruct you to recommend earnestly to the Spanish Government and to the queen-mother, if you have an opportunity of doing so, the adoption of a legal and constitutional course of government in Spain. The recent fall of the King of the French, and of his whole family, and the expulsion of his ministers, ought to teach the Spanish Court and Government how great is the danger of an attempt to govern a country in a manner at variance with the feelings and opinions of the nation, and the catastrophe which has happened in France must serve to show that even a large and well-disciplined army becomes an ineffectual defence for the Crown, when the course pursued by the Crown is at variance with the general sentiments of the country.

“It would then be wise for the Queen of Spain in the present critical state of affairs to strengthen the

executive Government by enlarging the basis upon which the Administration is founded, and by calling to her councils some of those men who possess the confidence of the Liberal Party.

“I am, &c.,

“PALMERSTON.”

Despatches of a much more offensive character had frequently been addressed to Spanish Governments. We had supported Queen Christina's party against that of Don Carlos, because the former represented the constitutional cause; we had a sort of right, therefore, to speak in favour of constitutional principles; and under any other circumstances, and with any other ministry, our counsel would have been more likely to produce a good effect than a bad one.

But the famous monster meeting at that time threatened the peace of London, and the Spanish ministry were led to believe that the Liberal Government in England would either be overthrown by a revolution, or replaced by a Conservative Government named to resist a revolution. Thus a fair opportunity, it was thought, presented itself of parading the national dignity. My communication, therefore, was returned to me with an indignant protest.

Had any other man but General Narvaez been at the head of the Spanish Government this dispute would have excited but a limited attention. The minister might have answered it, or talked to me about it. But General Narvaez was a desperate man,

in a desperate position. The story recently told of his death-bed, when he was asked to forgive his enemies, and answered that he believed he had none, for he believed he had killed them all, painted his character. He had come into office to make his fortune; he was determined to keep in office and make his fortune. The man who was not for him was against him. Reckless of consequences, the Court feared his violence, whether against others or against itself; and as the strongest character dominates in extraordinary circumstances, so he dominated now.

For a time, however, his anger was calmed by his more temperate colleague the Duc de Sotomayer, and the frank explanations I was able to give; but as his danger increased, as dissatisfaction, both in the country and the army spread, he grew more and more irritated and bent on taking some violent measure which would overthrow his authority or confirm it.

From my long residence in Spain, my acquaintance with the language and the principal persons of almost all classes in the country, I had a certain influence, and, as is usual in these countries, that influence was much exaggerated by General Narvaez, who thought if he was to maintain himself he must get rid of me.

I myself thought the position untenable, and asked for leave of absence—this was refused to me. I then received anonymous and threatening letters. On one occasion, these notices of assassination were not

confined to writing. A respectable tradesman brought me an upholsterer's workman, who said he was putting up some curtains in a minister's house, and that whilst hid behind the curtains, the minister and another person came into the room, and that he heard a conversation at which my assassination was planned. I took down his deposition in the presence of Mr. Otway, who was acting as Secretary of Embassy, and, the day after I had despatched it home, called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I said, you say you hear absurd stories about my plotting insurrections. Now I have a story against your Cabinet's plotting murder, and this story is substantiated by respectable evidence. Of course I do not believe it, but I have sent it home.

It was evident after this that I should not be frightened, and could not safely be killed. At the same time, there were persons who thought or said I had the opportunity of seeing the queen in private, which I never had; and all these circumstances combined induced Narvaez, after despatching an envoy to make out his story twenty-four hours in advance of me, to send me my passports without a reasonable pretext for such conduct.

I say without a reasonable pretext because the reasons given were, that my own Government had disapproved of my conduct, which was false; that I had excited insurrection by giving English guineas to the Spanish soldiers, and by employing her Majesty's ships of war, without the knowledge of her

Majesty's Government, to make the circuit of the coast and promote revolution; things so absurd and impossible, that if the printed evidence of what I assert did not exist, such folly would be thought incredible.

One reason assigned to me was that my life was in danger, from the reports which had been circulated by the papers—which, after all, were by the ministers themselves—but there were, however, other causes at work besides those I have named, in bringing about the violent resolution which the Spanish Government had adopted. The Duc de Glucksberg, minister of Louis Philippe at the Spanish Court, was irritated at the idea of my remaining at Madrid after his departure; and M. Guizot and his adherents, who had arrived in England, were animated by a desire to prevent Lord Palmerston from enjoying the triumph which their overthrow would afford him. They fancied, moreover, that the revolution recently effected by surprise would be but transitory, and that events might take place in which the deposition of a ministry in England, that had been actively engaged in the Spanish marriages, might be advantageous to them.

On the one hand, then, M. de Glucksberg urged the Spanish ministry to commit itself by my dismissal; on the other hand, M. Guizot and his friends spread industriously the report, that Lord Palmerston had provoked the insult we had received by his efforts to produce a revolution in the Spanish peninsula.

Travelling without stopping even to eat, I not only passed on the road the gentleman who had been sent to precede me, but arrived in London within a few hours after the news of my dismissal.

I found Lord Palmerston quite ready to confront this conspiracy, for such it was, and in no wise disposed to shrink from the responsibility of his personal position. I cannot say the same of all his colleagues, and I found it necessary to state for the information of the Government that I asked no favour, and would either defend my conduct myself or leave it to them to do so.

There was no difficulty in determining that the conduct of the Spanish Government had been one of unscrupulous audacity, and that the falsehoods invented to justify it were shameless for their mendacity; but the more important question to determine was the course which our Government should pursue respecting it. The dismissal of the Spanish minister at the Court of St. James's, although he had personally abstained from mixing himself up in the accusations made by his Government, was a matter of course. But was nothing further to follow? The Liberal party in Spain, which was everywhere ready to rise, waited the aid which it now confidently expected from England, and paused in mute suspense, expecting our decision. A fleet sent to Cadiz, demanding instant satisfaction, would have been instantly followed by the most ample apology; for persons who had the disposal of power at Madrid

had large sums of money invested in Cuba, which they were far less disposed to sacrifice than General Narvaez, and the Court would have avoided a revolution by the appointment of a Constitutional Ministry. Lord Palmerston was perfectly aware of this, and proposed to the Cabinet prompt and decided measures; but his colleagues did not give him their support. Some were not sorry that his policy should receive a rebuff, which did not damage themselves; some belonged to that school which looks upon national honour as a shadow that is always to be sacrificed to the substance of immediate interest; and some had been so alarmed by the wild doctrines which were then beginning to threaten society in France, that they thought that military despotism should rather be protected than attacked, and that one Narvaez was better than twenty Louis Blancs.

Under ordinary circumstances, the downfall of Louis Philippe, and any movement that had overthrown the monstrous despotism which General Narvaez had established in Spain, would have been hailed with satisfaction; but a sudden change had taken place in public opinion in England, especially amongst the higher classes in London, where the dread of an insurrection had completely changed the ordinary tone of opinion.

The doctrines of M. Ledru Rollin, and M. Louis Blanc, taken up by the working classes in England, the monster meeting which was called together for

the purpose of supporting those doctrines, and bringing about, if any chance should afford the opportunity, a Government in England similar to that which, subverting the existing system of society, seemed likely to be established in France, had created a sympathy in favour of any Government, however bad, which by any means, however arbitrary or ferocious, maintained itself in power. The disposition of the drawing-rooms, at least of our metropolis, was then rather in favour of the Spanish Government than hostile to it, and a presumptuous feeling excited against Lord Palmerston (the facts being yet unknown) sufficiently strong to induce some of his friends to think it advisable to admit that our conduct might have been blamable, but that in such case the fault must be attributed to me and not to my chief.

The arbitrary acts of Narvaez, which at other times would have produced the loudest expressions of execration, were approved as the vigorous efforts of authority to restore order. The liberal sentiments of Lord Palmerston were viewed with distrust, and his colleagues were generally disposed to make me the scapegoat for his proceedings. It had so happened, however, that Lord Palmerston had twice, in the most decided manner, approved that conduct, at the same time that he had refused me the leave of absence which, foreseeing that the position, if I was to maintain a struggle against such a desperate man as the Spanish premier, would ere long be unten-

able, I had solicited. Any blame, therefore, given to me, fell necessarily on my chief.

This was the state of things which I found in London; but my presence, and perhaps more than that, the accusations of the Spanish Government against me now made known, at once settled public opinion.

These accusations, indeed, though they might be propagated in Spain, where no journals that did not repeat them were allowed to appear, were too absurd to obtain a moment's attention out of it.

I had employed her Majesty's ships to rove round the Spanish coast in order to excite insurrection; I had corrupted the Spanish troops by largesses of English guineas. The Spanish Government did not accuse the English Government of any complicity in these designs or acts. I was the person who, unauthorized, had committed them.

Neither M. Guizot nor any one else could give a moment's credence to such trash. But it was not difficult to say, "Of course Bulwer is absurdly accused, but you may depend on it Palmerston must have done something, or instructed him to do something, which has caused all these stories." Lord Aberdeen, than whom no man was more disposed to be just, but over whom the great capacity and authoritative manner of M. Guizot had a considerable influence, somewhat inclined to this opinion; and he asked me whether I should have any objection to meet Sir Robert Peel with him and answer such

questions, as they might deem it necessary on public grounds, and without any party motives, to put to me. Before giving a positive reply, I submitted the question to Lord Palmerston, saying fairly that I would avoid such a meeting if he wished me, but that if I attended it, I should answer all that was asked me fully and without any disguise.

He said at once, "By all means go. You can better answer about yourself than I can; and as for me, I have said and done nothing which I am not ready to avow and defend." I went consequently to Sir Robert Peel, where I met Lord Aberdeen, and related in detail all that occurred in Spain, since the French revolution of February. It was easy to show that my own conduct had been strictly guided by my instructions, and that I had personally done my utmost to avoid a quarrel with the violent man at the head of Spanish affairs, having even requested permission to come to England on private affairs—but he had allowed no intermediate course. He had requested an ally in the English minister, or determined on considering him an enemy. The first alternative being impossible, he adopted the second.

In regard to Lord Palmerston, I did not attempt to deny that his communications had been such as to make me understand that he should like to see a change in the administration in Spain. That he himself did not think it unlikely that the Orleans dynasty would eventually be replaced, and that it would be well that they should not, in such case, find

the men who, Lord Palmerston imagined, with some exaggeration perhaps, were its tools, in power. He thought, also, that the violent course pursued by the Duke of Valencia was not only unjust in itself, but not unlikely to have dangerous consequences, and that if it did, the connection between the duke and the Crown might not merely bring about a change of ministry, but the fall of the monarchy itself. I was, therefore, authorized and enjoined to favour such a change as I have described by suitable means, but that of course no orders had been given me to encourage violent ones or to employ money or vessels for that object.

Sir Robert Peel put to me several questions, listened with great patience and attention to my replies, and finally said he was perfectly satisfied, and that he should condemn the conduct of the Spanish Government, and not sanction any attack on the policy of the Foreign Office; a promise which, when a discussion took place on the motion of Mr. Bankes, he strictly adhered to; indeed, Lord Canning came to me after the discussion was over to say that there had not been a single dissentient voice.

A singular turn, however, took place in affairs in Spain. At the moment I left, it was rising in all directions. People expected that General Narvaez had, by this last act of violence, set the seal on his fate; and had the slightest intention of resenting his conduct been manifested by us, the Court was prepared to give every satisfaction, and dismiss

him. For we had but to send a fleet to Cadiz and hold up our little finger, and Narvaez and his seconds would have fallen down like a pack of cards. The queen-mother, who trembled for a large portion of her property, engaged in speculations in Cuba, would have been the first to desert him. The army, not a regiment of which he could rely upon, would have shouted vivas to his successor. There is no satisfaction we could have demanded that would not have been gratefully given and prodigally offered. I need hardly say that this was the course which Lord Palmerston proposed to the Cabinet, and I am fully persuaded that Sir Robert Peel, who was keenly alive to the honour of the country, would have accepted it.

When it was perceived that we submitted to the insult we had received, an immediate revulsion in feeling took place. The pride of the Spaniard was gratified at having braved with impunity the power of Great Britain. Every one became suddenly disposed to truckle to the man who had bullied Lord Palmerston. Spanish statesmen were encouraged in that policy, which finally snapped the sceptre, too frequently used as a bludgeon. The triumph in the name of the Spanish Crown was dearly bought by the Spanish monarchy, since it began the history of calamities which have left Queen Isabella a hopeless and crownless exile. Ambitious men who aspired at despotic rule in other countries were tempted by the example; for the

triumph of M. de Morny, in the winter of 1851, was a mere imitation of the triumph of General Narvaez in the spring of 1848, whilst in furnishing Baron Brunnow with the conviction, a little later communicated to his Court, that England would submit to any degradation sooner than go to war to resent it, we brought about that conflict in the East, by which no one profited, and of which the renewal will be always menacing us at any moment that we are thought unequal in mind or strength to engage in it. So certain is it that unreasoning violence and over-hesitating forbearance have alike to pay the forfeit that is ultimately exacted from all exaggeration. Never was extreme caution the parent of more desperate consequences. But for these consequences Lord Palmerston was not responsible. Had his advice been followed, it is more than probable that Queen Isabella would still have been on her throne in Madrid; that a constitutional Government would have been long since established firmly in France; and that the campaign of the Crimea would have been avoided.

There is nothing so fatal to a great country in critical times as to be governed by small men, who are not sympathetic with the power in their hands, and who shrink before perils which, like other phantoms, disappear when you have but the courage to approach them. The effect produced on Lord Palmerston's reputation was also disadvantageous.

CHAPTER VIII.

LETTERS ON THE SPANISH MARRIAGES AND OUR
RELATIONS WITH SPAIN.

DRAMATIS PERSONÆ.

QUEEN-MOTHER, CHRISTINA.

QUEEN ISABELLA and her sister, the Infanta (DOÑA FERNANDA).

DON FRANCISCO (Duke of Cadiz) and DON ENRIQUE, sons of Don Francisco de Paula and first cousins to Queen Isabella.

COUNT TRAPANI, brother of Queen-Mother and of the King of Naples.

DUC DE MONTPENSIER, son of Louis Philippe, King of the French.

PRINCE LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG.

COUNT MONTEMOLIN, son of Don Carlos, in whose favour his father renounced his claim to the throne.

RIANZARES, husband of the Queen-Mother.

“ Foreign Office, July 19, 1846.

“ MY DEAR BULWER,

“ Upon the question of the Marriage I have little, if anything, to add to what I have said in my despatch. I mention three candidates, although the public only talk of Coburg and Don Henry; but I know, because Guizot told me so at Paris, that the French Government contemplate the Duke of Cadiz for the Queen, if Trapani should prove to be an impos-

sibility; and when Cadiz is married to the Queen, they mean Montpensier to marry the Infanta. Cadiz is preferred by them to Henry, for a reason similar to that on account of which Trapani is preferred to Cadiz—namely, on account of his insignificance and want of those qualities which the husband of the Queen ought to possess. But these are reasons which must make us think him the least eligible of the three, and I imagine that neither the two Queens nor anybody else in Spain would be for him. The choice, then, in reality lies between Coburg and Don Henry; and there is much for and against each. Coburg seems to be the favourite of the two Queens, and I suppose there is a party of a certain extent for him in Spain. Against him are Louis Philippe and the Progressista party; the latter, however, relatively rather than positively, and more because they prefer Don Henry than because they object to Coburg. We might, perhaps, object to Coburg as too much connected by marriage with the family of the King of the French; and Louis Philippe might, if he chose it, upon that very ground, represent Coburg as a French candidate. Against Don Henry is the enmity and fear of Christina; for him, the support of the Spanish Liberals and the Bourbon category laid down by Louis Philippe. In the present state of things we do not wish to throw the weight of our preference into the scales of either of the two candidates; we would rather wait and watch the course of events.

“ But the thing which is urgent is to effect a reconciliation between Christina and the Progressistas; and this can be done only by removing from her mind all apprehension that, in the event of their again obtaining power in Spain, they would use that power hostilely to her. There must be complete amnesty between them, and not only amnesty for the past, but security for the future. They must engage that by them she shall never be molested, either in regard to her residence in Spain, or in regard to her accounts during the minority of her daughter, or in regard to her pension, or any other of her money affairs. They must, in short, promise her a full discharge for her pecuniary responsibilities, and a guarantee, as far as they are concerned, that her future income will not be touched. She, on her part, should let them come back to Spain and take again their natural position in the country. How such an understanding is to be brought about between the two parties I am not quite prepared to say; and it is not desirable that you should take any open or active part in bringing it about;* though you might

* All these injunctions are well enough on paper, and applicable to some governments and some cases, but were inapplicable to Spain and the existing crisis. Queen Christina was in power; she was surrounded by her own party always faithful to her. The army of that party was in complete command. The Progressistas had revolted against her at La Granja, forced her to quit Spain, subsequently, to give place to Espartero. Don Enrique was a young prince of unstable character, but always inclined to be hostile to her. To expect she would by any intrigue with the men always inimical to her lose the confidence of those always faithful to her, was a chimera.

suggest it to any of the confidential friends of Christina with whom you may be in habits of intercourse. In the mean while it will be well for you to get into more frequent communication with the Liberal party, and, among the rest, with Don M. Tejada, General Chacon, Don Pedro Collado, and Señor Gamboa, one of the former Ministers. These are persons whom Olozaga has mentioned to me. You will, however, of course not begin by making any suggestions to them, but hear any which they may make to you; but you may say that the British Government is most desirous of seeing peace and order restored in Spain, and that we are of opinion that this can never be done until Christina and the Liberal party are reconciled to each other, and are brought to place confidence again in each other; and that, although we know that we have no natural or proper connection with such a negotiation, we shall be glad to be useful in any way in assisting it to a successful issue. One step, as a preliminary, would be useful, and that is, that somebody in whom Christina has confidence should be sent as soon as possible to ascertain and report to her the personal disposition of Don Henry in regard to her. She fancies it to be hostile; I am informed that it is quite the reverse. On this point you might, if you have any means of doing so confidentially, suggest that she should send to Brussels Señor Pastor, a friend of Salamanca's. He might come or return through London, so as to have an opportunity of conversing

with Olozaga. It would not be safe, however, to communicate on these matters with Isturitz, who, of course, wishes to keep up the dissensions in Spain which he may think useful to his own personal interests.*

“†The next thing to be desired is that the Ministry should be modified by getting rid of some of the Arbitrary Power men and filling their places by moderate Moderados, so as to get back to legal order and constitutional government. But this is a matter which you cannot well mix yourself up with, and which must be left for the Spaniards themselves to manage. My information goes to imply that, if Christina’s fears of the Liberal party could be removed, she would cease to cling to the Reign of Terror men, and would not be disinclined to make an Administration of moderate and liberal-minded men.

“Bresson wrote a long letter to Minto, desiring him to urge upon me the expediency of explaining and opening all my most secret thoughts and wishes about Spain to Guizot—probably that he might be the better able to counteract me. However, as all I want is that Spain should be free, tranquil, and

* An intrigue with the Queen-mother against her favourite Minister had little chance of success.

† This advice—quite reasonable, and which I endeavoured to follow—was nevertheless impracticable in that country, where two and two do not make four. The Progressistas had withdrawn from my house because I received the Moderados who were in office. The Moderados would withdraw if I courted the Progressistas back again.

independent, I shall of course explain those views to Guizot, but with a foreknowledge that his objects in regard to Spain are hitherto just the reverse, and that, therefore, unless he changes his policy, which is not quite impossible, you and Bresson will not receive those identical instructions which Bresson is so anxious should be sent to you. But Guizot and I are personally upon the most friendly terms, and are equally anxious in the main to preserve the *entente cordiale*. By-the-by, however, as I told him in a conversation we had at Paris, the marriage of Montpensier to the Infanta would seem to me nearly as objectionable as his marriage to the Queen, and would be almost equally injurious to the friendly relations between England and Spain, and England and France. I should hope that such a marriage may be prevented, but the best thing that could happen would be that the disinclination to it should have its origin in Spain, and that we should not have to make objections to an arrangement proposed by Christina for her daughter. If Coburg married the Queen, Don Henry might marry the Infanta, or *vice versâ*. But I mention all these things rather that you may know our views and opinions than in order that you should at present take any steps upon them. I shall write again soon.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. H. L. Bulwer.

“ Foreign Office, August 3, 1846.

“ MY DEAR BULWER,

“ I am glad to find by Jerningham’s letter, received to-day, that the Spanish Government have no hostile intentions against Portugal ; but they should be reminded of the treaties by which we are bound to protect Portugal ; and they should, moreover, not forget that a refusal to deliver up refugees, where no treaty engagement to surrender them exists, is not a legitimate cause of war.*

“ It is, I think, very desirable that Don Enrique should pay a visit to England, but he cannot come unless Tacon, the Spanish chargé d’affaires, is authorized to present him at Court. By the etiquette of the British Court, no prince of a foreign royal family can be presented to our sovereign unless it be by the diplomatic representative of the Court to which such prince belongs. This rule is convenient and cannot be changed, nor can any exception be made to it. It was by this rule that we have been enabled to avoid receiving the ex-Duke of Brunswick at Court without entering into personal questions with him. But it would be unbecoming both for Don Henry and for the Royal Family of Spain that he should come here, and not be treated with respect by the Court and the Ministers ; and yet he could not

* The Spanish Government—then inclined to be despotic—was for aiding the Queen of Portugal, who favoured a similar policy ; and was seeking on various pretexts to do so.

be so treated unless Tacon be authorized to present him.*

“Whether he marry the Queen or not, he must necessarily play a part in Spanish affairs; and it would be good for him, for the Royal Family, and for Spain, that he should come over here, and receive those impressions, and hear that advice which he would meet with in this country. Moreover, as he has been at Paris, at Brussels, and, I believe, at the Hague, to forbid him from coming here, or to prevent him from coming in the only character in which it would be fitting or useful for him to appear, namely, as a Spanish prince, would not be very complimentary to us. Try what you can do about this, and the sooner the better.

“Upon the Marriage question our opinion becomes confirmed by reflection. If the marriage of Coburg to the Queen could be effected with the full consent and concurrence of the Spaniards, and would not bring them into a bad understanding with France, and especially if it was not to be followed by the marriage of Montpensier to the Infanta, we, the English Government, should see with pleasure a good cross introduced into the Royal Family of Spain; but I doubt whether, even in that case, those members of the Coburg family who are now here would not think the position in which Coburg would thus find himself more full of difficulties and of dangers than of

* Don Enrique had quitted Spain, hostile to the Court, and was considered leagued with the party hostile to the Government.

compensating advantages. The general opinion of those whose judgment in this matter has most weight is that the best arrangement would be that Enrique should marry the Queen, and Coburg the Infanta. But the great object to be accomplished in the interest of England is to prevent a French prince from marrying either the Queen or the Infanta. If Montpensier marries the Infanta, it will, as I have before stated, be as bad as if he married the Queen; and will give France equal if not greater power over the policy of Spain. It was bad enough for England in the last century to find herself engaged in differences and wars with Spain, not upon Spanish, but upon French grounds; but now that France occupies upwards of 500 miles of the opposite coast of Africa, and is creating a large naval station at Algiers, the inconvenience would become still greater. Such a marriage would destroy all confidence, and put an end to all good understanding on our part both with France and Spain, and we should be driven to seek a counterpoise in closer and more intimate alliances with other powers whose feelings and policy may not be as congenial with those of France and Spain as our own up to this moment are. In short, the marriage of a French prince with either of the daughters of Christina would be a plain and public declaration to Europe that both Spain and France are looking forward to a combined war against England; and we should have to govern our conduct and measures accordingly. Louis Philippe of course

prefers this marriage for the same reasons which make us object to it; but he is too wise and sagacious to try to force it on, if he finds a resistance at Madrid and at London, and we should have no objection whatever to Christina making her knowledge of our sentiments about it a reason for altering her mind and proposing another and a different husband for her daughter. Louis Philippe has hitherto maintained, in regard to Montpensier, that marrying the Infanta was quite a different thing from marrying the Queen; and that his marriage to the Infanta was perfectly compatible with the understanding established with our Government that no French prince should be the husband of the sovereign of Spain. This ground taken up by him ought to debar him from objecting to the marriage of Coburg with the Infanta, upon the same pretence of Bourbon dynasty considerations upon which he objected to Coburg's marriage with the Queen. Nor can he say that we, having contended against Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta as being tantamount with his marriage to the Queen, are inconsistent in giving up Coburg as a candidate for the Queen, and afterwards supporting him as a candidate for the Infanta; for we have never admitted the validity of Louis Philippe's objection to Coburg as husband for the Queen, and only prefer Enrique, because, upon Spanish grounds, he seems the better candidate.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. H. Lytton Bulwer.

“Foreign Office, August 16, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“It is very difficult to satisfy oneself that any given course upon the Marriage question is the best. The view which I have explained in my despatch to you is that which we at present take of the matter; we think it would be far the best for Spain on the whole, and in the long run, that Isabella should have a Spanish husband; and that husband, if he is to be a Spanish prince, can be none other than Don Enrique; and I should say that it is for Isabella's interest to have him for a husband rather than for a sort of rival, or at least as head of the Opposition; and if the marriage was effected, I do not see why Christina should fear anything as to her future condition, provided proper arrangements were made and a suitable understanding come to about her future prospects and past accounts. As to Coburg, you yourself in your despatch advert to one ground of doubt, if not of objection, which makes us very loth to undertake the risk of advising him to become a candidate. You say that all you have said respecting him depends upon his personal qualities; that if he is an ordinary man he will be swamped; but if he is a man of energy and ability he will become a great prince. Now I have not seen the Prince since he was here as a boy of twelve years old. He was then a sharp, quick lad, but nothing more. But I know what his father is; I know what his second brother, the heir to the father,

is; and I know what his sister, the Duchess of Nemours, is. If all these high and distinguished persons were to put together all the energy and ability which they severally possess, it would fall far short of the quantity necessary to endow a great prince. They are all of them, except the King of Portugal, below par. The chances, therefore, are against Prince Leopold being anything remarkable; and the best that can be hoped from him is, that he may turn out an ordinary man with not much less sense and judgment than the generality of mankind.*

“The long-delayed answer from the family will, I believe, soon now be sent off; it will probably be, that Prince Leopold cannot be advised to become a candidate as long as there is any Spanish prince a candidate, upon whom the choice may fall. Nobody (bear it in mind) except the French, any longer talks of the Bourbons as a class of candidates. You seem to think that such an answer, which may be considered as declining for the present, will induce Christina to fall back upon Trapani. I can hardly think so; Trapani is too odious to the nation to be chosen by the Court. But Christina may then try to patch up matters with the Duke of Cadiz, whom she would perhaps prefer on account of his Absolutist politics and

* Lord Palmerston's was a very sensible remark, and mine was a very exaggerated one; but the real question was whether Prince Leopold was likely to be a better man than Don Enrique; and whether the principle of submitting to the exclusion by France of every prince but a Bourbon was better than leaving to Spain the independent choice of a husband for her sovereign.

his personal insignificance; and Louis Philippe is for him, as Guizot told me when I was at Paris. He then said that Isabella would marry Don Francisco, the elder of the two brothers. This would be a very bad match for Spain, and therefore for us. But I think, from what Jarnac said to me two days ago, that the French Government would concur with us in recommending Enrique; though, perhaps, their recommendation would not be very warmly pressed—would be made for the express purpose of being rejected, and to serve by its rejection as a groundwork on which to claim our co-operation afterwards in recommending Don Francisco. But that we could not and would not do. The choice evidently lies between Enrique and Coburg. Jarnac spoke to me about the Duke of Cadiz; but I said I considered him disqualified, and that there could be no use in endeavouring to marry Isabella to a prince who would become personally ridiculous and politically a nonentity.

“Jarnac and Guizot want to make out that a distinct understanding was come to, between the French Government and Aberdeen,* that France on the one hand should withdraw Montpensier or any son of Louis Philippe from the list of candidates, and that England on her side should prevent Prince Leopold from marrying the Queen. I tell Jarnac that I find no trace of such an agreement on record, and that it

* No such understanding was ever come to or even approached, if I am to believe Lord Aberdeen, whose word was that of a man of strict honour.

does not tally with anything that Aberdeen told me on these matters; and that it is an agreement, at all events, which we cannot adopt. I tell him that we cannot for a moment admit of any parity of position, as regards political jealousy, between France and England, between a son of the King of the French, and a third son of a German nobleman; seeing, moreover, that, while on the one hand that third son is brother-in-law to a French prince and to a French princess, he is only cousin to the husband of our Queen. I say that, even if the candidate in question were the Prince George of Cambridge, he could hardly be said to be so closely allied to the Crown of England as Montpensier is to the Crown of France. I tell Jarnac that we do not adopt the French category of Bourbon descendants of Philip V., and that we do not admit that the French Government are entitled to object to Coburg as the representative of English influence. But I say that, although I cannot yet tell him officially the opinion of the English Government upon a matter which the pressure of domestic questions has prevented the Cabinet from considering, my own individual opinion, and that of such of my colleagues as have given their attention to these matters, is, that a Spanish prince would, on the whole, be the best husband for Isabella; and that the only Spanish prince who could properly be chosen, would be Enrique. To this, as I have said above, Jarnac replied by expressing his belief that if we would settle down to that decision the

French Government would go along with us in pressing that arrangement upon Christina.* I said I would let him know when the Cabinet had been able to consider the matter.

“I have not as yet broached, in conversation with Jarnac (St. Aulaire is in France on leave), the question of Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta. I have purposely abstained from doing so, because the impediments to that marriage had better, in the first instance at least, be created in Spain. Whenever we have got a guarantee there against such a marriage, we shall have no difficulty in coming to an understanding with the French Government that it shall not take place.

“The language I hold to Jarnac is purposely general, and applicable to Montpensier’s marriage with the Infanta as well as with the Queen. I tell him that it is a great and paramount object with us that Spain should be independent, and that her policy should be founded upon Spanish and not upon French considerations; so that if ever we should have the misfortune of finding ourselves engaged in war with France, we should not merely on that account, and without any separate quarrel with Spain, find ourselves involved in war with Spain also. That this

* The treacherous policy of the French Cabinet at this time was evidently to encourage Lord Palmerston to persist in pushing forward Don Enrique, because it knew that by this means it was throwing Christina into the arms of France. Count Jarnac was an innocent victim of his chief, and gave in good faith the assurances which there was no intention to realise.

independence of Spain would be endangered, if not destroyed, by the marriage of a French prince into the Royal Family of Spain; and that as, on the one hand, France would be entitled to object to such a marriage being contracted by an English prince, so England is entitled to object to such a marriage being contracted by a French one. That such an objection on our part may seem uncourteous, and may be displeasing; but that the friendships of States and Governments must be founded upon national interest, and not upon personal likings. That France values the friendship of England, and England the friendship of France, not merely from personal sentiment, but from the conviction of political utility; but that we should be purchasing too dearly the present good-will of France, if, to obtain it, we were to sacrifice great national interests, and to create for ourselves dangers and embarrassments in the future. I tell you all this, because it is useful that you should know exactly how we stand in these matters as regards France, and that we consider ourselves free to follow the course which we think the best, unfettered by any engagements towards France; though, of course, the effect which any particular proceeding of ours may have upon our relations with France must be an important element of any decision we may take.

“In a few words, then, the upshot of the matter is: we hold ourselves free to recommend to the Spanish Government any one of the candidates whom we may

think the best, whether he be Coburg or any other ; and we do not consider ourselves in any way bound to prevent Coburg from accepting an offer if made to him. But, upon the best of consideration we can give to the matter, and according to the information which we hitherto possess, we think that it would be best for all the parties concerned that Enrique should marry the Queen, and that Coburg should marry the Infanta ; and that is the arrangement we wish you to try for. We cannot think that the reluctance of Christina to agree to this arrangement may not be overcome ; and if she was to determine upon it and carry it out at once, no disinclination of Louis Philippe to the Infanta's marriage with Coburg would signify a straw ; he would be out of court, and could not be listened to. The next best arrangement would be, that Coburg should marry the Queen, and Enrique the Infanta ; but this would not be by far so good a scheme. We are not sure, and, in fact, do not know, whether Coburg would accept the offer for the Queen. I am sure that Louis Philippe's assertion to Cowley the other day, that Coburg, when last he passed through Paris, told him (Louis Philippe) that he should decline, is not true ; the probability is that he would accept ; but it is by no means sure that he would make a good King-Consort. He might, or he might not ; and if national feeling and jealousy ran strong against him, he might, or he might not, have judgment, discretion, and strength of character enough to steer safely through the intricacies of his course.

“But either of these arrangements, if determined upon by the Spanish Government and adopted by the Cortes, we should be ready to support by all our moral influence and means.

“Of objections we have but one; and that one is, to the marriage of a French prince to a Spanish princess on the throne, or next door to it; and I wish you to make Christina, Rianzares, and Isturitz aware that we should consider such a marriage as a measure of contingent hostility to England, on the part both of Spain and of France, and that we should be obliged to shape our future course with regard to both those powers accordingly.

“I have sent you some instructions about slave-trade matters; but you may, if you think it best, postpone acting upon them till this Marriage question is brought nearer to a settlement.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“Do not imagine that I show all my despatches to Jarnac; I showed him the first and gave it him to take home with him and copy if he liked it,* because

* The misfortune was, that the despatch was not only calculated to raise the apprehensions of Louis Philippe about a prince of Saxe-Coburg, to support whom Lord Palmerston was not in reality inclined, but it was also a violent and uncalled-for attack on the men in power in Spain, by whom all questions concerning Spanish politics had to be decided, and who of course were at once informed by Louis Philippe of the language which our Government held respecting them.

“After a struggle, of now thirty-four years’ duration, for constitutional freedom, Spain finds herself under a system of government almost

to do so was the civilest way of conveying to the knowledge of Louis Philippe opinions about Spanish questions which I well knew to be at variance with his views."

To the Right Hon. Lord Cowley.

"(Private.)

"Foreign Office, August 17, 1846.

"MY DEAR LORD COWLEY,

"I send you two lines by this messenger to beg you to assure Guizot, that I am quite convinced that no member of the British Government, nor any person connected with it, had anything to do with the article in the *Times* about the Spanish Marriage, and the personal attack on the King of the French which that article contained. The *Times* at present takes the line of supporting Lord John Russell's

as arbitrary in practice, whatever it may be in theory, as any which ever existed in any former period of her history. She has, indeed, a Parliament by law; but all freedom of election for the members of that Parliament has been overborne by force or by other means; and no sooner does the Parliament meet than, upon the first manifestation of any opinion not in accordance with that of the Executive Government, the Parliament is either prorogued or dissolved. There is, indeed, by law, liberty of the press; but that liberty has, by the arbitrary acts of the Government, been reduced to the liberty of publishing what may be agreeable to the executive, and little or nothing else. There are, indeed, by law, tribunals for the trial of persons accused of offences and crimes; but numbers of persons have been arrested, imprisoned, banished, and even, in some cases, executed, not only without condemnation, but even without trial"—*Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer, July 19, 1846.*

All that Lord Palmerston says here is perfectly true; but it could not be agreeable to hear it as the opinion of the English Government, through the medium, and with the comments of the French Government.

Government, and I hope it may continue to do so; but the *Times* writes entirely from its own inspirations, and everybody in England well knows that the corporation called the *Times* find it more for their interest to write from day to day in such manner as they think best calculated to promote the sale of their paper, than to follow the advice, much less the dictation, of any individuals or Government.

“I was very sorry to read the most unjust and personally offensive attack on Clarendon, in the *Journal des Débats*, which was the more mischievous in its tendencies and effects because it is well known, or at least generally supposed, that the *Débats* is not only in acknowledged communication with the Government and the Court, but actually receives an annual subsidy from them in aid of its expenses; and, therefore, what appears in that paper bears a very different character from a stray paragraph in one of our London newspapers. Normanby will be off to Paris to-morrow.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. H. Lytton Bulwer.

“Foreign Office, August 22, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“My messenger has been unavoidably detained some days after I meant to have sent him off. This enables me to say how glad we were to learn by your private letter, which came by the post, that orders have been given for the return of the Spanish

troops from the frontier of Portugal. I trust that that French intrigue has been effectually defeated.

“The despatch which I send you by this messenger about the Marriage question contains the opinion which we have all come to, as to what would be the best match for Isabella; and I have been told by a person who has been a good deal at Madrid lately, and who is not a Spaniard nor a Progressista, that the general notion is that Isabella has a preference and personal liking for Enrique.

“I have had several conversations on these matters with Jarnac. I have hitherto said that the Cabinet had come to no decision on the matter; that we certainly, however, could not, as he and his Government wish us to do, make any objection to Coburg, or admit for a moment that there is the least parity of political connection between Coburg and England, and between Montpensier and France. But I have said that my own private opinion is, that a Spanish prince would be best, that there are but two Spanish princes to choose from, and that the English Government could not honestly recommend a ridiculous prince like the Duke of Cadiz; and that, consequently, there is no eligible Spanish prince but Enrique. And I said that I know this to be also the opinion of Lord John Russell, Lord Clarendon, and such others of the Government who have given their attention to Spanish affairs. Jarnac’s last statement to me was that, if the British Government would recommend Enrique, the French Government would do so

too.* Now that I am sending^g you off this instruction, I shall see Jarnac again and ask him to get Bresson instructed to take this line. But we cannot act jointly with France—though we may and ought to act in co-operation with her, if she is willing to take the same line that we do—because we must not place ourselves upon the same footing of authoritative dictation which she has endeavoured to stand upon.

“I have some doubts whether the French Government or Bresson will co-operate in earnest in favour of Enrique. The only thing that could make them do so would be the belief which they begin to entertain that the choice will practically lie between Enrique and Coburg; otherwise they would be tempted to let Enrique be rejected, in order to fall back upon Cadiz. But these manœuvres would be much baffled if the Montpensier match was out of the question.

“I own I am not without doubt whether Christina will agree to Enrique, even if England and France recommend him, but the rational probability is that she will do so. There is but one way in which she could carry the Coburg marriage, and that is by assembling the Cortes, and by presenting that match to the Coburg family as the unanimous wish of the Court, the Government, the Cortes, and the nation.

* I have already said that this could never have been stated with sincerity; and, being said now, induced Lord Palmerston, just at this crisis, when the Spanish Government was more or less doubtful, to persist in a course which threw that Government necessarily into the hands of his opponents.

In such case, the objections of Louis Philippe would be silenced, and the hesitation of the Coburg family would be overcome. But would it be possible to obtain such unanimity, and is the object in view of sufficient importance to make worth while the efforts necessary to accomplish it, and the risk and embarrassment which might attend failure in any step of so complicated a proceeding?

“If the whole succeeded, Spain would have to sustain for some time to come the ill-will of France;* and though invasion and war are of course out of the question, there are many ways in which neighbours can plague each other. But, to say the truth, I am not sure that the Coburg nerves would be stout enough to beard Louis Philippe, when the thing came to the point. In that case, the family would try to soothe him and to obtain his acquiescence, and that would have to be purchased by the marriage of Montpensier to the Infanta;† and we—England—

* This is true; but if she refused to conclude a marriage between the Duc de Montpensier and Doña Fernanda she would have to sustain the ill-will of France; and this we were engaging her to refuse. There was no half part to take; we had to allow Spain to succumb to France to satisfy her, or to support her to resist France—or rather the King of the French—and be prepared for his Majesty’s displeasure.

† The Queen-mother would have been willing to make a condition, if the Queen married the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, and Louis Philippe assumed to be offended in consequence, that she, holding herself then to be released from her engagement, would not sanction the marriage of her other daughter with the French prince; though she undoubtedly would not have been well-disposed to give her to Don Enrique, for whom we—without any knowledge of his character, or any other knowledge of him, than that he was hostile to the Queen-mother’s party and friends—showed such a singular predilection.

should then be the sufferers by the second match, without being in any respect gainers by the first.

“The only respect in which English interests would benefit by the Coburg match would be that these swell-mob quarrels with Portugal might be of rarer occurrence. But, as they are only sham rows, got up to favour some act of pocket-picking, we never can be unable to deal with them effectually.

“I can easily understand that Christina and Rianzares would prefer for Isabella a husband unconnected with any party in Spain, and friendly to them ; but these are temporary considerations, applying to the momentary interests of two or three individuals,* and do not furnish adequate grounds for a decision upon a question which involves the permanent interests of a nation. On the whole, therefore, we wish you to try all you can do in favour of Enrique, and for Coburg for the second sister. We are sure that such an arrangement would be a good one. In regard to any other, we do not clearly see our way.

“I am glad you are getting better, and hope your weather is grown cooler, as well as ours.

“The article in the *Times* about the Marriage, with which I had nothing to do, has, I think, had a good effect at Paris, and has thrown Louis Philippe upon his defence, and has rather abated his assumption of a right to dictate.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

* But the question at issue was to be decided at the moment by the two or three individuals on whose pleasure or displeasure everything depended.

"F. O., 25 August, 1846.

"MY DEAR BULWER,

"There seems a fatality against my sending off this messenger, but at last he is going. I have nothing more to add to what I have said to you publicly and privately, except that I am told that accounts have been received here in London that the marriage of the Duke of Cadiz to the Queen is settled. This would be discreditable both to Christina and to Louis Philippe, but it is very possible. As far as we are concerned, the most important thing is to prevent Montpensier marrying the Infanta. It is not very material to British interests whether Isabella marries Coburg, Henry, or Francisco, excepting that the latter is an absolute and Absolutist fool, and that we wish Spain to have as much sense and brains in the Palace as possible, and an Absolutist husband would be always trying to overthrow the Constitution and leaning upon France for support, and, therefore, we wish for Henry, and cannot recommend Francisco.

"Isturitz's talk about revolutions, &c., is very much to throw dust in our eyes; but of course there is a standing conspiracy of all rational men against such a system of misgovernment as has been going on in Spain.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

The next letter announced that the French had won the game.—The Comte de Jarnac was chargé d'affaires in London.

“Hertford House, le 2 septembre, 1846, au soir.

“MON CHER LORD PALMERSTON,

“J’apprends que le 28 août la Reine d’Espagne a arrêté et décrété son mariage avec le Duc de Cadiz, et qu’Elle a consenti au mariage de l’Infante sa sœur avec M. le Duc de Montpensier. Je n’ai aucuns détails encore, comme vous le jugerez bien, d’après les dates, mais je m’empresse de vous transmettre, comme je la reçois, cette importante nouvelle, ne sachant au juste où elle vous parviendra.

“Mille compliments empressés,

“JARNAC.”

To the Comte de Jarnac.

“Penzance, le 6 sept. 1846.

“MON CHER COMTE DE JARNAC,

“J’ai reçu avec des regrets bien sincères les nouvelles que vous m’avez communiquées par votre billet du 2, et que j’avais déjà apprises par une lettre de Lord Normanby.

“Quant au mariage de la Reine d’Espagne à l’Infant don François, vous savez déjà ce que j’en pense, et je me bornerai pour le moment à dire que c’est du moins une consolation pour nous de savoir qu’on ne peut pas reprocher au gouvernement anglais d’avoir prêté la main à cet arrangement.

“Quant au mariage projeté entre l’Infante et le Duc de Montpensier, cela est pour nous une affaire beaucoup plus grave, et si ce projet venait à se

réaliser, ce ferait, on n'en peut douter, un événement de fort mauvais augure pour les relations futures entre l'Angleterre et la France. Je ne vous parlerai plus d'entente cordiale, parce que, ce qu'on nous annonce par rapport aux affaires de l'Espagne ne nous prouve que trop clairement qu'on ne veut plus à Paris ni de cordialité ni d'entente. Mais la base de la politique du gouvernement anglais d'aujourd'hui et de demain comme de celle d'hier, est et sera amitié aussi étroite que possible entre la France et l'Angleterre. Mais l'amitié a les conditions d'existence. Vous me direz peut-être (et ce n'est pas moi qui le niarait), que les peuples n'ont pas de cousins, que toute chose a sa valeur, et qu'on peut acheter trop cher l'amitié de son voisin ; et vous croyez que le mariage projeté pour le Duc de Montpensier assurerait à la France des avantages politiques en Espagne, qui lui serviraient de compensations bien amples, et au-delà, pour la perte de l'amitié de l'Angleterre. Eh bien, moi qui crois que bonne amitié et bonne entente entre nos deux pays contribueraient à la longue plus efficacement au bien-être des deux que tous les projets d'ambition que l'un ou l'autre des deux gouvernements pourrait se former, moi, je vous répondrais que je doute que ce calcul soit juste. Mais ce dont je ne puis douter, c'est que ce calcul se fonde sur des provisions pour l'avenir dont la réalisation serait remplie de malheurs pour les trois pays.

“Je serai encore pendant deux ou trois jours courant

les mers dans la flotille royale,* mais je tâcherai d'avoir un entretien avec vous à Londres sur cette affaire importante vers la fin de cette semaine, ou au commencement de la semaine prochaine.

“Tout à vous,

“PALMERSTON.”

Jarnac replied evasively, but with protestations of amity.—Lord Clarendon, then a member of the Cabinet, writes :—

“The Grove, Sept. 13, 1846.

“MY DEAR PALMERSTON,

“I send you two letters from Wm. Hervey, one of which may be useful in case you intend to refer to the Treaty of Utrecht in any remonstrance you address to the French Government; the other shows how entirely he, on the spot and with good means of judging, concurs in the expediency of the course you told me on Friday you should pursue. In my letter to him I had complained of the apathy of the people here upon foreign affairs, and that public opinion had not manifested itself as I could have wished upon the disgraceful conduct of L. Philippe. Wm. Hervey's remarks upon this point are reasonable, I think.

“I had a long talk with Jarnac and Dumont to-day, and told them both in strong terms, but in a friendly tone, what grave cause of complaint we had

* It is to be remarked that the time for deciding and announcing the marriage was when the Queen and her principal Ministers were yachting, and when it was consequently impossible for a cabinet to be called together.

against France; that there had been neither *entente* nor *cordiality*; that our wishes and opinions had been utterly disregarded; that ever since the change of Government there had been a disposition to find fault, merely to mask their own underhand game; that they could not believe what they said of our having put forward the Coburg prince *en première ligne* as a candidate for the Queen; and that for the consequences of breaking up the friendly relations between the two Governments we were not responsible; but that I feared they would be felt, not alone with respect to Spain, but in every part of the world. I told Jarnac besides, that he might rely upon it there was but one opinion in the Cabinet with respect to the manner in which we had been dealt with by his Government. He made the best case he could; but it amounted to nothing at all beyond complaints of delay in answering his first proposals, and want of confidence in not frankly communicating any objections felt here to the Montpensier marriage. Both he and Dumont, over and over again, said that the King had only acted *en bon père de famille*; and that if it had not been for the wealth of the Infanta he would never have thought of the marriage. Louis Philippe estimates it to be fifteen millions (fr.), and I suppose he must have good reason for believing it; but I never heard of her having a farthing; and I am sure Jarnac is wrong in thinking it was the provision made for her by Ferdinand. He certainly left a good deal of money, which as certainly was invested by Christina in the

French funds for her own use; and if her daughter is to depend upon her honesty or generosity for these millions, I believe and hope that Louis Philippe will get a penniless daughter-in-law.

“From Jarnac’s tone, I am sure they expect resistance of the marriage at Madrid, and possibly some personal affront to Montpensier when he goes there, which is to be attributed to us. I should think that Bulwer will require some warning* upon this, and upon not openly encouraging any insurrectionary movement.

“Yours sincerely,

“CLARENDON.”

* In relation to this remark, I may, for the first time, mention an incident which I may have related in a private letter to Lord Palmerston at the time, but I have not the copies of my private letters to refer to.

On the morning that the French princes entered Madrid, a young man of respectable appearance presented himself, bringing me a letter from a tradesman I employed, which said he had something particular to communicate to me.

He then told me that he and seven other young men had got an apartment in the street (I forget its name) where there are arcades, and by which the princes had to pass to the Palace; that they were in connection with others who would form a crowd near the house, and that as the princes stopped opposite their window they would shoot them. What he wished was, that, in case of accident or pursuit, they might find refuge at the Embassy. I let the young man proceed quietly, and then asked his name and address, which he gave me, but hesitated as to naming his friends. I then told him I should not betray him, but that I should warn the police to pay attention to the house he named, and that if I had the slightest reason to apprehend that he had not abandoned his plan, I should at once have him arrested and tried for his life. He seemed very much surprised; but finally retired awkwardly, saying that as I disapproved of the attempt, it would not be made.

“(Private.)

“Paris, September 11, 1846.

“MY DEAR CLARENDON,

“In continuation of what I have already written to you on the subject of the renunciation of the Duke of Orleans, the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht, and the Real Cedula of Philip V., I now enclose the *Español* of the 5th instant, containing an extract from the Treaty of Vienna, of 1725, between Spain and Austria, in which it is stipulated that the Crowns of Spain and France should *never* be united in the same person, ‘*nor in the same line.*’ The treaty is made in Latin, and the words are :—

“‘Perpetuâ et immutabili jam lege statutum, sancitumque permaneat, quod nullo unquam tempore monarchiæ Galliæ et Hispaniæ in unam eandemque personam, *nec in unam eandemque lineam* coalescere valeant.’

“There have been some symptoms in the journals, both of Madrid and Paris, who support the Montpensier marriage, of a disposition to endeavour to get rid of the obligations of those treaties by impugning their validity. I have not been able to examine thoroughly as yet into all the details of this question ; but I will tell you what I have ascertained in the short search which I have as yet had time to make into Marten, Koch, Henstell, Dumont, and Léonard.

“It appears that in our treaties of peace with Spain of 1809 and 1814, the treaty of *peace* of Utrecht was not specifically renewed. That those treaties are in force, however, I have always understood, and Guizot

himself, in a few observations which *he* made *to* me ten days ago, did not attempt to deny that they were so ; he merely contended that they went no further than to provide that the two Crowns should never be united on one head. The validity of the treaty is confirmed by the following facts :—

“ I.—In the Treaty of Paris of 1814 between the five powers, it is expressly provided (in the additional article) that the Treaties of 1805 and 1809 should be annulled. This is a tacit admission of the validity of other treaties.

“ II.—In the additional article to the same Treaty of 1814 between France and Prussia, it is expressly stipulated that the Treaties of Bâle of 1795, of Tilsit of 1807, and the Convention of Paris of 1808, shall be annulled. This is another tacit admission as to the validity of treaties not annulled.

“ III.—In the 107th Article of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, express mention is made of the Treaty of Utrecht as of a treaty in full force—‘*conformément au sens précis de l'article 8 du Traité d'Utrecht.*’

“ IV.—In the secret article to the Treaty of 1814 between England and Spain it is stipulated that Spain shall never renew any engagement of a nature similar to the family compact, or do anything to give England just ground of alarm on that subject. I have not yet been able to find this article, and cannot consequently quote the words ; but I believe the above is the sense of it.

“I do not give the above as forming by any means the whole of the evidence in favour of the validity of the Treaty of Utrecht, but merely as being all that I have as yet found. I have no doubt that there is plenty more, and of a very unequivocal kind, for I have always understood that that treaty was admitted to be binding.

“Some use has been made of the observation of Lord Aberdeen that our treaties with Spain were fallen into desuetude; but that observation applied only to treaties of commerce, and not to treaties of peace. At Utrecht we made *two* treaties with Spain—one of commerce, and one of peace.

“Even supposing, however, that the Treaty of Utrecht could be considered as abrogated, there can be no doubt as to the law of Spain* and the Cedula, which I sent to you, published in the *Español*, from

* En el art. 18 del mismo tratado se insertan los textos de las respectivas renunciaciones del EMPERADOR y de FELIPE V. El Emperador dice espresamente en la suya: *para que por ella adquiriera tambien su pleno vigor y efecto la renuncia del reino y corona de Francia que... Felipe V., rey de España y de las Indias, hizo por sí y sus descendientes el día 5 de Noviembre de 1712, á favor del Serenísimo duque de Orleans, y fue recibida por ley en España y ES COMO CONDICION DE LA NUESTRA: y tambien para que por esta nuestra renuncia se revaliden las que hicieron el Sermo. duque de Berry en Marly el día 24 de Noviembre de 1712, y el referido Sermo, duque de Orleans en Paris el 19 del mismo mes y ña fueron confirmados por los tratados de Utrech á 11 de Abril de 1713, y que con tan perpétua é inmutable ley, quede determinado y establecido que en ningún tiempo las monarquías de Francia y España puedan unirse en una misma persona, NI EN UNA MISMA LINEA.*

En la renuncia de FELIPE V., inserta en este tratado, se dice tambien que la hace para que quede establecido que en ningún tiempo las monarquías de Francia y España puedan llegar á unirse en una misma persona, NI EN UNA MISMA LINEA.

which it is clear that Montpensier's marriage with the Infanta cannot, according to the constitution of Spain, take place until the Queen has a child. This you may think, however, is a matter which concerns Spain more than England.

"If I find anything to throw further light upon this subject I will let you know. It may be remarked, however, that the arrangement made at Utrecht was one which concerned the *whole of Europe*, and could not be deranged by a war between any two of the parties to it.

"Ever yours most sincerely,

"W. HARVEY."

To the Right Hon. Edward Lytton Bulwer.

"Foreign Office, September 12, 1846.

"MY DEAR BULWER,

"I am coming round to the opinion that you have been right all along, and that we have been wrong, about this Spanish Marriage question. We ought to have at once and boldly adopted Coburg, and to have carried it in defiance of the French; but we were unwilling to break with France just on our first coming in, and we did not think the Coburg marriage a sufficiently strong English interest to justify us in doing so. However, France, or, rather, Louis Philippe and Guizot, have ill repaid us for our delicacy towards them. The only thing now to try for, is to prevent, if possible, the Montpensier marriage, and the main obstacle must come from Spain. Of course we cannot

dabble in insurrections, and can have nothing to do with the responsibility of encouraging measures of violence; but any extent of moral and political resistance will be fair and desirable. We shall strongly remonstrate at Paris, and I shall send you an instruction to do the like at Madrid, if you have not done so already. Nevertheless I conclude that you will already have made use of my despatch about the Montpensier match, in order to make known to the Government, and to other persons, our feelings upon the subject of that proposed marriage. It seems to me that the objection founded on the Treaty of Utrecht is a valid one, and may be usefully employed. Jarnac's excuse for his Government is that they thought we were urging the Coburg match, and therefore they urged the Cadiz one; and that Christina would not consent to give Isabella to Cadiz unless Louis Philippe agreed also to give Montpensier to the Infanta. This sounds like an invention, and does not tally with Guizot's boast to Normanby, '*j'ai agi.*'

"I think the constitutional objection to the marriage of the Infanta without the consent of the Cortes seems well founded. But can the Cortes be persuaded to stand up against the match?

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To the Right Hon. H. L. Bulwer.

“Broadlands, Sept. 16, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“I entirely approve of what you have been doing, and say as Lord Anglesea did to the Irish, ‘Agitate, agitate, agitate’—only take great care not to be mixed up with any schemes for insurrection. But though you must steer entirely clear of any such things, you need not interfere to overrule those who, from knowledge of their own, may think that they will obtain sufficient national support to make any attempt of this kind worth risking. You should, however, as I have no doubt you have done, endeavour to bring the Moderados and Progressistas together;* and if the Carlists had any sense—which I presume they have not, for if they had they would have ceased to be Carlists—they would unite with the other two parties, to make a great national effort to rescue their country from French domination.

“I have written to Jarnac, in order that he might send my note to Paris, and have actually stated to him and Dumont (the Minister of Public Works, now in England, and who came here yesterday with Jarnac) that if the present Government of France shall persist in adopting the system of unscrupulous ambition which guided the foreign policy of France under Louis XIV. and Napoleon, there is no good-

* I succeeded in bringing many of the more moderate Moderados to agree to an union with the Progressistas: but the Progressistas would agree to nothing but their own entire domination.

will and friendly feeling on the part of England which can be strong enough to prevent the relations between England and France from becoming again such as they were during the reigns of Napoleon and Louis XIV. The feeling of the Queen, Lord John Russell, Clarendon, and all our colleagues who have thought of these matters, is alike. We are all indignant at the bad faith, and unscrupulous ambition, and base intrigues of the French Government. It is hard to say whether they have behaved worst in forcing upon poor Isabella a husband whom she dislikes and despises, and who may be a husband only in name, or towards us, in promoting a marriage to which they well knew we had strong and well-founded political objections, and which Louis Philippe and Guizot had personally assured the Queen and Aberdeen should in no case take place till Isabella should have had children, and till the succession should thus have been secured. I told Dumont and Jarnac that if this marriage takes place, it will be the first time that the promise of a French sovereign will not have been realised. I fear my civility led me to a mis-statement of past history; but it was right to pay an undeserved compliment as to the past, when I was making a personal reproach as to the present. My own opinion is that, after the strong expressions of feeling on our part which have been conveyed to Paris, Louis Philippe will offer to postpone the Montpensier marriage for a certain time—perhaps till Isabella shall have had a child, or two children—

provided that we will engage not only not to oppose it then, but to use our influence to assist it. This will be a difficult proposition to deal with; because they may say that if we refuse the bargain they must go on with the match now, in order to guard against future chances of its being defeated by delay. Our answer must depend a little upon what are the prospects in Spain. If there should be a fair prospect of defeating the marriage altogether, we might decline such a proposal, and say—what is true—that we are against the match *in toto*, but then we play the whole game—win all, lose all—and that may be dangerous. If, on the other hand, there was but a slight chance of preventing the marriage altogether by Spanish agitation, then we should do well to close with such an offer, if made, or to try to get it made, and thus at least to diminish materially the evil consequences of the match. Let me know your opinion upon this matter.

“Dumont said that the Infanta would come and live in Paris: that France would gain a princess, but Spain would not gain a prince. I observed that there were such things as roads and post-horses, and that temporary residence in one place is no security against future removal to another. I afterwards asked Jarnac whether it was not true that the French Court had written to Madrid to say that if Isabella married Coburg, Montpensier should not marry the Infanta. He said, ‘Certainly, because the King of the French could not have permitted his son to be the

second person in Spain, if Coburg had been the first.' I pointed out how this declaration cut the ground from under Dumont's assertion, and how it admitted the whole force of our political objections.

I think there is a good deal in the objection founded upon the Treaty of Utrecht and the Spanish Constitution.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

To Le Comte de Jarnac.

"Château de Windsor, le 24 septbr. 1845.

"MON CHER COMTE DE JARNAC,

"En me référant à notre conversation d'hier, je désire vous faire remarquer et je vous prierai de faire remarquer à Monsieur Guizot, que dans le *memorandum* du 27 février dernier, que vous m'avez montré hier, la question du mariage de l'Infanta est envisagée comme question essentiellement politique; et que le mariage de cette princesse est placé dans la même catégorie avec le mariage de la Reine Isabelle.

"Il est dit dans ce *memorandum* que, d'après la manière de voir du gouvernement français, ni l'une ni l'autre de ces deux princesses ne devrait se marier avec un prince qui ne fût pas descendant de Philippe V.; et ce *memorandum* déclare également, par rapport à toutes les deux sœurs, que le cas où le Roi des Français se croirait libre d'agir selon ses

propres déterminations serait le cas où il y aurait danger imminent de voir un contrat de mariage, ou pour la Reine ou pour l'Infanta, avec un prince qui n'était pas descendant de Philippe V.

“ Il me paraît donc que votre *memorandum* prouve incontestablement que le gouvernement français a toujours regardé le mariage de l'Infanta comme une affaire essentiellement politique, et nullement comme une affaire simplement de famille ; et je me crois fondé à affirmer, que le mariage de l'Infante avec le Duc de Montpensier serait aussi contraire au principe posé dans le *memorandum* du 27 février, qu'il le serait aux arrangemens du Traité d'Utrecht, et au maintien de l'équilibre européen.

“ Quant au cas dans lequel il est dit dans le *memorandum* que le Roi des Français se croirait libre de suivre à l'égard de ces affaires ses propres impulsions, (déclaration d'abord que Sa Majesté avait bien le droit de faire, mais que le gouvernement britannique ne pouvait certainement point accepter), ce cas ne s'est pas encore présenté ; parce que, quant à la Reine Isabelle, le danger imminent dont il est fait mention dans le *memorandum* n'a pas existé ; et quant à l'Infante, jusqu'au moment où Monsieur Bresson a demandé Sa main pour le Duc de Montpensier, tout le monde était d'accord à considérer le mariage de cette princesse comme une affaire qui devait suivre et non pas accompagner, le mariage de la Reine.

“ Très-sincèrement à vous,

“ PALMERSTON.”

To Lord Normanby.

“Broadlands, Sept. 27, 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I really had no time to write to you privately with the despatch which you were to read and present to Guizot, and, moreover, that despatch seemed to be so full and explicit that there was really nothing to add to it. I have been, of late, completely swamped by business, and though, as you say, it is September, and I have been here near a fortnight, I have only been able to go out partridge-shooting *once* !

“The session left me with an accumulation of arrears, the cruize increased it, and a subsequent visit to Windsor, to meet the Princess of Prussia, has not helped me to get up to the surface.

“I will send you copies of my communications with Jarnac. The French lay great stress upon my despatch of July to Bulwer, and contend that they found, or thought they found, that we were thus giving encouragement to Coburg ; and that this set them free from all their engagements as to not marrying Montpensier to the Infanta till the Queen should have had children in the plural, and not a child in the singular. But dates and facts cut this ground from under them ; for you will see by Bulwer’s despatches that, some days before Bresson went to the palace, and carried by a night-attack the double marriage, Bulwer had, with Bresson’s knowledge, gone to the palace and officially, on the part of the English

Government, recommended, not Coburg, but Enrique; therefore, when Bresson demanded the Infanta for Montpensier, he knew that there was no imminent danger of the Queen marrying Coburg.

“Our Queen and Prince Albert are perfectly right about the whole thing, and greatly disgusted with the bad faith of Louis Philippe and Guizot.

“We must try to prevent the marriage altogether, and if it is delayed we may be able to do so. They may offer to delay it till children are born, on condition that we shall then help them to carry it through. This we never could engage for. We object to it entirely, and at any time; but if done when the Queen has children, it would be a fair trial of strength between England and France. If done now it would be a scandalous breach of promise and good faith on the part of the French minister and the French King personally. I wrote to Jarnac, and told him and Dumont verbally, that if this marriage takes place it will be the first time that the promises and declarations of a French King are not realised. I believe I was too complimentary to the predecessors of Louis Philippe. Do not mention it to any one; but the Queen has written the King of the French a tickler in answer to a letter he sent her. Both have passed through the Queen of the Belgians. Her letter was quite her own, in concert, I presume, with Prince Albert, and I did not see it till after it was written, but I concurred in every word. She claims the performance of his promise to her to delay till

after children are born to the Queen. In his letter to her he had dropped all mention of that, and alluded only to Guizot's promise to Aberdeen. She takes no notice of what passed between the ministers, and dwells only on what was said between the sovereigns.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. H. L. Bulwer.

“Broadlands, Sept. 27, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“I send you another protest to be delivered to the Spanish Government if the former one has not produced the desired effect, which I do not expect it at once to have done. If you should find that I am wrong in any of my Spanish facts—though I have desired them to be verified at the Foreign Office before the note is sent to you—you will of course correct the error in copying the note out. Our Queen is quite right and stout on this question, and has written a most energetic letter on the subject to Louis Philippe. This you will not mention to anyone; but I tell it you in order that you may not be misled by any contrary assertion of Bresson's; and I happen to know that Guizot has been writing to Aberdeen to endeavour to entrap him into some admission at variance with our course, but has got something very different from what he wanted.

“I still think that the marriage will be delayed, and, if delayed, it may be prevented.

“If the Spanish Government ask how they can obviate our objections without breaking their word with Louis Philippe, say there seems to be no possible way, but you will ask me if they wish you to do so; and this will gain time. Delay is so habitual in Spain when any good thing is to be done, that it would be very hard if one could not get a little of it when a bad thing is hanging over us. We might, perhaps, be satisfied by a renunciation by the Infanta for herself and her children, if she is legally of age to make one, and by a law excluding her and her children and descendants from the throne, if such law was passed by a Cortes which itself was legally constituted, which I apprehend the present Cortes is not.

“If the marriage is persisted in, we must hope for a revolution, which would bring into power the Progressistas and expel Christina; but we must have nothing to do with that.

“Narvaez professes to some private and intimate friends that he means to turn over a new leaf and join and bring in the Progressistas; but then he tells them that *they must not oppose the Montpensier marriage*, but wait till it is done, and act afterwards. This looks very much as if he was a decoy-duck of Louis Philippe. You will judge whether he is sincere, but you may tell him that nobody will believe in or care for his sincerity if he waits to shut the door till after the steed is stolen.

“Parker, I hope, will be instructed to go back to Cadiz, or to Carthagená, if the French squadron has slipped into Cadiz, and the presence of the two squadrons in one port might be embarrassing.

“If the marriage of Montpensier can be delayed till after that of the Queen, I should think that Francisco, Papa and Baby, would both do their little best to substitute Enrique for Montpensier.

“Does not Louis Philippe exaggerate the fortune of the Infanta, in the hope that we shall think him only a fortune-hunter and not a crown-hunter?

“Louis Philippe pretends that my mention of Coburg, in my despatch of July to you, as one of the candidates, led him to think there was imminent danger of Coburg being the Queen’s husband, and therefore set him free from all former engagements, and especially from that taken by Guizot to Aberdeen, that Montpensier should not marry the Infanta till the Queen was not only married, but the mother of children in the plural; but the facts were, that you, in pursuance of the knowledge which you had of our wishes and intentions, went to the palace to recommend, not Coburg, but Enrique, *before* Bresson smuggled through the marriages of the Queen and the Infanta, and, therefore, at the time when those marriages were carried by the method of kidnap, Bresson, at least, knew that there was no danger of the Queen marrying Coburg.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Lytton Bulwer.

“Broadlands, Sept. 29, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“I omitted to say in my last, that we quite agree with your keeping on personal good terms with the present Government in Spain, and with the Court. We oppose their policy, but we do not want to quarrel with them individually.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Lytton Bulwer.

“Foreign Office, Oct. 8, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“I have just seen Espartero and Olozaga, who have brought me a letter from Enrique to Espartero, from Brussels, received to-day, saying that he declines having anything to do with revolutions, and disavows beforehand any use they may make of his name. Olozaga ascribed this to the persuasion of Rumigny.* Perhaps it may be proper prudence on the part of Don Henry, who may distrust the discretion of those who wanted to put him forward as their standard; and it does not follow that he might not join any movement which had begun and was likely to succeed.

* M. Rumigny was French Ambassador at Brussels, where Don Enrique was residing. Don Enrique was, I told Lord Palmerston from the commencement, quite unreliable.

“Espartero’s notion of any movement was that it should be for the Queen, and the Constitution of 1837, and against French influence, and for the exclusion of the offspring of the Montpensier marriage. All that would be perfectly consistent with loyalty to the Queen. I quite agree with you that they ought all to keep quiet and wait for better times, unless they have a clear and manifest chance of success. Small and partial efforts will at once be put down, and will lead only to the shooting of a number of people, and to the strengthening of the present order of things. I am not without my doubts of the sincerity of Olozaga; there is something in the course he has pursued, in his language and manner, which does not inspire me with confidence. I suspect he is more in the interest of Louis Philippe than he would wish us to believe. If Narvaez would put himself at the head of a good movement he might turn the scale, but he is quite right not to commit himself by any premature declaration of sentiments. It would only deprive him of the power of doing anything.* Of course the marriage has, ere this, taken place, and Bascheathal says that Montpensier is to stay in Spain till the end of this month. His presence may, on one hand, win him support, by presents, by his manner, and by the belief it will afford, and which all with him will try to inculcate, that the present order of things will henceforward have the military support of France, if

* There was not the slightest chance of Narvaez putting himself at the head of a movement against his own party.

necessary. On the other hand, it holds out to the Spaniards an existing and visible symbol of French domination, and renders some demonstration more likely than if he were gone home, and had left only his money behind him.

“I have to-day received from Jarnac Guizot’s answer to our despatch. It is long, feeble, and inconclusive as to the points which it undertakes to answer, while it is silent as to others which it ought to have answered, if answers could have been given to them. The despatch has been put into my hands to read, but the copy has not yet been sent me.

“You may fearlessly say that there is but one opinion in England, from the highest to the lowest among those who have paid any attention to the subject, as to the conduct of the French Government in this affair, and many who never before thought of foreign matters have taken much interest in this.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

In another letter to Lord Normanby, Lord Palmerston added:—

“Everybody here, of all ranks and parties, are furious; and I happen to know that Peel, Aberdeen and Graham are indignant at the conduct of the French. Peel sent a message to this effect confidentially to John Russell and me by Morpeth two days ago from Windsor.”

F. O., 9 Oct., 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“You have done capitally in all your communications with Guizot, and we are all much pleased with your manner of dealing with your business. Habits of debate are very useful to ambassadors.* I must say Guizot cuts a most pitiful figure in the whole transaction, but I suppose that all he cares for is carrying his point, and that he is indifferent as to how he may stand in the argument. I should have thought, however, that he would have showed more regard to character. Lansdowne writes me word that when he read your despatch giving an account of the quibble about the time when the marriages were to take place, the paper fell from his hand from astonishment at the contrast between that display of ingenuity and certain general professions of the value of truth and honesty which he had formerly heard from Guizot. Jarnac gave me yesterday the reply to our protest. It is, as you say, more feeble than was expected. It contains, moreover, some contradictions and some untruths, especially one about Aberdeen. The despatch says that some little time before the late Government went out, the French Government learnt that Christina had, with the cognizance of Bulwer, written to the Duke of Coburg about the marriage of Prince Leopold to the

* Lord Normanby had said in a letter enclosing an account of a conversation with Guizot, “My memory has been so much exercised in Parliament for the purpose of reply, that I find a greater facility than I had expected in reporting conversations.

Queen, and that therefore the French Government made representations at London and Madrid, and expressed its 'surprise,' and that in answer to such communication Aberdeen gave them satisfactory assurances. Now the fact happens to be, that Bulwer, having written to Aberdeen that he had been cognizant of such a letter, Aberdeen, from an excess of delicacy, thought it necessary to tell St. Aulaire. St. Aulaire wrote word to Guizot. Guizot did not, or affected not to believe it, and wrote to Bresson to ask if it was true. Bresson asked Christina, who stoutly denied it, and was able to ride off upon denying that she had written to one member of the Coburg family, when the fact was that she had written to another. St. Aulaire was instructed to say that Aberdeen had been misinformed. Aberdeen persisted in his statement, and at last the French acknowledged that he had been right. I shall certainly in my answer point out how much at variance with the fact their representation of this transaction is.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

"C. T., 15 Oct., 1846.

"MY DEAR BULWER,

"I quite agree with what you say in your letter of the 6th, that our policy must now be to try to form an English party in Spain. That ought always to have been our policy; and if the late

Government* had only kept together the English party which we bequeathed to them in Spain, all these French intrigues never could have succeeded. It must be for us now to repair the mistake; and if Isabella has children, we may still manage to rescue Spain from the grasp of the French Constrictor. But Don Francisco the bridegroom and Don Francisco the elder must be the foundation of our party. Reckon not upon Christina, nor Rianzares, nor Isturitz. My firm belief now, on looking back to events and putting things together, is, that those three were in league with Louis Philippe, and that all their tempting offers about the Coburg marriage were a trap laid for us, and that, if we had snatched at the bait, they would forthwith have shown us up to Louis Philippe, who would then have declared himself fully justified by our proceedings in doing what he has now done about the Montpensier marriage; and instead of being as he now is, the detected pick-pocket, he would then have been only the diamond cut diamond and the successful counterminer. But at all events these people are now identified with the Montpensier marriage, and we must get rid of them before we can get rid of the consequences of that marriage.

“I do not mean, however, that you should quarrel with them or alter your general relations with them till the proper time comes; but when that time does come, the first object to be aimed at is civilly, but im-

* Sir Robert Peel's.

mediately, to expedite their return to France. I hear that the two Franciscos stoutly, and like good Spaniards, refused to mount their horses to go out and meet the French Princess. This looks well for their patriotism, though possibly a dislike to equitation in a crowd may have had its share in their refusal.

“I have no time to say more.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“Right Hon. H^y. L. BULWER.”

To the Right Hon. Henry Lytton Bulwer.

“C. T. Nov. 15, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“I have this evening received your letters and despatches of the 7th. I am glad to hear that Don Enrique has received permission to return to Madrid, let who may have obtained it for him; and I should be glad to hear that Espartero and Olozaga had got leave to go back also. It will be a great matter to get all the good Spaniards back into Spain. They can do nothing abroad but make conspiracies doomed to fail, when in their own country they may sway public opinion, control the Government, and, at last, by constitutional means, regain power.*

“Our game is now to be a game of patience. We

* This is always the delusion of English statesmen: they think things are done in those countries where constitutions exist in name as they would be in others where they exist in reality. Spaniards out of power go to bed, or conspire, and only expect to sway public opinion by a fortunate pronunciamiento.

must bide our time ; watch our opportunities ; avoid precipitation ; keep our Spanish friends from rash proceedings, which would only ruin their cause and our hopes. As to revolutions, it is clear that the Spaniards have had their fill of them, and of civil war. The battle must now be fought at the elections, in the Cortes, in the newspapers, and at last in the Court and at the Palace.* But we must carry our objects by sap, and not by storm.

“Your endeavours to unite parties for Spanish and national purposes against French influence are just what we wish, and I trust that they may be successful. Your account of the King, and of your conversation with Francisco Papa, is very graphic and amusing. If you can make the King a patriot and the confessor a bishop, you will do great things ; but I fear, from what you say, the latter will be easier than the former.

“The Queen wishes to have prints of the Spanish Royal Family ; get and send me for her as many as you can, charging the cost in your extraordinaries. I mean the present people ; but a good print of Ferdinand might be added, and one of Don Carlos also, as well as of Francisco.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

* Lord Palmerston should have put the first last, and the last first ; for the Court named the ministers, the ministers (as Lord Palmerston himself says elsewhere) named the Chambers, and bought or silenced the newspapers whose publication annoyed it.

To Mr. Bulwer.

“ Foreign Office, Nov. 19, 1846.

“ MY DEAR BULWER,

“ Your account of Francisco the younger is not very encouraging, but I fear it is too exact; however, we must hope for the best, and endeavour to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. You are pursuing the right course. The thing to try for is to reunite the Moderados and Progressistas, and to organize a good and strong Spanish party. This must, I am aware, be the work of time, but I do not despair of seeing it accomplished. Espartero, whom I saw two days ago, takes rather a gloomy view of Spanish affairs, and thinks that Francisco will turn out as ill as any of his ancestors, and that even Trapani would have been better for Spain.

“ It has been suggested to me that it is possible that in the marriage contract of the Infanta, daughter of Philip V., who married the Dauphin, son of Louis XV., there may have been some renunciation made by the Infanta of any eventual right for herself and descendants to the throne of Spain;* perhaps you might be able at Madrid to ascertain how this matter stands. Let me know the result of your inquiries as soon as you can; for if it should turn out that there was such a renunciation, it would come in well in the reply, which I may

* The Salic Law excluded her and her descendants.

have to give, to another despatch which Guizot is going to send me.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Mr. Bulwer.

“Foreign Office, Nov. 26, 1846.

“MY DEAR BULWER,

“You ask me for a husband for one of the daughters of Francisco. I have found one. What think you of Montemolin, who is recently arrived in London, and whom I have been to see to-day? He is a very well-looking, agreeable, gentlemanlike young prince, very like Ali Effendi, the Turkish chargé d'affaires, whom you must have met either in Paris or in London, and who is now Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople. I can assure you the young lady might go farther and fare worse; and I am very sorry for Isabella, for Spain, and for Europe, that he was not Isabella's husband instead of Francisco the younger.

“Now the true arrangement would be that Montemolin should marry King Francisco's sister; that the Salic Law should be re-established in favour of all the male descendants of Isabella; failing her male issue, in favour of issue male of Francisco by any other wife; then of issue male of Enrique; and then of issue male of Montemolin; thus bringing Montemolin back into the line of succession after Francisco and Enrique. Such an arrangement would probably lead the eastern powers to acknowledge Isabella, and

would practically exclude Montpensier and his children, if he has any. This may not be brought to bear easily, but it is something to think of; at all events, the marriage of Montemolin to the Princess might be suggested. He is only just come here. I thought he had been here before; but it seems he went at once from France to Switzerland, and has there been in communication with the Russian Government, from whom, I presume, he expects some pecuniary assistance; and I believe that his partisans mean before long to attempt a rising in Spain, though of course I did not ask him about that.

“Pray reproach Isturitz and the rest with having sent Gonzales Bravo back to Lisbon, where he is doing great mischief, and claim a performance of their promise to recall him. Say that we are not men to be so trifled with, and that we cannot stand broken promises; that we cannot permit this evil interference of Spain in Portuguese affairs; and that they ought to recollect that we have a strong squadron on the coast of the Peninsula, and that Spain has ports.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

CHAPTER IX.

AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL, AND CORRESPONDENCE
THEREUPON.

ONE of the early matters which engaged Lord Palmerston's attention, after his return to office, were the affairs of Portugal, where a civil war had arisen.

Under the influence and auspices of Costa Cabral, who was once termed by Mr. Bernal Osborne in debate the Jonathan Wild of European diplomatists, and who had started in life as a furious Liberal, the Portuguese Government had entered on a course of extreme and exasperating tyranny. The Marquis de Saldanha occupied the place of President of the Council soon after Cabral had been compelled to fly, but he succeeded to the taint of Cabral's policy, and neglected to cleanse the Administration. The consequences were visible in the shape of a civil war which raged in Portugal. The Count da Antas was in military command of the rebels under the revolutionary "Supreme Junta of Government." The Viscount

Sa da Bandiera was another of their principal leaders, and Oporto was their head-quarters. After varying fortunes the Queen of Portugal accepted the mediation of Great Britain, France, and Spain, and a protocol was agreed to on May 21, 1847, at a Conference between the representatives of the four powers concerned, "with a view to the pacification of Portugal." The conditions to be offered to the Junta were: An amnesty, the revocation of decrees which infringed the Constitution, the convocation of the Cortes, and the appointment of an administration to consist neither of Cabralists nor of members of the Junta. The three powers further determined and engaged that their naval forces should act in conjunction with those of Her Most Faithful Majesty on the coast of Portugal.

The civil war was thus shortly brought to an end.

"Foreign Office, Oct. 30, 1846.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"I am this afternoon returned from Windsor, where I have been for two days. The Queen and Prince are very anxious and uneasy about the state of Portugal. We send off to-morrow Colonel Wyld, who goes in the *Cyclops*, from Portsmouth to Oporto and Lisbon, to see and report on the state of things, and we shall order a reinforcement of our naval force in the Tagus. But this is all we can at present do, and our interference must be confined to giving advice and taking care of the personal safety of the Queen. It is

a most unfortunate state of things; but I trust the danger is somewhat exaggerated; still it is great; and what makes matters worse, it has been brought on by the folly of the Court, instigated I believe by the German tutor, Diez. It was foreseen that, if the elections went on and the new Chambers should meet, one of their first acts would be to address the Queen to remove the intermeddling tutor. Thereupon he set to work to secure himself, little caring for or little foreseeing the danger in which he was involving the King and Queen. The only way, as he thought, to avoid the address was to prevent the meeting of the Cortes, this could only be done by getting rid of the Government which was pledged to call them; the way in which that could be accomplished was by making a *coup d'état*; and so it was made, against the advice of all persons whose judgment was worth having, and without consulting Lord Howard, because they knew he would have been against it; and contrary to the opinion of our Court, though I believe that opinion arrived too late. It is hardly to be expected that the crisis can be got over without some concession. If Leopold wishes to help the King and Queen out of their embarrassments, he should advise them to pack off Diez forthwith; for he may be assured that that man, however well-intentioned, has been, is, and will be, as long as he remains in Portugal, their evil genius. Saldanha had written to request that the Spanish troops might return to the frontier, not meaning to call them in till the last

extremity. Of course if they were called in by the Queen to save her, we could not make any objection to their having done so, provided they aimed at no other object and retired when that was accomplished; but it would be a very hazardous move for the Queen. It would identify her throne with foreign interference, it would denationalize her, and associate her with a people whom the Portuguese dislike the most. Any compromise which she could make with her own subjects would be a better and a safer arrangement.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Lord Normanby.

“C. T., Nov. 1, 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I send you at last my answer to Guizot,* which you may either read to him and send to him afterwards, or only send to him, as you may think best. It is civil in language, but contains I think some strong arguments.

“We have heard of Parker’s arrival at Lisbon, with his whole squadron, so that our naval force in the Tagus will now be respectable. No doubt his presence will produce a useful effect; when people see a strong force, they do not exactly know how far such a force may be authorized to act, and they fear the worst, and guide themselves accordingly. Parker will be

* See Parliamentary Papers, 1847. “Correspondence relating to the Marriages of the Queen and Infanta of Spain, 1847.” Page 62.

instructed to protect the persons of the Royal Family, if they should be obliged to take refuge on board their own line-of-battle ship in the Tagus, or on board one of ours; and in case of need he will be authorized to garrison the fort of Belem with his marines; but you had better say nothing about this latter point, lest the French should intrigue to prevent it. But if you should hear of its having been done, you will know that it will have been sanctioned by the British Government. Rothschild said to me last night that he heard from Paris that the Government there said they should not mind our squadron going into the Tagus provided we did not send any land troops. I think they can hardly have said this, because they know well that we are bound by old and special treaties with Portugal, and that if the *casus fœderis* were to arise we should not inquire whether the French Government minded or not that which we might feel ourselves called upon by our treaty engagements to do.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Lord Normanby.

“C. T. Nov. 15, 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“Nothing could be better than your steerage in the Montpensier affair. You maintained firmly our protest against the political transaction, and you

demonstrated by your personal civility that there is no littleness in our feelings on this matter. You did the right thing just in the right way.

“The Bey of Tunis is decidedly not a sovereign and independent prince, and ought not to be treated as such. I can hardly think that the French will endeavour to do so. They were quite correct in this respect in the course which they pursued in the case of Ibrahim Pasha, and no doubt they will take the same line with the Bey. That is to say, that they will have him presented by the Turkish Ambassador, or *Chargé d’Affaires*. At all events, you should bear in mind that the Bey is not a sovereign, so that we at least may not give the Sultan any just cause of offence in this matter.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“I hear it is reported in Paris that a letter has been shown at the Tuileries, addressed by Thiers to me, about the Spanish marriages. If that report is true, I hope that when the letter is done with it will be sent on to me; for, though I never yet had any letter from Thiers, yet if his letters are as lively as his conversation, I should be sorry to miss receiving the first which he has written to me.”

In November 1845, a conspiracy was discovered at Posen to restore the independence of Poland.

An advance was made in the early part of the following year upon the city of Cracow, and the Senate applied to Austria, Prussia, and Russia for their intervention. Austrian troops shortly after occupied the city, but were quickly expelled, and Russian troops, coming to their assistance, recaptured it. Although the independence of the Republic had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna, the three protecting powers proclaimed its annexation to Austria in November 1846, and thus accomplished the extinction of the last remnant of Polish nationality.

In a letter to Lord Normanby of the 17th Nov., Lord Palmerston says :—

“The three Powers have announced to us their intention of giving Cracow to Austria; they are determined to outdo Louis Philippe, and as he wants to break a treaty of last century, they actually break a treaty of this century. It is wicked and foolish, and will recoil upon themselves. How, for instance, can we now join them in quoting the Treaty of Vienna as requiring the maintenance of Cantonal sovereignty in Switzerland? The next thing that will happen will be that Russia will declare the Kingdom of Poland an integral part of the Russian Empire; and we shall see how Austria and Prussia will like that. Perhaps they will agree to it, in order to get rid of the name of Poland altogether, and to execute, though by a very different partition, the Treaty of Reichenbach in 1813.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, Nov. 19, 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I have just received your letter about Cracow. You will have received mine of Tuesday. I have prepared an answer, which I shall send off to Vienna without waiting for Guizot. Our answer is, that we don't admit the necessity of doing what the three Powers are going to do; and that we deny their competency to do it, and protest against it as a clear violation of the Treaty of Vienna. It comes very awkwardly at the present moment. Metternich has no doubt long intended it, and thinks the time propitious when England and France have differed, and when he thinks each would be willing to gain his support about Spain by being easy with him about Cracow.

“Guizot will make a show of resistance, but the fact is that even if France and England had been on good terms, they have no means of action on the spot in question, and could only have prevented the thing by a threat of war, which, however, the three Powers would have known we should never utter for the sake of Cracow. The measure is an abominable shame, and executed by the most hollow pretences and the most groundless assertions.

“I suspect that Prussia consents to it unwillingly; that Austria is urged on by her own covetousness and hatred of freedom and independence, even in name, and is pushed on by Russia, who wants to

have an example set, which may hereafter be quoted by her as an excusing precedent when she swallows and assimilates the kingdom of Poland.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Public interest about Tahiti was still alive in England, as is seen by what follows.

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, Nov. 20, 1846.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I have been assailed by representations in favour of the people of Tahiti. Great uneasiness is created in this country by the knowledge that the French are sending out, or have sent out, a large reinforcement to Tahiti, with a brigade of mountain guns. It is feared that the intention of the French is to storm the camp of discontented natives in the remote and mountainous part of the island, and to exterminate those who will not submit.

“I spoke last week to Jarnac about this, and read him an extract from some of the memorials which I had received, and in which the Missionary Society of London say that the missionaries at Tahiti frequently offered to mediate between the French and the natives, but their offers have always been rejected. I told Jarnac that I wished he would bring this matter privately under the notice of Guizot: that I did not like to make an official communication about it, as I

had not exactly ascertained how the matter of Tahiti stood between the two Governments; and I was afraid of either admitting too much, or of perhaps appearing to retract what had been before admitted. That what I wished to impress on Guizot was the expediency of treating these natives with mildness. That nothing had for many years excited in this country so angry a feeling against France as the proceedings of the French in Tahiti; that the anger excited had not been confined to one class of society, or one denomination of religionists, but had extended from the nobleman to the shopkeeper and farmer, and that even ministers of religion, who in general would sacrifice anything for the sake of peace, have, at public meetings, called for war to rescue Tahiti and its Queen.

“That, consequently, any fresh act of severity and any additional bloodshed in that island—but, more than all, anything that bore the appearance of an intention to exterminate the people—would create the greatest irritation in this country; and that, although the French Government evidently do not mind producing this effect when they have any point to carry which they think of importance to them, they may probably not deem it worth while, at the present moment, to excite, by a fresh irritation in a case in which really and truly no French interest whatever is at stake. I have had no answer as yet to this private communication, and you may as well take an opportunity of mentioning the matter to Guizot, and

of saying that I will address him officially on the subject if he wishes it, but that I have had such pressing applications from various parts of the country (and expect more), that I must in one way or another be able to give these people some answer, and I hope he may enable you to put it in my power to give them a favourable one.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“I ought to mention that the London Missionary Society complains that the missionaries at Tahiti do not enjoy that liberty of religious functions which was promised by the French Government, and the Society say that these missionaries have in other respects been harshly treated.”

A war had been for a long time carried on by the Republic of Buenos Ayres against Monte Video, and the latter place was blockaded by President Rosas. At length, in 1845, the French and English Governments interfered with a combined force, and forced open the navigation of the River Parana, and established a blockade.

The object of the English Government was to secure for all foreign merchants protection for life and property, and that General Rosas, the Buenos Ayres Dictator, should not keep his forces to overawe Monte Video. On the other hand, Lord Palmerston was anxious clearly to intimate to the French Govern-

ment that the game of Algiers was not to be played over again in the River Plate.

To Lord Normandy he says : “ I have had a long conversation with Broglie about River Plate affairs, and have granted him as a favour that which if he had not offered I must have claimed as a right, namely, that England and France shall finish in concert the bad business which they began together. It would never do to leave France to settle the matter single-handed : if she did so, she would occupy Monte Video. But I drew Broglie’s attention to the distinction between the blockade as a measure of coercion against Rosas and the protective measures for maintaining the independence of Monte Video. The blockade has long ceased to retain its original character, because the commerce of Buenos Ayres goes on as if there was no blockade, excepting only that all goods going to and coming from that port are obliged to be landed at Monte Video, and to pay duty there for the benefit and profit of a company of men of all nations, who have bought the customs’ duties for a certain period of time. But this is no longer blockade ; it is piracy ; it is equivalent to stopping neutral vessels on the high sea and making them pay black-mail. I am glad we are out of such a system, and if the French do not make haste to get out of it too, they will get into trouble with other countries.

“ As to the protection of the independence of Monte Video, we are still bound with France to provide for

that, and I have asked Broglie to ascertain what Guizot has to propose on this. My belief is that the only danger to Monte Video springs from her foreign garrison, and that her best safety would be to let Oribe take quiet possession of the town."

To Lord Normanby.

"Carlton Gardens, Dec. 7, 1846.

"MY DEAR NORMANBY,

"What I propose to do about River Plate affairs is to frame a draft of a convention between England, France, Rosas, Oribe, and Monte Video, for the termination of the hostilities by sea and by land, which have been carried on for some time past on the banks of the Plate.

"Such convention should be, almost word for word, the articles agreed to and signed by Rosas and Oribe; and therefore such as those two chiefs would sign without fresh negotiation.

"I would propose to send it to the admirals to obtain the signatures of Rosas and Oribe. They should then hand it over to Ouseley and Deffandis for them to sign, and for them to get it signed by the nominal Government of Monte Video. I should propose that this should be all that the P.P. should have to do in the matter; and that the admirals should be charged with the duty of superintending the execution of the withdrawal of the Argentine troops and the disarming of the foreigners in Monte Video; and I should propose that both Ouseley and

Deffandis should be called from Monte Video. Nothing could be so loose and irregular as the way in which everything connected with Hood's mission was managed by Aberdeen. Onseley was told that after Rosas and Oribe should have been induced by Hood to sign the articles, the conclusion of the diplomatic arrangements would rest with Onseley and Deffandis; but what those diplomatic arrangements were to be, no man in the Foreign Office can tell me, and no paper or book can show. The real truth is, though we had better keep the fact to ourselves, that the French and English blockade of the Plate has been from first to last illegal. Peel and Aberdeen have always declared that we have not been at war with Rosas; but blockade is a belligerent right, and, unless you are at war with a state, you have no right to prevent ships of other states from communicating with the ports of that state—nay, you cannot prevent your own merchant ships from doing so. I think it important, therefore, in order to legalise retrospectively the operations of the blockade, to close the matter by a formal convention of peace between the two Powers and Rosas. I explained this to St. Aulaire, the day before yesterday.

“St. Aulaire made many civil speeches about his desire to avoid increasing irritation and his conciliatory disposition, and I did full justice to his personal character; but I said that the question between England and France was not one of persons or of *procédé*, but of substantial things. That no doubt

the manner in which the thing was done had made it even more offensive than it necessarily was ; but that the thing itself remained ; and that, as long as it did remain, and as long as nothing is done to obviate the evil, there is no civility and no *procédé* which can permanently alter the state of thing between England and France.

“ We have had no correspondence with the United States about Mexico ; and there has been nothing to send to you, except what I conclude you have had, the refusal of the United States and Mexico to accept our mediation. We should prefer that the United States should not take California, and divers other portions of Mexico which they mean to annex, but, unless we had been prepared to go to war to prevent them from doing so, I fear that any representation from us would only have exposed us to receive an unsatisfactory answer, such as we should give to any foreign power which should favour us with advice in regard to one of our own wars.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ I have no doubt that Louis Philippe hates me ; but I am not ambitious of being *le bien aimé* of any French sovereign, and I care not for dislike which is founded on nothing but a conviction that I am a good Englishman, and that I see through, and will do my best to thwart, all schemes of foreign powers

hostile to the interests of my country. Personally, Louis Philippe ought to feel obliged to me, as far as in our relative positions it has at former periods been within my reach to do him good service when he stood in need of such help. As for the attacks on him in the *Times* and *Chronicle*, they are the sentiments of the writers of those papers, and it is impossible to exercise any daily control over such writers, even if they were in communication with us, which the *Times*, at least, is not. But I am not at all sure that such *coups de patte* from time to time do any harm, although they may draw forth complaints and angry expressions. Louis Philippe's burst of anger the other day, about the use of his name in my despatch, was probably a piece of acting, and intended solely for the purpose of gagging me in my reply to Guizot.

“As to my better humour with Jarnac, it was simply this : that, on taking leave of me in his capacity of Chargé d’Affaires, the last time I saw him, and before St. Aulaire’s arrival, he said that he hoped that we remained personally good friends, and that no impression had been left on my mind of anything on his part unfriendly towards me. I replied : Certainly not ; that he had done his duty, and I mine ; and that I trusted we should always be good friends, personally and privately.”

To Viscount Ponsonby.

“Foreign Office, Jan. 21, 1847.

“MY DEAR PONSONBY,

“I have seen Hummelaner and have had a preliminary conversation with him and Dietrichstein. He is to send me his papers to read. I have told him that if he is able to show that Cracow was the source of danger to the Austrian dominions, and if I am authorized to publish the proofs, that may go far to mitigate public opinion here; though, of course, the question will still remain why the three Powers did not previously consult England and France, and the other parties to the Treaty of Vienna; and the stronger the case the three Powers can make out for the necessity of some alteration in the political condition of Cracow, the less reason there was for fearing that they should not obtain the consent of those other Powers to some reasonable and fair arrangement.

“Dietrichstein, Brunnov, and Bunsen staid away from the House of Lords when the Queen made her speech, and I think that they were right, as it might have been unpleasant for them to have stood by to hear their Courts taxed with having violated a treaty.*

“I still hear reports of secret negotiations and arrangements between Guizot and Metternich, to the effect that Metternich should keep us at arm's length

* “The extinction of the free state of Cracow has appeared to me to be so manifest a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, that I have commanded that a protest against that act should be delivered to the Courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, which were parties to it.” (*Extract from Queen's Speech, January 19th, 1847.*)

about the Montpensier right of succession to the throne of Spain, and that Guizot, in return, is to do everything that Metternich can wish about Italy.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Lord Bloomfield.

“Carlton Gardens, Jan. 23, 1847.

“MY DEAR BLOOMFIELD,

“I have received your letter of the 5th; pray thank Count Nesselrode for the friendly language which he has held to you, and assure him, that the sentiments which he has expressed are fully and entirely shared by us. We feel that a cordial and intimate understanding between England and Russia is essential for the interests of both countries, and that there is nothing in the well-understood policy of either country which can prevent or interfere with such intimacy and cordiality; and we feel strongly and are perfectly convinced that when we are upon terms of cordiality and intimacy with Russia, we can rely upon her good faith and sincerity, and that we can count upon her steadiness.

“Of course it is our object and interest to be upon good terms with France. England and France have many interests, commercial and political, all over the world, which are perpetually coming into contact; and a good understanding between Paris and London is necessary, in order to prevent that contact from degenerating into collision. But as to trusting the

French Government, or feeling any real confidence in it, I think everybody in England have now had their eyes sufficiently opened to prevent them from falling into that mistake.

“I suppose that Aberdeen used to be persuaded by Guizot, to try to make up matters between Russia and France; and he would, if successful, have been rewarded for his pains by the endeavours which Louis Philippe would immediately have made to detach Russia from England. We shall certainly not fall into the same error, nor meddle and make between the two, unless they were likely to go to war, which is, of course, in the highest degree improbable.

“What is the meaning of the military preparations in Poland and in western Russia, which Du Plat tells us of? Have they reference to some outbreak which is expected, or do they bear upon the King of Prussia’s projected constitutional reforms, or did the Russian Government think that France was going to break loose on the Rhine as a set-off against Cracow?

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Colonel Wylde.

“Carlton Gardens, Jan. 26, 1847.

“MY DEAR COLONEL WYLDE,

“I have only time to write to you a few lines to say that I have been down to Windsor to-day by desire of the Prince to see him and Count Mensdorf

on Portuguese affairs. I found that they were under the impression of the belief, which prevailed at Lisbon when Count Mensdorf left it, that a junction had taken place between the Miguelites and the Junta of Oporto. I showed the Prince that the despatches from our Consul at Oporto, dated the 15th, prove that, up to that time, no junction had taken place, and that none seemed to be likely. But as, by your account, Saldanha and the Queen appear now disposed towards a settlement by negotiation, in order to avoid the loss of Portuguese life and the destruction of Portuguese property, which the attack and capture of Oporto by storm would inevitably occasion; we shall endeavour within a day or two to send you official instructions to go to Oporto if the Queen wishes and authorizes you to do so, and, when there, to endeavour to negotiate between the two parties.

“The basis of negotiation must be a declaration and engagement made by the Queen, to you, as the representative in this matter of the British Government, that immediately on the termination of the civil war, she will establish constitutional government, and call a Cortes without delay. Unless this assurance is given in the most formal and positive manner, we cannot meddle with the matter. She ought, I think, also to assure us that she will not, for the present at least, bring into office the Cabrals, against whom the revolt has taken place. Of course she would not be expected to exclude them for ever

from power ; their turn may come ; but to replace them just now would be to irritate and provoke a large portion of the country With those assurances in your hand, you may be well entitled to urge the Junta to lay down their arms and submit to the Queen's authority. Of course, they would say the assurances given may be satisfactory as to the nation, but what is to become of us as individuals, and how are we to be secured ? The reply to that natural inquiry would be the production of some conditions such as those which Saldanha sent you ; though I think one, at least, of those Articles was a little too sweeping in its operation.

“The general basis should, I think, be amnesty for the mass of the insurgents ; precautions as to some of the chiefs and leaders. That security was wisely and liberally stated in Saldanha's Articles to consist in their temporary retirement from Portugal ; the military so retiring to have half-pay for their support. For the civilians no provision was proposed by Saldanha, because, I presume, he concluded that most of them had means of their own ; and I infer and take for granted, that no confiscations or sequestrations of property are thought of. The difficulty, and it is one which we in this country have no personal knowledge which would enable us to solve, is, how far these voluntary and temporary banishments are to go. There may be a certain number of men whom it would be better for their own sakes and for the peace of the country for a short time to remove

from Portugal. But if the list is made large, and I think Saldanha's Articles make it much too comprehensive, the Queen will lose the services of many men who, though they have been opposed to her Government and Ministers on the present occasion, might, when the contest is over, become very useful servants of the Crown; and it must also be remembered that if all the leading men of the Liberal party are to be compelled to leave the country, though only for a time, the conduct of affairs must necessarily fall into the hands of the opposite set of men, who have been clearly proved to be hateful to a large portion of the nation; and that is not the way to restore contentment in the country. But upon this point your own good sense and right feeling will enable you to judge, better than any advice or instructions that I can give you. As this letter will just be in time for the packet, and as, in the state in which things are in Portugal, the difference of a few days may be the difference of many lives, I fully authorize you to act upon this letter as if it was an official instruction, if you find that events are pressing on, and that evil would result from delay. You may press upon the consideration of the Junta the dangers to which they would expose themselves, their town, their friends and partizans, by refusing to come to terms; and whatever may be the period assigned for the retirement from Portugal of those who may be required to leave it, they should remember that such period may, and

probably will, by-and-by, be shortened. You should also impress upon them that this offer of mediation is the only thing that the British Government can do in their behalf; and that if they should determine to abide by the fate of arms, we may and shall deplore, but we cannot avert the result.

“The *Black Cat*, with 1,000 muskets, and ammunition, &c., besides, destined for Oporto, has been detained in the river by the Board of Customs, on the application of Baron Moncorvo.* I doubt, myself, whether the law will sustain the detention, and whether the vessel will not therefore be released; but you may mention this to the Queen as a proof, at least, that this Government shows no undue favour to the insurgents, and does not, as the people about her tell her, afford the insurgents support. We certainly think that it is the fault of the Court which has brought on the insurrection, but we take no part in the civil war, except as mediators to put an end to it.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

Sir Hamilton Seymour had now succeeded Lord Howard as English Minister at Lisbon.

* Portuguese Minister.

To Sir H. Seymour.

“Carlton Gardens, Feb. 5, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“The Queen should remember that unless she shows herself to be the sovereign of the whole nation, she cannot expect the whole nation to regard and love her as their sovereign; and that a throne whose stability rests on the point of the bayonet has a very ticklish and uncertain basis. Pray preach all these things, and such others as may occur to you in the same spirit; and make the Court and the Government clearly and distinctly understand that they must expect no support from England to help them to continue a system of misgovernment; and that England will take care that no support for that purpose is given them by Spain.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Lord Normanby.

“Foreign Office, Feb. 11, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I shall present this evening an extract from your despatch about Guizot’s insinuation,* and the answer which I send you this evening, and which I

* M. Guizot, in a debate in the Chamber, February 5th, 1847, had said : —“ I now arrive at the second despatch of the English Ambassador, dated the 15th of September, and to the conversations which I had with him. I have a few preliminary remarks to offer. When an Ambassador does me the honour to call on me and ask me questions, it is not to an interrogatory that I submit : I am in such a case bound to the truth, but I only reply so far as suits the interest of my country. Another observation that I have to make is, that I cannot admit the accounts of a

thought it but right towards you to place on record. John Russell and I agreed that some parts of your despatch, written as it was under the natural excitement of the moment, were too pugnacious in their tone to be quite in keeping with the tone of feeling here, and we thought those passages not essential to your complete vindication. The extract, as I give it, contains a plump *démenti* to Guizot, and my despatch to you says that I believe you, and not him.

“I am bound to say, however, that his insinuation has been little understood or felt here as being an imputation upon you. The part of his speech which has struck people here, was his avowal that he had deceived you about the time of the marriages because you were an adversary, and in a matter in which he conceived the interests of his country concerned, he thought cheating fair.

conversation sent by an Ambassador to his Government as an authentic and unobjectionable document. In order to simplify the question, I will say that the English Ambassador entertained the same opinion on this point; for he came to me on the 2nd of September to communicate to me his despatch of the 1st, and to ask whether he had rendered an exact account of our conversation. The Ambassador considered that a despatch could not acquire a character of authenticity and of irrefragability until after this proof.”

Lord Normanby took this as a personal offence, though, I confess, it seems to me a perfectly legitimate expression, for if you report a conversation and do not show your report to the person whose expressions you repeat, he may say that it is not in exact accordance with his recollections, without imputing to you any wilful falsehood. Few conversations indeed are so accurately reported as not to admit of this difference as to remembrance. A more dignified and statesmanlike course would have been a more quiet one, and this Lord Palmerston evidently thinks, though he will not mortify Lord Normanby by saying so.

“That last speech has finished him in public opinion here.

“The passion which Louis Philippe put himself into during his conversation with Howden was, probably, an intentional venting for a particular purpose of a feeling of irritation, which has long been rankling. He is, of course, very angry at being found out, and especially at having lost the hold he had upon the mind of our Queen. He also feels deeply the disadvantage of having lost caste in public opinion in this country; for, like Chartres of former days, he valued a good reputation for the profit which could be made out of it.

“I do not think we shall have any discussion upon these matters, unless Hume’s motion about Cracow, which now stands for the 18th, should lead to it. We are desirous of preventing discussion; the question cannot stand better than it does in public opinion as to the relative conduct of the two Governments; and as regards the conflicting interests of the two countries, nobody could, in our Parliament, add anything to the conviction that must be produced on the mind of every Englishman by the speeches in the French Chambers.

“What you said in a letter of Saturday, about the King’s hints or suggestions about the re-establishment of the Salic Law in Spain is curious.* But

* That Louis Philippe had sent a message to Metternich to the effect that if Austria would refrain from joining England in the matter of the Spanish marriages, France would consent to the re-establishment of Salic Law in Spain.

I should doubt his being, at present, ready to make any concession in that way. That, however, is the point which we must keep in view, and march upon as one pivot; steadily but *silently*. Before that can be accomplished we must have a more popular administration in Spain, and a more decided expression of opinion from the three Powers. All this I do not despair of, but we must keep our counsel, and not count our fish till the fishing is over.

“The new Prussian constitution need not so much have alarmed Austria and Russia, except in as far as it must be looked upon as only a first step; for, certainly, no representative assembly ever had their teeth drawn and their claws cut more completely. There are so many things they are not to do, that one is almost puzzled to find out what it is they are to do. However, we know well that the difficulties of the King of Prussia were great, and I have reason to believe that the dissuasions came in some degree from Paris as well as from Vienna and St. Petersburg. But Prussia has now cast the die, and she must go on, for retreat is impossible.

“*But if she does go on, Germany will follow her, and sooner or later her example must be followed by Austria.* As to Russia, we shall not see the day, probably, when she will become constitutional.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Sir Hamilton Seymour.

“Foreign Office, Feb. 15, 1847.

“SIR,

“I have to acquaint you that her Majesty’s Government approve the note which Mr. Southern addressed to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, with a view to deter the Portuguese Government from carrying into execution the intention which it was reported that they entertained of transporting to Africa the principal officers taken prisoners at Torres Vedras.

“I have to instruct you to make a representation to the same effect to the Portuguese Government if the same purpose is still entertained, and to observe to that Government that, as these officers surrendered as prisoners of war, and on condition of being treated with the honours of war, it would be a breach of faith to deal with them in the manner which appears to have been contemplated; but even if this were not the case, it would be repugnant to every principle of justice, and contrary to the practice of all Governments, to inflict punishment without trial and condemnation.*

“I am, &c.

“PALMERSTON.”

* The Marquis of Saldanha, in command of the Queen’s forces, defeated the insurgents under Count Bomfim at Torres Vedras on the 22nd of December, 1846. The insurgent leader and a considerable number of his followers were taken prisoners after honourable capitulation. About forty of the chief of these, including Count Bomfim, were, without

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Carlton Gardens, Feb. 17, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I have received your despatch,* brought by Rothschild’s servant. He himself did not come. I am glad you have written it, because it may serve as an authority for contradicting the report, if any occasion for doing so should occur, and it is useful that your statement should be placed before the Queen, in case the assertion should have been made to her by her correspondents from the Tuileries. But it would not do to publish anything on the subject. People here are all satiated with despatches about the Montpensier marriage and our differences with the French Government, and to lay anything more before Parliament would do more harm than good.

“Besides, as you say, these lies grow up like mushrooms at Paris, but they die away in the same rapid manner; and the lie of one week is obsolete and forgotten before the contradiction of the following week can overtake and come up with it. The only thing for you to do is to stand your ground, and not to quit your post. If you were to come away on leave, Guizot would boast that he had driven you

trial or even identification, placed in the hold of the brig *Audaz*, which was ordered to transport them to the coast of Africa. Mr. Southern remonstrated with the Portuguese Government relative to this proceeding and reported the case to Lord Palmerston, whose reply is contained in the despatch I have here inserted.

* Denying the report that he was in secret communication with the French opposition.

off; and even if your friends were to represent the matter differently, and to say that you had gone away as a mark of the displeasure of yourself or your Government, Guizot would never do anything which could be deemed an apology; and then if you went back again, your doing so would be a submission. I do not myself see that anything further on his part is needed by us. You have officially said that his insinuation was untrue; we have published to all Europe that we believe you, and not him; what more can either you or we want? It is always desirable to avoid making anything depend upon a foreign Government or a foreign Minister doing or saying any particular thing as a concession, unless one is prepared to go to all extremities in the event of their refusing to do so. It is like the old practice of the House of Commons, of calling people to the bar, and making them kneel and beg pardon. The House has the power of committing a man, but has not the power to make him kneel and beg pardon; and so we now do that which we can do, and leave off attempting that which we cannot enforce. On the same principle, we have told Guizot that the truth is not in him, and that we believe him not. That we had the power of doing; but we have not the power of compelling him to apologize, and therefore we had better not expose ourselves, by asking it, to the liability of being obliged to put up with a refusal. There is no reason why you and he (if he remains in, as he probably will) should not do busi-

ness again together as before ; and the best line you can take is to hold that the publication of the last despatches, and the unanimous feeling in Parliament on the subject, place you upon a satisfactory ground ; and that neither your Government nor the Parliament require their opinion to be confirmed by any admission of Guizot's.

“I very much doubt the report which you say you have heard, that Montemolin has gained over a considerable portion of the Spanish army.

“You do not say from what authority the report came ; at the same time it is not impossible that Austria and Prussia may have furnished him with money to do it ; but it must have been done very clumsily if it is known ; and if it is known, one must presume that the Spanish Government will take means to render the measure ineffectual, or at least, by putting in a fresh set of officers, make it necessary for the parties to buy the army over again.

“I am sorry to hear what you say of the private conduct of Isabella ; but it was too probable that when married to a man she disliked and despised, she should seek compensation elsewhere, and that in the true spirit of inductive philosophy she should wish to found her conclusions upon a great variety of experiments. If Montemolin could convince the Progressistas that he is a good Liberal, as he professes to be, his chance, after all, would be worth something.

“If Miguel should return to Portugal, or if his

partizans should become powerful there, the treaty of 1834 is worked out, and its stipulations have been fully executed by the expulsion of Carlos and Miguel at that time from the territory of Portugal. But a case would arise similar to the one which led to that treaty, but not identical with it, and the difference between the two cases might lead to a difference, of course. At that time, Carlos and Miguel were both in Portugal, at the head of troops; and if Miguel had remained master of Portugal, Carlos would from thence have invaded Spain. Spain, therefore, was concerned in the matter as well as Portugal, and for that reason France, as the neighbour of Spain, was party to the treaty; besides, at that time we trusted France, and wished to give the world a public manifestation of our union with her.

“Now the question regards Portugal alone, and concerns Spain only by recoil, inasmuch as a restoration of Miguel in Portugal might give encouragement to the Carlists in Spain. But there is no immediate danger to be warded off from Spain. It may, therefore, be sufficient—and upon this point I told St. Aulaire to-day that we wished at present to keep ourselves free—it may be sufficient that, if the case shall arise, a convention should be concluded between England, Spain, and Portugal, to regulate the entrance of Spanish troops into Portugal; to determine the object for which they should enter; to specify the range of their operations, and to provide for their retreat when the object is accomplished.

In that case Portugal must be one party, as demanding assistance ; Spain another, as consenting to grant it ; England a third party, as bound by ancient treaties to defend Portugal from foreign invasion, and therefore a guarantee that Spain shall keep faith, and not do more with her troops when in than she professed to send them to accomplish, nor keep them in longer than necessary for the purpose. In short, Portugal, being weaker than Spain, requires a protector in the matter. But there seems at first sight no particular part to be assigned in this matter to France ; and there is some disinclination in the Cabinet to let her unnecessarily into an affair which concerns Portugal alone, or to have anything whatever to do jointly with her when it is possible to avoid it. You will thus be able to know how to parry any question which may be put to you upon these matters.*

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

To Sir Hamilton Seymour.

“ Foreign Office, Feb. 17, 1847.

“ MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“ Moncorvo has written for full powers to conclude some fresh engagement, if necessary, in the event of Don Miguel’s returning to Portugal ; but pray warn the Court against giving in to the delusion that they will by such means obtain aid against

* These views were subsequently modified by circumstances.

the Junta and the Liberal party; we shall take uncommon good care to prevent that. If the Queen fears Don Miguel, she must make haste to make up matters with the Junta, and to be able to unite all the parties who are for constitutional government in a compact band against the adherents of Don Miguel. If Portugal is to be governed despotically and by sword and bayonet, a man is as good as a woman for such purpose, and it matters little whether the despot is called by one Christian name or another. Pray make this very civilly to be understood by the King and Queen; and endeavour also to explain to them in courtly terms that the sending off the Torres Vedras prisoners to the coast of Africa has done the Queen irreparable injury in public opinion here; and if it turns out that they are sent to a milder destination, you may observe how unfortunate it is that the Queen should have incurred unnecessarily the odium of a severity which she did not mean to inflict.

“I hope and trust that Diez will be shipped off too; but the ‘evil that men do lives after them,’ and the mischief done by Diez* will continue to be felt long after he has re-crossed the Bay of Biscay. It will be something gained, however, not to have such an evil counsellor always at the royal ear; and better advisers will have more chance of swaying decisions upon new events as they arise. I am afraid we cannot get rid of Padre Marcos and the rest. They

* This gentleman had been placed by his family about the young King.

seem to have put poor Macdonell to death in a cruel and cowardly manner; such excesses only brutalise war, and do not accelerate its termination.

“I am inclined to think that Miguel has no intention at present of going to Portugal, and that he will not do so until, and unless, there is a considerable force in the field under his banners.

“He came overland from Italy as servant to a Captain Bennett, and arrived here on the 2nd inst. from Calais.

“See what you can do in favour of Palmella, whose banishment was a most groundless act of capricious and arbitrary power. If they say that he was not banished, but ran away of his own accord, ask whether you may be authorized to tell him so, and to let him know that he is perfectly at liberty to return to Lisbon.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, Feb. 19. 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I should hope that Guizot has by this time made such an explanation as may remove the barrier between you. St. Aulaire has told me that he has written strongly to urge him to do so, and Brougham tells me the same thing. I dare say Guizot speculated a little upon the chance of an unfavourable division

for us on G. Bentinck's motion.* If so, he must have been much disappointed.

“In concert with John Russell I sent for St. Aulaire this afternoon; and I said that, with reference to a conversation which we had had on these matters two days ago, I wished to say to him, that I had written to you to say that you should not leave Paris; that there is no reason why you should do so. That you had appealed to your Government, and that your Government have declared you to be, in their opinion, in the right. That, consequently, you would stay; and that if Guizot chose to make it impossible for you to transact business with him, the fault was his, and not ours. But I said that in all matters it is of great importance that both sides should clearly understand the true state of the case, and therefore I wished to tell him confidentially, but not at all for the purpose that he should convey it as a communication from me to M. Guizot, though he might perhaps usefully mention it as his own belief and conviction, that if the result of this affair should be that you should be forced to leave Paris, supposing always no new incident to have arisen to alter the state of things, no other Ambassador would be sent; and the diplomatic relations between the two countries would be brought down to the nature of those which now exist between France and Russia; there to remain until Guizot might choose to drive away our *Chargé d’Affaires* also.

* For advances of public money in aid of Irish railways.

“You will not make use of this to anybody, unless you think it useful to instil the idea into the mind of the King; not as a threat, but as a partial drawing-up of the veil which conceals the future.

“We have not made up our minds whether, if any new engagements are entered into about Portugal, we should associate ourselves with France or not. Some of us think it would be better not to do so, especially as France would have no legitimate functions to perform in regard to Portugal. As St. Aulaire broached the subject, I thought it would be well to let him see the doubt, and to let him just intimate to his Government that we have no wish to hamper ourselves unnecessarily with fresh engagements with France. I only wish we could wind ourselves decently and well out of the joint operations of the Plate.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, Feb. 23, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“We are very anxious to hear that the differences between you and Guizot have been in some way or other arranged. He ought to be willing to do what is right, and you might let him off rather easy as to what he should do. People here are getting uneasy about these things; they do not quite understand the local importance at Paris of things which

would not be of so much importance here, and they are fearful that personal differences may more seriously affect the international differences which led to them. You know how sensitive people are here about anything which, in their wisdom, or rather in their want of it, they may think likely to lead to war; and you are well aware that this feeling is perhaps strongest among our own friends and supporters, though it is also easily assumed by the other parties who are in their hearts hostile to us, though for the moment they allow us to live on sufferance. It is therefore very desirable, and more so than in Paris you may be aware of, that an accommodation should be come to as to the personal differences.

“I have spoken twice to St. Aulaire about it, and I have no doubt he has written to Guizot and to the King. Guizot must by this time have given up the hope of turning out either me or the Government, and it is in vain for us to think we can turn out Guizot, nor really and truly do I think that it is worth our while to make any great effort to do so. In some respects it would be advantageous to us to have a minister in power in France who would have lost his means of imposing on the credulity of the British public.* But in any contest between an

* It must be remembered that in all this portion of his correspondence Lord Palmerston is writing under great and natural irritation at the breach of faith that had been practised on us in the Spanish marriages. I do not think that he in the least exaggerated the nature of that breach of good faith; but I think he judges M. Guizot's character generally too much after an incident that may be considered rather as an exception to it.

ambassador and a leading member of the Government the latter is likely to be the strongest, and the battle if it is one of life and death is probably an unequal one.

“In regard to this last ball affair,* I should say that, as the invitation was sent, even though by mistake, it would have been best to have assumed that they were all right—that they were sent out according to rule—and thus to have left Guizot to go as he pleased. But he has dexterously taken an unfair advantage of your having said that the invitation was sent by mistake, and he has thus contrived to get up a sort of party against you.

“However, that matter may be considered as over; and, of course, on any other occasion on which you give a party or ball, you will invite the ministers as usual just as if nothing had happened.

“The only matter then on which anything like a making-up is necessary, is that which Guizot said in the Chambers.

“To tell you the truth, that has not been thought here to be quite as offensive as it seems to have been

* Lord Normanby here committed a great and, I venture to say, a vulgar error, which was quite unaccountable in a man of such high breeding. During the coolness between himself and M. Guizot, arising from the incident that has been alluded to, Lady Normanby gave a ball, and a card was sent to M. Guizot, according to the usual list for invitations. This card Lady Normanby afterwards said had “been sent by mistake.” It is only fair however to add that, according to the English Ambassador’s version, this statement was only made in reply to a boast of Mr. Guizot’s, that Lord Normanby had been “ordered” from home to send the invitation as a proof that his Government did not back him up in the quarrel.

considered at Paris. St. Aulaire says that Guizot assures him that he had no intention of impeaching your veracity. The best settlement would have been his saying that in the Chamber, in answer to a question put to him by some Deputy. But probably the time when that could be done is gone by. Might he not say that to you in presence of the King, as peacemaker? The King, perhaps, might not dislike acting that part; or might he say it to the King, and might the King say it to you, Guizot not being present? Or might Guizot make such a declaration to Appony, in order to its being conveyed to you? Any of these ways would, I think, do. But it is very desirable that the matter should be arranged, and if it can be done in a manner personally satisfactory to yourself, you may be sure that it will not be criticised in this country.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Sir H. Seymour.

“Foreign Office, Feb. 26, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“I wish you to press in the strongest manner upon the Queen and King, and on any of the people about them who may be worth talking to, that it becomes every day more and more absolutely necessary for them to make overtures to the Junta, and to come to some amicable settlement, so as to put an end to the civil war. Tell them plainly that if they speculate upon a Miguelite insurrection, to bring in foreign

troops to put down the Junta, they deceive themselves. We shall take good care that any measures to be adopted against Miguel, if he should return to Portugal, which he will probably not do, shall not be perverted into an interference between the Camarilla and Junta, between whom in reality the civil war is waged.

“Tell them that as to our guaranteeing a loan, they might as well ask us to give them a slice of the moon.

“But tell them also that the Miguelites here are active, and have been sending emissaries to Portugal by the last packet, and that we have no means of preventing them from doing so. The men may land in Spain, and so find their way to Portugal.

“The only way in which the Queen can make herself strong against Miguel is by rallying again round her that portion of her subjects by whose exertions, devotion, and sacrifices she was placed upon the throne; but if the Constitution on which she rode in triumph is to be abrogated, and despotism is to be set up in its stead, such of the Portuguese who are for despotism will naturally say that it is Miguel, and not Maria, who is best entitled to be their despotic sovereign. Try to get Palmella permission to return; Moncorvo says he went away of his own accord. That is distinctly untrue; but if it is said at the Palace, the ready answer is: Well, then, let him know, or let me tell him that he is at liberty to return when he likes it.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“ Foreign Office, March 5, 1847.

“ MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“ I am very glad you have arranged your differences with Guizot, and the manner in which the settlement has been made is quite satisfactory.

“ I am not surprised that you should be annoyed at the *candour* of our common friends, but that is an evil inseparable from public life. None but the men who are actually engaged in the conduct of an affair can justly understand all the bearings of the circumstances, and the full value of all the separate incidents of which it consists; and the tendency of the minds of one's best friends always is to think that one has done too much rather than too little, when difficulties arise which are connected with what has been done; and, on the contrary, to think that too little has been attempted, when difficulties arise which are connected with what has been omitted. But men must be taken as nature made them, and it is well to make the best of things as they are. It is, however, the duty of those who are charged with the conduct of a branch of the service *to support those who are acting with them, and to back them up well through the difficulties to which they may be exposed; and you may rely upon it that I shall always do that, which I hold to be the sine qua non condition upon which the co-operation of men of honour can be expected.*

“ I hope the French do not seriously contemplate

an occupation of the Balearic Islands ; I do not think we could stand that. By occupation I mean the occupation of some post on shore ; as to having some ships at anchor for a time in Port Mahon, we could no more object to that than they could to our fleet lying in Cadiz or Carthagea, or visiting Barcelona. We shall write to Bulwer by a messenger whom I have detained, but who will be sent off to-morrow ; and we shall instruct him to ask the Spanish Government about this matter, and to say that we could not see with indifference a French garrison in any part of those islands.

“Don Miguel is still in London, living in obscure retirement, and, as I believe, in great poverty. I much doubt his going to Portugal, and I do not expect any considerable rising in his favour there. The Portuguese, Spanish, and French Governments propagate reports of such risings to serve as a foundation for Spanish interference in favour of arbitrary government in Portugal.

“As little do I credit any notion that Montemolin intends to raise his standard in Spain. I believe his present intention is to remain quiet in England, and to see the country, and make acquaintance with the people, and though Carlos, or, rather, Carlos’ friends may be more stirring, the time is not yet come for any successful Carlist movement. When Louis Philippe’s plot for degrading and ruining the Queen and all the Spanish princes and princesses shall have gone on nearer to its maturity, and the question

shall have arisen whether the Spaniards shall have Montemolin or Montpensier, then there will be a Carlist movement in Spain, but it will be the movement of Spaniards of all parties; and we must wait to see whether it will be sufficiently national to be triumphant. But such an event may perhaps never happen; and crowns do not change heads as easily as hats.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“As to Guizot, I conclude he is as strong as ever, and I really do not see that we should gain much by any change.

“We might, indeed, have some man more agreeable to deal with, more to be believed on his word, and more to be trusted to fulfil a promise; but any successor would in his heart be just as hostile to England; and perhaps might think himself more obliged to be stiff, in order not to be thought less disposed to brave us than Guizot has shown himself to be (we should perhaps rather say to deceive us) in regard to the Spanish marriages.”*

To Sir H. Seymour.

“Carlton Gardens, March 26, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“I am sorry to find that Saldanha has prevented any negotiation with the Junta. I rather

* Hinc illæ lacrymæ!

expected that he would do so. If, however, a Progressista Government should be formed at Madrid, Spain may be as unwilling to interfere as we are to let her do so.* In the meanwhile, the Ministers at Madrid, who are for helping Maria to do what she pleases in Portugal, are placing Isabella under duress at Madrid, and they have virtually deposed her by resolving† to continue to be her Ministers, whether she will or no. This, however, cannot last long; and they must go out, unless Isabella gives in, which seems hardly probable.

“I have no fresh instructions to give you, unless

* It is to be remembered that the Government then in power in Spain desired to interfere to support despotism in the two countries. Lord Palmerston meant that a Progressista Government would not interfere for that purpose; but when, by a change of ministers in Spain, a more moderate set of men came into power, who, if they interfered, would only interfere in favour of a moderate course, our objections to such intervention ceased, and indeed we were not indisposed to avail ourselves of it.

† The Ministers in Spain had indeed adopted a most singular course. The Queen was not allowed by them to see any one without the King's permission. I was myself refused one day; but on insisting to see her Majesty the next, was admitted with an apology for what had happened the day previous. In the curious interview I then had with Queen Isabella, she seemed to take her confinement as an absurd joke, and laughed at it, but at the same time did not herself know how to put an end to it; for, by a law then existing, but which was never intended to have that application, every royal decree had to be signed by a Minister; and as none of the then Ministers would sign a decree putting them out of office, they pretended to the legitimate possession of it. My declaration that I should cease my functions (as I was accredited to the Queen, and not to the King) unless Her Majesty were at perfect liberty, put a stop to her confinement, but I had no right or power to force the Government against the law to obey her commands. A few days afterwards, however, this state of things was brought to an end in the dramatic manner I have related.

you could pack Diez up in a box, nail him down, and send him by the next packet. But still there will remain Fronteira, Padre Marcos, Castillo, and others whose names I do not know.

“The French Government are anxious for Spanish interference, but I think we shall be able to prevent it, whatever Ministry may be formed at Madrid.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. G., March 26, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“What a pretty state of things in Spain! A Conservative Ministry that virtually deposes its Sovereign, neither choosing to resign, nor allowing the Queen to dismiss them, but acting on the principle that if she does not know when she has good servants, they know that they have got good places. But such a state of things cannot last, and the ministers must give way if the Queen is determined. She has only to refuse to see or to transact business with any of them, or she might send for any other person, constitute that person her minister, and make him sign the dismissal of the others. It is like the state of things which some people wanted to introduce into the army and navy here, by establishing that no officer should be dismissed the service except by sentence of a court-martial.

“St. Aulaire has been very anxious that we should

agree to sanction Spanish interference in Portugal. I put him off till Isturitz should come. But at the same time I pointed out to him that as neither Carlos nor Miguel are in Portugal, as they were when the Quadruple Treaty was signed, its positive stipulations do not apply; and that as no Miguelite movement of any importance has happened, the spirit of the Treaty does not bear on what is passing in Portugal. That for Spain to interfere by force in a contest which is between two political parties in Portugal, and not even between either and the Crown, would be to put in practice the principle of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, against which, when carried into effect by Austria in Italy, France protested by seizing Ancona, and against which when acted upon by Russia in Turkey, France, with us, made her objection. The real fact is, that the poor Queen of Portugal has been pushed on by her Camarilla and her French advisers to do exactly the sort of things against which, when done by Charles X., the French rose in revolt, and for doing which Charles X. was obliged to give up the Tuileries to Louis Philippe. The Queen of Portugal is quite right, according to her own notions, to put the Junta down by force if she can do so; but if she cannot, she ought to treat with them and to endeavour to make a compromise.

“It is always interesting to know what Louis Philippe says and does on critical and important occasions, because it at least shows what it is that he

thinks it useful to try to make other people believe that he thinks and feels; not that one imagines the least in the world that his thoughts and feelings are such as he represents them to be; at least, one does not think so, more than one thought of any good actor on the stage during the best portion of his part.

“Metternich, I suppose, we must now look upon as gone clean over to France; and if that is so, Russia and France will soon draw more together.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBY.”

In the following memorandum, Lord Palmerston puts on record the views which were afterwards embodied in the formal Convention of May.

“Carlton Gardens, March 25, 1847.

“I entirely concur in the view taken by Lord John Russell, of the nature of the present state of affairs in Portugal, and of the bearing of the letter and spirit of the Quadruple Treaty upon that state of things; and I am decidedly of opinion with him, that ‘there is at present no case for interference, either by the letter or the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty.’

“But it may be argued, by those who ask for interference, that there may be ground for such interference, independently of that treaty, upon general principles of policy, and not in virtue of

any anterior engagements. The Quadruple Treaty itself was, it may be said, the record of a determination taken upon general grounds of policy, and was not the fulfilment of any anterior engagement; and the question may be asked, is there now a sufficient reason for interfering by force of arms in the civil war in Portugal, on grounds of general policy, and without reference to any anterior engagements?

“It is acknowledged by writers on the Law of Nations that, when civil war has been regularly established in any country, and when the nation has been divided into two contending armies, and has been marshalled in two opposing camps, foreign states may treat the conflicting parties in the same manner as if they were two separate nations; and may allowably side with one or the other party in the civil war, as they would with one or the other belligerent in a war between two independent nations. The right to do so is acknowledged to exist in all such cases; the expediency of doing so must depend on the circumstances of each particular case.

“The decision of any third party in such a case must depend upon the answer which it could give to two questions—First, Is the cause of the party whose side we think of taking, a just one? Secondly, Is it for our interest to give that just cause active assistance?

“Now, in the case of a civil war which originates in a disputed succession, both of these questions may

generally be answered without difficulty, either one way or the other. The Government of a foreign state may easily make up its mind as to which party is right in regard to a disputed succession, because the facts upon which the decision is to turn are known as well out of the country where the dispute exists as in it; and the interest which such foreign Government may have in the matter can be easily appreciated. Such was the case out of which the Quadruple Treaty arose. The civil war arose out of a disputed succession in Portugal and in Spain; and the interest which England had in the matter was a matter of comparatively plain and simple calculation.

“But it is different when a civil war arises out of a contest between political parties in a country, who differ in regard to principles and forms of government, and who, without pretending to change the reigning dynasty, stand up for different systems of internal organization.

“It is more difficult, in such a case, for the Government of another country to pronounce with certainty that either party in such a civil war is absolutely in the right; and when the struggle for conflicting systems of government is mixed up with mutual accusations of illegal or unconstitutional proceedings, the task of judging between them is rendered still more difficult. In such a case, too, it is far less easy to answer the second of the above-mentioned questions, even after having formed an opinion on the first; for, supposing the right to be

pretty clearly on one side or the other, there are a vast number of considerations to be taken into account before a foreign Government could decidedly determine that it was for its well-understood interests to interfere by force of arms. But this is the present case of Portugal; and there would be much difficulty for the English Government to answer the two foregoing questions affirmatively in favour of the Queen of Portugal. At the same time, England has a great interest in the welfare of Portugal as a State; and the present course of events seems likely to ruin Portugal for a long time to come as a European power.

“Is there, then, any way open for England by which, without violating principles on which her foreign policy has always been founded, and without taking steps which would make enemies of the majority of the Portuguese nation, she might speedily put an end to this disastrous war?

“England has offered the Queen of Portugal mediation between her Government and the Junta; the offer has been declined, because Marshal Saldanha does not choose the war to end by negotiation and reconciliation, and because he insists upon it that what is plainly the minority of the nation shall, by aid of a Spanish force, be enabled to crush the majority. But such an end would not be lasting; the defeated majority would wait their opportunity, and, whenever a party sympathising with them should rise to power in Spain, they would again

try the fate of arms in Portugal. Saldanha's plan is, therefore, objectionable in policy, as well as in principle.

“But might not the English Government renew its offer; but giving to its offer the character of arbitration rather than of mediation? Might some such communication as the following be made to the Queen?—The course you are following is fatal, end as it may; for it is evident that it will not end in your Majesty's triumph over the Junta and their adherents, by your own means. England is your ancient ally, and is bound to come to your aid in times of difficulty and danger. She is ready to do so now; but you must allow her to prescribe for Portugal such remedies as her disorders require. We demand, therefore, of you *carte blanche* as to the offers which we require you to authorize us to make in your name to your revolted subjects. These offers, however, we intend to be generally these: General amnesty for all who shall tender their submission on or before a specified day; such amnesty, of course, to include retention of titles, honours, and property; and of military commissions, either on full or half-pay, for officers, according to the discretion of the Government; and restoration to the Queen's service for such non-commissioned officers and privates as choose to be so restored. *Some few, and very few—probably not above ten—of the leading members of the Junta to retire for two or three years from Portugal.* A new Ministry to be formed,

consisting of men belonging neither to the Junta nor to the Cabral party. All edicts by which the Constitution has, in any of its parts, or in the whole, been suspended, to be immediately rescinded, and the Constitution, as it stood before the 6th of October last, to be immediately restored. The Cortes to be summoned to meet on some specified day, not too distant; and the elections to take place at a proper interval before their meeting. M. Diez to leave Portugal by the very next packet; and the system of Camarilla Government to be for ever left off. If the Junta should agree to these terms, the civil war would be over; and the fair and just demands of the Portuguese nation would be satisfied. The Junta, therefore, might be told, when those conditions were proposed to them, that if they should refuse them, the British Government would then be prepared to take an active part in favour of the Queen, and would join its forces to hers in order to restore peace to Portugal. Of course, in such case, the British Government must, however inconvenient it might be to do so, guarantee to the Junta the faithful performance of these conditions by the Queen; and probably there would, in such a case, be no difficulty in enforcing their execution. There can be little doubt that such a course would put an end to the war in a fortnight after it was resolved upon.

“If the Queen should say that she could not adopt such a plan, because Saldanha would resign, the

answer would be: That plan would render his resignation a matter of indifference; but we will offer you Colonel Wylde to take his place at once, or Colonel Wylde shall be Chef d'État-Major, to assist, with his skill and judgment, any Portuguese General whom you may place in nominal command.

“If the civil war could be terminated in this manner, by England alone, without Spanish or French interference, the honour of the Queen would be saved, the liberties of the Portuguese nation would be respected, and the tie between England and Portugal would remain unbroken. The despatches received this afternoon, from Lisbon and Oporto, seem to show the urgency of some energetic measure for putting an end to the calamities with which Portugal is now afflicted.

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, April 2, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“Will you be so good as to send the inclosed letter and a tin box, which goes with the messenger, to the Duke Décazes?*

* The Duc Décazes was the celebrated favourite and minister of Louis XVIII., one of the handsomest men of his time, with good abilities and the most engaging manner. He endeavoured to moderate the extreme rancour of parties, and to form a Government between the ultra-Royalist and the ultra-Liberal factions—a policy which entirely concurred with the views of the King himself; and, in spite of difficulties of all kinds, might have succeeded, but for the assassination of the Duc de

cuttings which I have got for him from Persia, for his collection at the Luxembourg.

“Well done, Isabella! I thought she would beat the Sotomayer Government, and that it was impossible that the struggle could go on many days longer. Pacheco and Salamanca will do very well, for the present at least; and we may now look forward to a reign of the Liberals in Spain long enough at least to do some good things. This change at Madrid will make it easy for us to prevent Spanish interference in Portugal, for the friends of the new Spanish Government will be at Oporto rather than in Lisbon. I hope, however, we shall be able, as mediators, to restore peace to Portugal. It is high time that this should be done, for the country is going at full gallop to ruin.

Berri, which gave the ultra-Royalists—who absurdly attributed this murder to the liberal tendencies of the Government—overwhelming power. The King was obliged to yield to the clamour about his bed-chamber, and dismiss his friend, “whose foot,” it was said by the wits of the time, “had slipped in the blood of the Duc de Berri.” He went to London for a short time as Ambassador, and afterwards retired into private life. He thus remained till 1830, when he began again to take a leading part in public affairs, and was very useful to Louis Philippe in conciliating hostile individuals. His reward was the high post of Grand Préféréndaire, or President of the Senate, residing in the Palace of the Luxembourg. His wife was a daughter of Count St. Aulaire by a Danish Princess, and was a lady remarkable for her spirit, her wit, and her attachment to her friends, beloved by those. I hope and believe she still lives. Her son, the present Duke, then known by the Danish title of Duc de Glücksberg, derived from his mother, was for a short time Minister in Spain towards the close of Louis Philippe’s reign, and was then a very young minister of considerable talent and promise. He remained faithful to the Orleans family, is now a Deputy, and not unlikely some day to fill an eminent post.

“If we could only get rid of Colletti in Greece, we should have a fair prospect of getting the affairs of Europe into better trim than they have been for some time past.

“I go on Monday to Broadlands for the week, but as I have now a railway to Romsey, I am only three hours and a half from this office.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To Sir Hamilton Seymour.

“Foreign Office, April 3, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“I send you instructions which I hope will put an end to the civil war. The only difficulty which I anticipate will be with the Queen, and with the people who govern her without her knowing it. But the recent change of Ministers at Madrid will probably help us,* because, if the new Ministers have any predilections towards Portugal, I should think it might be rather towards Oporto than towards Lisbon. At all events, we may be pretty sure that they will not let their troops enter Portugal without our consent, and, therefore, the Queen of Portugal must feel that her chances of assistance from Spain are much lessened, if not extinct. I trust she will agree to our terms. If she does not, we must rest upon our oars, and wait till one side or the other is fairly worn out by fatigue and exhaustion.

“I say in my despatch that the amnesty ought to

* The Pacheco Government.

be full and general; and you should try all you can to get it made so. The amnesty after the end of Miguel's civil war, and as recorded in the convention of Evora Monte, excluded nobody, and that was a much stronger case than this, because that war was against the Queen's crown; this is only against Diez, and her Ministers, and Camarilla. If, however, you should find this condition to create an insurmountable obstacle, you might consent to one or two exceptions being made to the amnesty, to this extent, that one or two of the members of the Oporto Junta might be required to absent themselves from Portugal for a short time, not exceeding a year; but it would be most desirable to avoid this, because, if on the other hand, the Junta were to take their stand against this, and to make the universality of the amnesty a *sine qua non* condition of their submission, which is very likely, it would be impossible for the British Government to make the question of interference or no interference turn upon the question whether one or two men should or should not be excluded from the amnesty. The Queen must be made to understand that we are greatly stretching our established principles of foreign policy* by engaging to coerce the Junta

* There certainly was little in our conduct compatible with the principle of non-intervention, and it was only on the ground that we were saving the sovereign from ruin, and the country from confusion, and establishing something like a system of liberality, moderation, and equity, that we could justify our course; but if we did that, it might fairly be said we did justify it, considering our peculiar relations with Portugal, and admitting that States, like individuals, have duties which may inspire them with an interest in their neighbours' welfare.

in any case, and that unless she gives us the broadest possible ground to take our stand upon, we could not justify our course to Parliament and the country; and therefore she ought to make the amnesty without exception; and if she insists upon proposing it with exceptions, she must clearly understand that if the Junta refuse to accept such a condition, we cannot enforce it, and she will have to yield, which would be derogatory to her; whereas, if she herself proposes the amnesty without exceptions, she places herself upon the highest ground of generosity, and will find her advantage in it ever afterwards. In fact, the establishment of exceptions would probably spoil the whole affair, and I can hardly authorize you to agree to it in any case.

“Diez’s departure is absolutely necessary before Wylde starts. If Diez was still at Lisbon when Wylde reached Oporto, the Junta would of course demand his removal as an additional condition, and even if this was refused, and the Junta agreed to waive it, yet, as it is settled that he *is* to come away, his departure, after the demand for it made by the Junta, would appear to all the world to be the consequence of that demand, and, therefore, a submission on the part of the Queen; whereas, if he goes away before Wylde starts, his departure will appear to be voluntary, and the Queen’s dignity will be saved. But it would be quite impossible for us to talk to the Junta about eventual coercion while Diez is at Lisbon, because to do so would appear to be

making threats of coercion to support, not the Queen, but Diez. Upon this point we are quite determined.

“The Cortes ought to meet as soon as the preliminary arrangements can be made for it, and the sooner the Queen can substitute tongues for muskets, as instruments of civil and political strife, the better for her and her kindgom.

“There can be no doubt, I apprehend, as to the policy of recalling Palmella; and it has been hinted to me, by those who know him, that it would be politic for the Queen to write to him herself. It never can answer to a sovereign to make personal enemies of her principal nobles. Palmella is a man who may be very useful to the Queen. He has his faults, but his merits also. He is timid, and fond of money; but he is enlightened, statesmanlike, and almost the only prominent man left who has not engaged himself with one or other of the contending parties.

“Saldanha’s army is full of Cabralist officers (and, by-the-by, when people talk of a junction between the Junta and the Miguelites, the answer is that the Cabralists and Miguelites are nearly allied in political principles). It is not very likely that Saldanha and his officers should attempt any prank, and fall back towards Lisbon, to coerce the Queen, and prevent her from acceding to our terms; but, if he were to do so, he might be told that we will coerce him just as readily as the Junta, and that he had better take care what he is about.

“The Queen should, if possible, get rid of all the low and foolish people who surround her, such as Castello, Sacerda, Gonjao, and the like; and so soon as tranquillity is restored, she and the King ought to set to work in good earnest to form a party of their own; they should try to draw the old nobility to court; conciliate the Miguelites, and not alarm the Liberals.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

To the Marquis of Normanby.

“Foreign Office, April 6, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I send you copies of my despatches to Lisbon. I think the measure we have adopted will put an end to the civil war at least, unless the Queen is more Camarilla governed than we yet believe her to be. It is lucky in this respect, that the change in the Spanish Ministry has taken place at this moment, because the Portuguese Cabralists will have lost their confidence in obtaining military assistance from Spain without our consent. The Queen will probably make a hard fight for Diez, but we were obliged to make his previous departure a *sine qua non* of interference. For if he had been at Lisbon when Wylde arrived at Oporto, the Junta would certainly have demanded his removal. If they had continued their resistance on the refusal of the Queen to concede this point, we could not possibly have been parties to measures of

coercion; and if the Queen had given way and had then packed off Diez, she would have appeared to yield to compulsion that which, in fact, has long been decided, although the time of doing it has been frequently postponed.

“I said to St. Aulaire before he went, that the Queen, and my colleagues, and myself, would all be very sorry if he was to relinquish his post here; and that it would be difficult for the French Government to find any other person so well calculated to maintain a good understanding between the two Governments. He said he was much gratified by what I said, and that he was coming back, and should probably remain here until the end of the year, but that he has now been a long time in diplomacy and wishes to fix himself at home; and that his mother (I almost started with astonishment at the idea of his still having one alive), who is now ninety-one years old, wishes to have him near her during the *the few remaining years of her life*. So we left the matter, but if you have an opportunity, you may say to Guizot what I said to St. Aulaire, or you may mention it to the King. I really like St. Aulaire very much, and though his manner in an assembly is somewhat ridiculous,* yet when you come to talk to him on business he is sensible and satisfactory. The French papers seem

* M. de St. Aulaire must then have been about seventy-five, and had the air and manner of a ci-devant courtier of the old régime: but was a man of sound sense, and considerable literary attainments. His wife was considered the most charming woman of her time.

furious at the change of Ministry in Spain ; but how could matters have gone on as they were, with the Queen a prisoner in her own palace.* There could be but one of two results, either the submission and virtual dethronement of the Queen, or the dismissal of the Ministers. If these new men pursue a liberal and enlightened course of policy, they may, perhaps, be able to accomplish more in the present state of parties in Spain, than a Progressista Government could effect.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The following letter is quoted because the course we should pursue with those countries has been lately questioned, and the principle maintained that we should treat them as European states ; that is, according to a policy which they cannot understand, and will not appreciate. When their notions and usages become European, then we should of course deal with them as Europeans ; but as long as their

* This alludes to the confinement I have spoken of. The majority of the men composing the Government were liberal and enlightened, and M. Pacheco himself a man of high character and great ability ; and if the Progressistas would frankly and honestly have joined them—as I procured them the opportunity of doing—a really liberal and comprehensive party, free from the spirit of domineering exclusion, might, as Lord Palmerston wished, have been formed, and the destinies of Spain probably changed. But it is useless in that romantic country to expect that the reasonable will ever be the practical ; and individual pride and vanity always interfere to prevent combined action.

notions and usages are Chinese, we must treat them as Chinese.

To Sir John Davis, Bart.

“ Broadlands, Jan. 9, 1847.

“ MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

“ We shall lose all the vantage ground which we have gained by our victories in China, if we take the low tone which seems to have been adopted of late by us at Canton. We have given the Chinese a most exemplary drubbing, and that brought them, not to their senses, because they never were deceived as to what we were; but it brought them to leave off the system of pretended contempt, under which they had so long concealed their fear. They will not forget that drubbing in a hurry, unless we set them the example by forgetting it ourselves; and we must take especial care not to descend from the relative position which we have acquired. If we maintain that position morally by the force of our intercourse, we shall not be obliged to recover it by forcible acts; but if we permit the Chinese, either at Canton or elsewhere, to resume, as they will, no doubt, be always endeavouring to do, their former tone of affected superiority, we shall very soon be compelled to come to blows with them again. I entirely disapprove of the principle of truckling upon which Mr. Macgregor, of Canton, seems to think he ought to proceed; and if you cannot infuse into him a little more proper sense as to what is due to the country he

represents, and the British subjects whom he is there to protect, pray remove him to some other station where he may less stand in need of that firmness which his present duties require.

“Of course we ought—and, by we, I mean all the English in China—to abstain from giving the Chinese any ground of complaint, and much more from anything like provocation or affront; but we must stop on the very threshold any attempt on their part to treat us otherwise than as their equals, and we must make them all clearly understand, though in the civilest terms, that our treaty rights must be respected, unless they choose to have their seaports knocked about their ears. Last time the Government was the aggressor, and we systematically spared the people; but if the people become the aggressors, they must pay the penalty of their offence; and when we bombard Canton and set it on fire, we shall not be able to prevent many from suffering who were not sharers in the offence. The Chinese must learn and be convinced that if they attack our people and our factories they will be shot; and that if they illtreat innocent Englishmen who are quietly exercising their treaty right of walking about the streets of Canton, they will be punished. So far from objecting to the armed association, I think it a wise security against the necessity of using force. Depend upon it, that the best way of keeping any men quiet is to let them see that you are able and determined to repel force by force; and the Chinese are not in the

least different in this respect from the rest of mankind.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“F. O., 16th April.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“I shall be curious to know what the mysterious exclamation of Louis Philippe, ‘*c’est fort grave!*’ was elicited by. There are certainly many things going on just now in Spain to which he might in his view apply that exclamation, and it is to be hoped that it may continue for some time longer to be appropriate. The sweep of the Camarilla was a capital measure, and was rooting out, and not merely mowing over. At the same time we must not deceive ourselves as to the future. Isabella is now all for the popular party, but in course of time she will acquire Absolutist propensities, for she will find popular institutions inconvenient and irksome. The only hope is that before that time arrives, Constitutional Government may have rooted itself so firmly as to be beyond danger from any change in her personal feelings. I should not much care whether Broglie, Barante, or Montebello is sent hither to succeed St. Aulaire, if St. Aulaire is decidedly going to leave us. Broglie is no friend to England, that I have long known; but at the same time he is a gentleman, and that is something, and something more than can be said of Bresson.

We are anxious to learn the result of our communication to the Lisbon Government. If the Queen accepts our proposal, I have not much notion that the Junta will decline it; but the promises of support which Louis Philippe seems to have been giving to the Queen of Portugal through Caireira at Paris, and through Varennes at Lisbon, may tend to encourage the Queen to hold out; that would be unfortunate.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“MARQUESS OF NORMANBY.”

“F. O., 30th April, 1847.

“MY DEAR NORMANBY,

“Our monetary affairs look better; panic is subsiding, and the funds rising; and the notion, which seems well founded, that the Emperor of Russia is going to invest a few millions sterling of his hoardings in our funds has had a cheering effect in the City to-day.

You will see that the Queen of Portugal, or rather her advisers, stand out about sending a dozen men to live at the expense of the Portuguese Government for six months at Paris. If the subject-matter were less serious, one should call this childish. It is infatuation. They seemed determined to put the throne of the Queen upon the result of a battle. If they have the best of the fight, they will not essentially mend their position, and if they have the worst of it, the Queen will be in great peril; and at all events, if saved

by us, will undergo the humiliation of submitting, after defeat, to terms which, before the battle, she might have worn the appearance of imposing. If we were merely messengers between the Government and the Junta, we should willingly have conveyed the Queen's demand for the temporary banishment of the sixteen or eighteen persons in question, but we had taken the resolution to combine with France and Spain to compel the Junta to submit, on the terms to be announced to them. It was necessary that we should be careful that the terms were such that a refusal of the Junta to agree to them would justify us and our allies in undertaking the conquest of Portugal, for such the compelling operation would be in the present temper of the Portuguese; and whether that conquest might be difficult or easy, whether a short or a long operation, it would be an undertaking to which heavy responsibility would necessarily attach and which the English Government at least ought to be able to justify to Parliament and to the world. Now we think that, supposing, as is probable, that the Junta should agree to submit on the terms offered them, provided the amnesty were general, but should refuse to consent to their own banishment, the expulsion for six months of a dozen and a half of men would not be an object of sufficient importance to justify the conquest and subjugation of Portugal in order to attain it.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“ F. O., 6th May, 1847.

‘ MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“ We have received this in your despatches to the 28th ult., giving us an account of the Queen’s acceptance of our terms. I am delighted ; it is indeed good news, and I trust we shall soon hear that the Junta have accepted also, and that this calamitous civil war has been brought to a close. It is indeed impossible for anybody to have acted with more judgment, discretion, and firmness than you have done in the very difficult and trying circumstances in which you have been placed ; and you have saved us from great embarrassment by standing out sturdily against the foolish demand for exceptions to the amnesty. The invasion of Portugal by Spanish troops is too serious a matter to be undertaken for such trifles as the expulsion of a dozen and a half of people for half a dozen months. Even Isturitz,* though I wish him not to be quoted, says that the entrance of a Spanish force into Portugal would be a very serious thing for the Spaniards. That if, as is probable, the Portuguese were all to unite against them, they would be much harassed and distressed for provisions and supplies of all kinds, and might be compelled to retire, and that it must always be doubtful what, in such a course, might be the political feeling of the Spanish troops when they came in contact with the Portuguese Liberals. He says

* Had been President of Ministers in Madrid, but resigned in January.

that he and his colleagues were always against the measure, but it was constantly pressed upon them by Thomar,* and by the Spanish military commanders. I hope Wyldé will have been as successful in his negotiation with the Junta at Oporto as you have been in yours at the Palace; but I am well aware that matters which have to be settled with so many different people must be liable to many unforeseen difficulties and delays.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

“C. G., 26th May, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“You have been doing capitally, and are getting famously well through all your difficulties, and they are not small ones; you seem to forestall your instructions, so that I shall soon leave off sending you any. I hope you will not have had occasion to employ force to protect Lisbon from attack by Sa da Bandeira; but if it has become necessary, I have no doubt it will have been done with effect, and the means at Sir William Parker’s disposal will have proved amply sufficient. As to the demands of the Junta, we must be as firm in resisting any unreasonable pretensions of theirs as we were in refusing to comply with the overstrained expectations of the Court. There may, however, be some modifications

* Cabral, who was then in a sort of exile at Madrid.

of detail, in regard to which you must exercise your discretion, and whatever you may determine and get the Court to agree to, we shall be satisfied with. It would not do, however, for the troops of the Junta to continue to be the garrison of Oporto; and if the troops of Cague have been committing excesses on the North, it would not be desirable to put them into Oporto, but they might be brought to Lisbon, and some of the regiments now near Lisbon might be sent to garrison Oporto.

“Napier has been appointed to the *St. Vincent*, that he may go to Lisbon and take the command there when Parker moves on to the Mediterranean. We want to collect a larger force within that sea than we now have there; and with Parker and Napier, both with their flags flying there and thereabouts, we shall probably have Joinville on his good behaviour.

“I think that Guizot has had such a shake by his dismissal of his three colleagues at the head of army, navy, and finance, that his Government is not destined to last a great while longer.

“Yours ever,

“PALMERSTON.

“SIR H. SEYMOUR.”

“C. G., 13th June, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“Nothing can be more satisfactory than the course of things in Portugal, as far as we have

hitherto learned them, and I trust that by this time the Junta will have submitted, and Bandiera also, and that the people in Algarve and in the other provinces having followed the example thus set them, the civil war will have become completely ended, and tranquillity will have been entirely restored. Now then comes the time for keeping a tight hand on the Portuguese Government, as to the faithful and immediate execution of the four conditions, which they must not, under any pretence whatever, evade. The men now in power will try to put off the elections and the meeting of the Cortes, because they will fear that the elections will go against them, and that the majority in the Cortes, being for the Liberal party, will turn them out, and put another set of men in. But to this they must make their minds up. What we have intended to do, and what the Portuguese Government is pledged to us to do, is to transfer from the field of battle to the floor of Parliament the conflict of political parties in Portugal. The people, or at least a large portion of them, said they had grievances which required redress. The Queen's Government told them they should have no Parliament in which to state and represent those grievances. The reply of the people was natural and just: they flew to arms. Driven from the hustings and from Parliament, they sought refuge in the field. We have said to the Queen's Government that they must give back a Parliament, and that then the people must lay down their arms. The

people have laid down, or are about to lay down, their arms. The Queen must give back the Parliament; upon this point there must be no mistake.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“SIR H. SEYMOUR.”

“C. G., 6th July, 1847.

“MY DEAR SEYMOUR,

“I could not write this morning, and I am just come home, at half-past one, from the House of Commons, so my letter which must go by to-morrow morning's post, will not be long. I am glad to find that the Oporto Junta have at last given in. This puts an end to the civil war for the moment; whether it will be renewed or not depends on the Queen. If she fulfils faithfully her engagement, and governs in the true spirit of the Constitution, the Liberal party may be content with wielding power according to law; and being no longer fearful of being stripped of it, may be satisfied without upsetting or attacking the throne. But if the Queen breaks faith, or allows herself to follow the lead of the Cabral party, she will be, as you said in a former letter, a doomed woman. We must try to save her against her will and against her tendencies; you cannot therefore be too firm in insisting upon the fulfilment both of the letter and spirit of the Four Articles. The Torres Vedras prisoners must be sent

for immediately,* and I would rather that an English ship of war were sent to fetch them than that they were left to the carelessness and delays of a Portuguese ship of war, such as it probably would be, with ostensible orders for despatch, and secret instructions to be slow. I should wish, therefore, that you and Parker should determine at once to send off the *Sidon*, or any other vessel of suitable dimensions, which Parker can spare, to bring these people back, and the ship should be off immediately. She ought to carry out orders *open* and *unsealed*, and none others, to the Governors of Angola and Benguela, to collect and give up all the prisoners at once, in order that they may be brought back. A list of them should be sent, and the ship should carry medical means for such as may be suffering from wounds or sickness, and bedding, and other accommodation for them. I have been thinking this over since I wrote my letter to-day to the Admiralty, and I am sure that it would be much better, both as to public effect here and in Portugal, and as to the real comfort and security of the prisoners, that we should send a British ship for them. Of course, after the submission of the Junta, all questions as to whether particular people should or should not be included in the amnesty will have dropped to the ground, and everybody will have been included. With regard to the unconstitutional decrees which have been issued since October, I am

* They had capitulated on honourable terms, but were shipped off to Angola.

sorry for the King and the Bank, but the decrees as to both must be rescinded. The army and currency can surely go on as well now as they did before October 6th.

“The honour of the British Crown and the good faith of the British Government is pledged to the strict fulfilment of the Four Articles, and there must be no exceptions. You will see that the tone of the debate last night was not a bit more favourable to the Queen, her present ministers, and the Cabral party than the discussion which took place before. Moncorvo came to me this morning, and was evidently nettled at the things which were said, but I told him that Parliamentary privilege has no limit.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

During the first Session of 1847, Mr. Hume moved a resolution condemning the conduct of Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the affair of Cracow, and declaring that the payments to Russia by Great Britain on account of the Russo-Dutch Loan should be discontinued on account of her violation of the Treaty of Vienna without any previous communication with this country. A long discussion followed, one prominent feature of which was a eulogium of the conduct of the three despotic Courts by Lord George Bentinck as the leader of the Tory party. In a letter to Lord Normanby, Lord Palmerston says of this

debate, "Peel made a very good and very friendly speech; George Bentinck distinguished himself in his own way, in which he is likely also to extinguish himself as a candidate for office." Lord Palmerston himself spoke very briefly, merely declaring that the incorporation of Cracow by Austria was undoubtedly a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and had received universal condemnation, but that to meet it by such a pecuniary fine upon the Russian Government was, in his opinion, neither a legal nor a dignified course of action. Mr. Hume, after this, withdrew his motion.

In July, the Parliament was dissolved.

CHAPTER X.

MEMORANDUM ON THE NATIONAL DEFENCES.

THE following memorandum marked the first awakening on our part to the state into which our defensive forces had dwindled during the long peace.

In the uncertain state of relations with France Lord Palmerston looked naturally to our defences, and what he said on the subject cannot fail to be of interest.

It may be said, "But the French never did attack us." But we remember that though the boy who cried "wolf!" did so often when the wolf did not appear—he was right in the main, for the wolf did come at last, and the flock was eaten, because the cry had been disbelieved.

The fact is, that, whether we are to be attacked or not, it is the duty of the Government to keep the country in a state to defend itself. We might as well have no locks on our doors and no bars to our

windows, because thieves do not attempt to break into our houses every night, as to have an insufficient number of sailors and soldiers because we are not threatened every day by a hostile fleet or army.

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston on our National Defences.

“Dec. 1846.

“The defenceless state of the country seems urgently to require some effective remedy; and such remedy ought to be determined upon before Parliament meets.

“It may confidently be affirmed that neither England nor any other first-rate power ever stood in such a condition of comparative military weakness as that in which the United Kingdom (to say nothing of our foreign possessions) is now placed.

“There is close to our shores a nation of thirty-four millions of people, the leading portion of which, it cannot be denied, is animated with a feeling of deep hatred to England as a power. Our neighbours are kind, civil, and hospitable to us individually; but the French nation remembers the Nile, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St. Helena, and would gladly find an opportunity of taking revenge.

“The two countries have in every part of the globe interests, commercial and political, which are constantly clashing, and the conflict between which may at any time on a sudden give rise to some discussion of the most serious and embarrassing nature.

“We ought to be able at all times to deal with such a neighbour upon equal terms; but in order to do so, we ought to be upon an equal footing, if not in our means of offence, at least in our means of defence; but that is not our condition.

“In regard to naval force, France may be said to be for present purposes on a par with us. We have certainly a much larger number of line-of-battle ships in ordinary than she has; though some of ours might on examination not be found fit for service. But France has as many liners at sea as we have; she has the means of adding to that number to a certain extent, as readily as we could; and she is probably as well provided, or nearly so, with war steamers.

“But in regard to her land forces, she has a war establishment in time of peace. She has an army of 350,000 men, from which deducting 100,000, who for the present are employed in or appropriated to her African possessions, there remain upwards of 200,000 men at home and for her colonial service, of which probably more than 100,000 would at any time be disposable, at a fortnight's notice, for any particular service, and specifically for an invasion of this country, in the event of a war.

“In addition to this force, France has about a million of men enrolled as National Guards, of whom probably from 200,000 to 300,000 are armed, clothed, equipped, and trained. The National Guard of Paris and its suburban districts alone consists of 80,000 men, who all by turns do duty. The frontier of

France by land and by sea is surrounded by strong fortifications at every vulnerable point, and Paris is secured in the same manner against any sudden attack.

“The military stores of all kinds in France are ample, and they are all deposited in places of strength, capable of defence.

“Railways are constructing by the friendly aid of English capital, which will soon give the French great additional facilities for transport of men and stores.

“If a war were to break out between England and France, it is not at all impossible that France, though really inferior as a naval power, might, by her superior means of naval preparation, bring such a fleet into the British Channel in the first fortnight or three weeks after a rupture, as to be for the moment in very superior numerical force; or she might send eighteen sail of the line, with troops on board, to sweep our West India Islands. If we then kept our fleet at home, our West Indian possessions would fall. If we sent our fleet to protect them, the French fleet might double back by another track, and for a time have the command of the Channel. If that state of things was to last for ten days or a fortnight, France might land any amount of force she chose upon our coast. There is no reason why she should not, in such case, throw 100,000 men, with horses and guns, into this country.

“But, without supposing such an extreme, though very possible case, it is quite plain that her great

command of steamers fit for the conveyance of troops would enable France to transport at once a force of from 20,000 to 30,000, or even 40,000 men, starting either from Cherbourg, or from that and other ports in the Channel, with orders to rendezvous at a given time, at a given place; that one single night would be sufficient for their passage, and that no naval precautions, which our existing establishments would enable us to take, could with certainty intercept their course, or prevent them from reaching our coast; and there is a vast extent of sandy beach on the south-eastern coast of England where a landing could be most easily effected.

“The whole extent of that coast is bare of any efficient batteries to oppose a landing. But even if all the coast defences recommended by the Duke of Wellington were finished, armed, and manned, they would not prevent the landing of 20,000 or 30,000 men. The example of the landing effected by 13,000 British troops in Egypt, on a beach defended by troops and a large park of artillery, shows what may be done by an attacking force. The coast batteries would protect us from local insult by a small force, and would occasion loss to an invader, however strong, but would not prevent him from making his landing good.

“But suppose 30,000 men landed on the coast, what have we to oppose them? I will not deal with the other possible case, of the landing of a much larger army, because that would manifestly be, if

not the conquest of the country, at least its ruin as a power for a century to come ; for we should have to subscribe to any terms which France might please to dictate, and she would take care to make them humiliating and crippling enough. But supposing the smaller force of 30,000 men landed, what have we to oppose to them ? Why, after leaving the necessary garrisons in Portsmouth, Plymouth, Sheerness, Pembroke, Dover Castle, and other ports, which could not be left empty, the very utmost that we could bring into the field south of the Thames would not exceed 14,000 men, infantry and cavalry included ; and that calculation assumes that all the Guards (horse and foot) should be marched from London, that all the battalions and most of the depôts in England and Wales should be got together, leaving the duty of London and of the interior, the guarding of stores, escorts, &c., to be performed by the enrolled Pensioners and by the Police.

“ If 30,000 or 40,000 French troops were to land on the coast of Sussex within a fortnight or a month after a rupture with France, it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that, with our present means, it would be impossible for us to prevent them from marching in a few days to London, either with or without a battle ; and let any man picture to himself the state this country would be in with London occupied by an enemy’s army : the Court and the Government put to flight, the Public Departments in the hands of the enemy, the Bank

plundered, the merchants under contribution, the public stores destroyed, all the business of the country paralysed, Woolwich and Deptford (and probably Sheerness) burnt. Suppose, at the same time, a diversion made by a smaller force, landed in Ireland, to prevent any of the regular troops in that country from being sent over to England; and who would undertake to say that such a force, once landed in England, might not, besides other damage, destroy Portsmouth and Plymouth dockyards, burn the ships in ordinary, and paralyse for years the naval resources of England? They would, for a time, be masters of the country; and it is difficult to say how and when a force could be collected sufficiently strong to compel them to surrender.

“What, then, are the means for preventing such a calamity? Why, a large number of armed men; and nothing but armed men can defend any country with certainty. France has troops enough on her seaboard for an invasion; she has steam-vessels enough to bring them over; one single night is enough for the passage; and one single day quite enough for the landing. Our navy, on its peace establishment, cannot be sure of preventing the passage; our coast batteries, if we had them, could not effectually prevent a landing; but we have not a gun anywhere mounted that could fire a single shot at a landing force.

“The most effectual measure for the defence of the country would be, a very large increase of the

regular army; an addition of at least 30,000 men to our Home Garrison, with a Reserve besides, to be called out when an emergency arose. But this is impossible. The country would not bear the expense of so large a regular force in pay all the year round, nor would the feelings and habits of the nation admit of the maintenance of such a standing army at home in time of peace. Any small increase of the regular army would be useful, but would not adequately provide against the dangers which have been adverted to.

“We have, then, no other resource, but to have a Reserve which should be organized, and, to a certain degree, trained in time of peace; but which should be permanently embodied only in time of war; which, by being assembled under arms in time of peace for only a short period in each year, should cost comparatively little; but which, by having been organized and trained to arms in time of peace, should be, to a certain degree, an efficient military force when called out and embodied in time of war; and which should be liable to be so called out at a ten-days’ or fortnight’s notice, at the approach of danger. Some such force would be a necessary addition to the regular army, even if that army could be increased in peace by 30,000 men; but the smaller the practicable increase of the regular army, the larger ought to be this army of reserve: 100,000 for Great Britain and 40,000 for Ireland would not be too much to deter an enemy from attempting an

invasion. These numbers would bear about the same proportion to the present amount of population in the two islands which the Militia quotas of 1802 did to the amount of population existing then.

“Many persons think that it would be dangerous thus to train to arms a part of the people of Ireland; but it is probable that the known respect of the Irish for the obligation of an oath would prevail, and that the men sworn in would be faithful. But the measure might, for the present, be suspended in Ireland, and be applied only to Great Britain; or a smaller number of picked men might be enrolled in Ireland.

“There would be an advantage in making this army of reserve a Militia. The name, character, and organization of the Militia are familiar, and already provided for by law. There is already a Militia Staff, which was last year rendered efficient, and which would be ready for drilling the men. Some modification of the present system might be made: a large infusion of half-pay officers would be desirable; and qualification by property might be dispensed with for all but the field-officers.

“Some persons think that the revival of the ballot would be unpopular. Ballot might be postponed, as a last resource, and a voluntary enlistment might first be tried. Perhaps it might not be possible to complete the force by this means; but if a part only was raised, and the system of a Militia in time of peace was fairly revived, a great point would be

gained. That system, be it observed, has been discontinued only since 1831. If these regiments, having a sprinkling of half-pay officers in each, had been trained for twenty-eight days during two years successively, they would be fit to be embodied or to be mixed up with regiments of the line, to meet an invading enemy; and the knowledge that we had such a force, available for such a purpose, would probably prevent any attempt at invasion from being made. But, unless such Militia had been so trained, it would, when embodied, be merely an armed and organised mob, totally useless in the field for the first six weeks or two months—that is to say, during the period of the greatest danger.

“This is a measure of the most urgent and vital importance. Till it is adopted, this Empire is existing only by sufferance, and by the forbearance of other powers; and our weakness, being better known to others than it is felt by ourselves, tends greatly to encourage foreign states to do things calculated to expose us either to war or to deep humiliation. Surely, there can be no duty more urgently pressing upon a Government than to place the country which it governs in a condition to defend itself; and if any mischance were to happen, what possible excuse could be made for the Ministers by whose apathy and neglect the country had been left without adequate means of defence?

“But the difficulty, it is said, lies in the financial part of the arrangements. There is no money for

the Militia. The disposable surplus is small, and will entirely be absorbed by the slight augmentations to be made in the naval expenses, and in the military establishment, and by the cost of new works for fortifying the dockyards.

“The additions to the naval and military establishments will probably not be great; but the expense of fortifying the dockyards will certainly be considerable.

“Much is doing in this respect, but much more requires to be done. Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness will soon be defended by batteries which will secure them against any front attack from the sea by ships of war.

“Pembroke is, as yet, wholly without any defence of this kind.

“But when these sea defences are finished, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, as well as Pembroke, will all be assailable from the land side, by a body of a few thousand men disembarked in the immediate neighbourhood, and provided with artillery for firing into the dockyards. Each of our dockyards may be fired into from points at present undefended, without its being necessary for the assailing force to take possession of any of the works now in existence, or now in process of construction.

“This requires immediate remedy, and plans have been made for detached works which would secure our dockyards from such attacks.

“To place our dockyards in security against a

coup de main by sea or by land would probably require a million. But this is a matter of indispensable necessity.

“The progress of these works is watched attentively by the French, who have had an artillery and engineer officer at Portsmouth, and at our other arsenals, for several weeks of late.

“But Woolwich, the great deposit for our military stores, is wholly open and undefended ; and, from its position on low ground, commanded by neighbouring heights, it is incapable of being fortified. It is not fitting that our principal deposit for military stores for our army and fleet should be so placed ; our stores ought to be in some position in the interior of the country, and so fortified as to be capable, in some degree, of being defended.

“Our southern coast requires batteries to command landing-places, and to protect anchorages, such as the Downs ; and some such defences are needed for the Mersey and for the Firth of Forth, to protect Liverpool and Edinburgh, not against serious invasion, but against predatory incursion.

“We require harbours which, under the name of harbours of refuge, should be fortified stations for ships of war employed for the defence of our commerce and of our coasts ; we require some of these in the Channel Islands, as well as on the coast of England.

“All these works are essentially necessary to enable our soldiers and our sailors effectually to defend the country against an enemy.

“But the cost of these various works cannot in the aggregate be estimated at less than five or six millions at least, if the projected harbour at Dover is included. These works, however, would require several years for their completion, even if all the money were ready as soon as wanted. It would probably take five or six years, or more, to finish them. But the longer it would take to finish them, the more urgent is the necessity for beginning them, and for carrying them rapidly on, because the greater is the chance that the day when they are wanted may come before they are ready.

“There seems no possibility, however, that means can be found, out of annual surplus income, to carry on these works as rapidly as it would be physically possible to do so.

“But these works are in the nature of permanent improvements of the freehold, the charge of which may justly be thrown upon the inheritance, instead of being wholly defrayed by the tenant for life.

“Loans in time of peace for annual expenses are objectionable ; but a loan for purposes of this kind would be justifiable. The security which these work would afford would be enjoyed by those who are to come after us, and it is just that they should bear their share of the charge.

“The loan would only need to be realised by instalments, and it might be made from time to time in terminable annuities ; and if our financial condition should hereafter improve, the whole of it

might not be necessary. But the annual charge of the interest would be trifling compared with the benefit to be derived from the works.

“The result of such an arrangement would be, that these works would be pushed on as rapidly as they could physically be executed; and that money would be available out of the annual surplus of the revenue for organising and for training at least a considerable portion of the Militia, without putting off for another year a measure of primary necessity, and which would not in less than two or, perhaps, three years after it began to be in operation, become effectual for its purpose.

“PALMERSTON.”

CHAPTER XI.

CHARACTERISTICS OF LORD PALMERSTON'S LETTERS.

LORD PALMERSTON'S correspondence, when read, serves to account at the same time for his popularity and his authority: the mixture of pleasantry with satire—of good humour with censure—of friendliness with command. The kindly tone of refusals, the full and ample expression of thanks, combine in a singular manner to exhibit the minister who without exciting our imagination as the ideal of a statesman, orator, or hero, satisfied our mind with the reality of an able, practical, good-tempered man who loved his country and his countrymen, did his business with zeal and pleasure, liked a joke, would not be trifled with, and never showed a disposition either to cringe or to offend.

He had a good-natured, gay way of giving reproofs when he did not mean them to be severe, of which every one who had much correspondence with him will recollect some example. "Put a little more starch into your neckcloth, my dear ——," he said to

a favourite diplomatist who he thought did not hold up his head high enough at the court where the minister represented us. To a member of the Government who had been making promises as to measures in perspective, he closed a letter by observing, "I must say that the established practice for members of a Government is to speak of what the Government of which they are members has done, but not to tell the world of what that Government means to do."

It must often happen to a diplomatist who has any intellect to differ from some of the views which the Minister of Foreign Affairs may have conceived, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot know all the local circumstances to which his views have to be applied so well as the man on the spot. I have always considered it a duty in such cases to express my own opinions fearlessly, and in doing this with Lord Palmerston I never found him displeased. At times he yielded or modified his previous instructions; at times he persisted in them; but he never, as far as my experience goes, rebuked an agent, who had anything to justify his sentiments, for expressing them.

But he hated anything like a subterfuge, and saw at once through a device which some clever diplomatists practise of putting their own opinions into somebody else's mouth.

On one occasion a *chargé d'affaires* who was told to carry out instructions he disapproved of related

his conversation with the minister on whom he was told to urge them, and gave the minister's arguments in reply with all the skill and force he could supply.

Lord Palmerston, after answering these arguments with his usual ability, closed his despatch by these quiet observations: "It may be, and no doubt is, the duty of a diplomatist in reporting a conversation with a member of the Government to which he is accredited to report the nonsense, however great it may be, that may be said to him, but it would be more to the credit of his own sagacity if he took care in making his report not to let it be supposed that he did not see the absurdity of the things that had been said to him."

To one gentleman who was perpetually pressing on him some claims of his father to a peerage, which claims had been frequently put aside by him, after reminding his correspondent courteously of this fact and of the reasons for it, he writes, as if relieving himself from a disagreeable thought: "I confess I cannot see what advantage or satisfaction can accrue to your father from drawing from me at repeated intervals a repetition of this statement."

I cannot refrain from mentioning an instance of the scrupulous justice with which he distributed the patronage at his disposal.

An intimate friend of mine, who, in addition to a certain position in the diplomacy, had, from his birth, fortune, and talents, considerable claims to the attention of Government, and for whom Lord Palmerston

himself had a great partiality, begged me to ascertain whether he would obtain a certain appointment, then vacant, if he asked for it. I spoke to Lord Palmerston in the sense desired; and at my first doing so, he seemed well disposed to give me a favourable answer; but, after a little consideration, added, he would think over the matter, and let me know in two or three days. In two or three days we met at Hatfield; and then, taking me aside, Lord Palmerston said he had been reflecting on the services of those who might expect the place I had spoken of, and that he was sorry to say that there was a gentleman who had far stronger claims than the friend I had mentioned, whom he should like very much to oblige, but he felt he could not, in such a case, merely please his own feelings.

In all matters occupying his attention he entered into the minutest details. In one letter to Mr. S. Herbert, after asking if he had thought of multiplying instructions for the rifle volunteers, whether he had thought of preparing a little book of instructions, he adds: "Have you been able to persuade the Barrack Department to provide the sleeping-rooms of the soldiers with decent civilized arrangements of utensils for night wants?"

Nothing more annoyed him than that an agent should show indifference to the ill-treatment of a British subject; and he pushed this laudable feeling at times further perhaps than the general principles of international law would strictly allow. An

Englishman who goes to reside in a foreign country must be held undoubtedly subject to the laws of that country, and can only claim that such laws in his case should be fairly carried out. But Lord Palmerston did not always abide by that rule. "As to the laws of Venezuela," he observes in one instance, "the people of Venezuela must of course submit to them; but the British Government will not permit gross injustice to be done or gross oppression to be exercised on British subjects under the pretence of Venezuelan law."

When a timid, hesitating ministry is fearful of using the power confided to it, there is always a reason found for not doing so. Either the Government we have to complain of is powerful—and it would be imprudent to exact reparation from a state which might resent our demands and defy our power; or the Government we have to complain of is weak—and then it is beneath our dignity to force a nation so inferior to our own to do us justice.

Lord Palmerston had none of these scruples. Right, in his eyes, was right; and if he insisted upon it when a formidable enemy might be provoked, he treated with becoming scorn the argument that we should deal more gently with an inferior delinquent.

"What?" he used to say; "we are to tax our people for the purpose of giving them a strong Government, and then we are not to maintain the rights of our people because their Government is strong. The weaker a Government is, the more inexcusable

becomes its insolence or injustice." I must own that I myself think this mode of reasoning incontrovertible. I have never heard it asserted that we are to put up with a wrong or an affront because it comes to us from a contemptible antagonist, without recognising an attempt to cover an act of cowardice by an assumption of magnanimity.

Neither does it appear to me that, having once demanded a reparation, it signifies whether the act which called for that reparation concerns a great interest or a small one. The only question is, whether reparation was justly demanded or not. Our honour is pledged to obtain satisfaction when we once demand it with reason and equity on our side. Our honour is tarnished when we demand it without such advocates in our behalf.

I remember, early in life, making a great mistake, of which I not unnaturally apprehended the consequences. I consulted a man, more able perhaps than any other from his knowledge of the world and of affairs—a knowledge for which he was not always sufficiently given credit—Baron James Rothschild. "Pho, pho!" he said; "no man need ever care about one mistake; it is number two that signifies;" and he then showed me how a considerable success might be derived from the very error I had committed.

There never was a more striking example of Baron James's maxim than that furnished by incidents in Lord Palmerston's life.

I remember a keen observer of mankind saying to me when I was a youth, "Remember that what you do now and then may get you momentary reputation or applause, but what you do every day will be the basis of your character and ultimate reputation." I have often heard persons express their surprise at Lord Palmerston's great popularity. I could not myself altogether account for it until I read his correspondence.

There was a genuine desire to produce an agreeable impression as to themselves on others, which took away that character of selfishness which so often attaches to what a man when receiving or conferring an obligation usually says, that makes you feel that the person who got the letter addressed to him must have felt lighter and happier on the afternoon he received it.

It is said that M. de Talleyrand had a formula for answering literary men who sent him their works, which he said that he received with a satisfaction which he felt sure would be increased on reading them.

But Lord Palmerston goes heartily into the author's feelings. He sees the trouble he must have had, the hopes he entertains, the reputation he desires to establish.

The following letter to Mr. Wade* is an example of the manner in which he encouraged a meritorious writer in his labours.

* Now British Minister at Peking.

“94 Piccadilly, Sept. 23, 1859.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I am very much obliged to you for the highly interesting volume which you have been so kind as to send to me. I have received it with great pleasure, not only on account of its intrinsic merits, but because it is a proof that ability and perseverance may succeed in conquering the formidable difficulties of the Chinese language.

“The importance of the conquest, however, is fully greater than even the difficulty of its achievement.

“My dear Sir,

“Yours faithfully,

“PALMERSTON.

“THOS. WADE, Esq.”

The letter offering Mr. Cobden a seat in the Cabinet, in 1859, strikes me also as singularly happy. The allusion to Mr. Milner Gibson, whose accession to office Lord Palmerston mentions as a favour conferred on himself, and not as a favour he was conferring, indirectly but gracefully suggests to Mr. Cobden that the Premier is soliciting a favour from him also, and is the more flattering from the delicacy of the flattery.

“94 Piccadilly, June 27, 1859.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I understand that it is likely that you may arrive at Liverpool to-morrow, and therefore wish

that this letter should be placed in your hands upon your landing.

“ I have been commissioned by the Queen to form an administration, and I have endeavoured so to form it that it should contain representatives of all sections of the Liberal party, convinced as I am that no Government constructed upon any other basis could have sufficient prospect of duration, or would be sufficiently satisfactory to the country.

“ Mr. Milner Gibson has most handsomely consented to waive all former differences, and to become a member of the new Cabinet. I am most exceedingly anxious that you should consent to adopt the same line; and I have kept open for you the office of President of the Board of Trade, which appeared to me to be the one best suited to your views and to the distinguished part which you have taken in public life. I shall be very glad to see you, and to have personal communication with you as soon as may be convenient to you on your arrival in London, and I am,

“ My dear Sir,

“ Yours faithfully,

“ PALMERSTON.

“ RICHARD COBDEN, Esq.”

Two other letters I quote, one in which he expresses his regret at not being able to offer a gentleman an appointment. One in which he gives an

appointment to a gentleman. These two letters seem to me models of their kind.

The gentleman who got the appointment, and who might have thought it through a private friendship for his father, is expressly told that he owes it to his own merits; and the gentleman who is not appointed would have shown the refusal with as much pride to his mother or his wife as if it had been the offer of a lucrative place.

“94 Piccadilly, Dec. 14, 1859.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“Many thanks for your note of the 12th. I can assure you that it gave me great pleasure to find myself able to do that which was agreeable to the son of a much esteemed and highly valued friend; but at the same time it is due to you to say that I should not have been guided by my personal feelings in this respect, if I had not thought that you were the fittest person I could choose for the office to which you have been appointed.

“My dear Sir,

“Yours faithfully,

“PALMERSTON.

“Col. J. H. STUART.”

“94 Piccadilly, June 24, 1859.

“MY DEAR SIR,

“I return you the enclosed, and beg at the same time to express my regret that it has not been possible for me to avail myself of your very valuable assistance in regard to the arrangement which I have

had to make, as I am well satisfied that any public duties which you might have consented to undertake would have been performed by you with that ability which you are known to possess.

“Yours faithfully,

“PALMERSTON.

“B. GREGGON, M.P., 32 Upper Harley Street.”

Lord Palmerston was not a Democrat. He did not think a democracy the best government for a people, and he wished to maintain an aristocracy as a part of ours. But all his feelings and sympathies were of a broad popular kind. I find instances, in looking through his correspondence, when Secretary of War, of his interest in the private soldier's comfort and moral improvement. As a landlord he showed a constant attention to the comfort, education, and improvement of the peasant. But I do not know that I could find anywhere a more complete exemplification of his feelings as to the happiness and enjoyment of the great masses of the population than in two letters to Sir Benjamin Hall, at that time First Commissioner of Works, with respect to the management of the parks.

“94 Piccadilly, Oct. 31, 1857.

“MY DEAR HALL,

“I cannot agree with you as to the principle on which the grass in the park should be treated. You seem to think it a thing to be looked at by people who are to be confined to the gravel walks. I regard it as

a thing to be walked upon freely and without restraint by the people, old and young, for whose enjoyment the parks are maintained; and your iron hurdles would turn the parks into so many Smithfields, and entirely prevent that enjoyment. As to people making paths across the grass, what does that signify? If the parks were to be deemed hay-fields, it might be necessary to prevent people from stopping the growth of the hay by walking over the grass; but as the parks must be deemed places for public enjoyment, the purpose for which the parks are kept up is marred and defeated when the use of them is confined to a number of straight gravel walks.

“When I see the grass worn by foot traffic, I look on it as a proof that the park has answered its purpose, and has done its duty by the health, amusement, and enjoyment of the people.

“In the college courts of Cambridge a man is fined half a crown who walks over the grass plots, but that is not a precedent to be followed.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“Rt. Hon. Sir B. HALL.”

“94 Piccadilly, Nov. 12, 1857.

“MY DEAR HALL,

“I have been much surprised this morning at seeing a party of labourers employed in trenching a large piece of the Green Park. As head of the Government, I have a right to expect that essential alterations should not be made in the spaces allotted

for the enjoyment and recreation of the public without my previous sanction and concurrence, and I entirely disapprove of the restrictions which you are imposing upon the free enjoyment of the Green Park and Hyde Park by the public.

“Your iron hurdles are an intolerable nuisance, and I trust that you mean shortly to remove them. To cut up the Green Park into enclosed shrubberies and plantations would be materially to interfere with the enjoyment and free recreation of the public; and I must positively forbid the prosecution of any such scheme. As head of the Government, I should be held by the public to have authorised these arrangements, and I do not choose to be responsible for things which I disapprove.

“Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“Rt. Hon. Sir BENJAMIN HALL, Bart.”

There is earnestness and determination here. There might have been a different way of looking at the subject. It might have been contended that pleasure may be derived from the eye—that the working man might be gratified by seeing pretty patches of flowers, and walking down nicely-gravelled walks; and the popular philosopher might have theorized on this subject with much grace and plausibility. But what the simple glance of Lord Palmerston saw was the labouring man, relieved from his toil, strolling with his wife as he listed along the broad common, sit-

ting down under the trees, playing with his children, enjoying the free air and the open space in careless independence; and when he says that he likes to see the grass worn because it is a proof that the people have been enjoying themselves, we feel how completely his heart beat, even on the most ordinary questions, with the great public heart of the country—how much in reality he was one of the many, and concentrated in his own mind the feelings of the many.

It was this identity which he felt with the English people that made him so proud of their strength and so jealous of their honour.

It is singular how this feeling in a minister—this feeling which distinguishes the great minister from the ordinary one—raises his country, and elevates all those in its service by a sort of magical influence that is felt both at home and abroad. Chatham was in the soul of Wolfe, and his son in that of Nelson. Mr. Canning's high bearing and splendid words gave to a few guards sent to Lisbon a force which may be said to have paralysed the power of the great military monarchies of Europe.

Lord Palmerston had not the genius of these men, but he had the spirit and the sentiment, and he took care that no one who served under him should be without them.

APPENDIX.

I.

MEMORANDUM ABOUT OFFER OF GREEK CROWN TO PRINCE LEOPOLD.

THE following Memorandum was given to Lord Palmerston by the King of the Belgians in December, 1863, and contains an authentic summary of the negotiations which were started to obtain Prince Leopold's acceptance of the Greek Crown and the reason of his refusal:—

The political complications of the year 1830 have been stated repeatedly in such an incorrect manner, that a more truthful representation cannot be without historical interest.

As early as the year 1825 Greek agents visited England in order to find out whether Prince Leopold would feel inclined to accept the Greek Crown. They were Mr. Suriotis, from the Western provinces, and Mr. Orlando, from the Archipelago. Mr. Canning did not receive their overtures very favourably; he was of opinion that the Prince could be much more useful in England than in Greece, and that his going to Greece without the consent of the European powers could not have the desired beneficial results for that country. In certain quarters it was believed and hoped that the elements of a new political existence would never be found. It was not until 1828 that the necessity of a regular government made itself felt more strongly. Comte Capo d'Istrias, who

for a long time previously had taken the greatest interest in the independence of Greece, wished very much to see the Prince elected, because he considered it of paramount importance that the future king should be on friendly terms both with England and Russia, a great many difficulties being thus avoided. In 1829, England, Russia, and France agreed upon the Prince's election. In England public opinion declared itself strongly in his favour; George IV. alone was opposed to it, and consented only when the Cabinet, under the Duke of Wellington, threatened to resign. It was unfortunate for Greece that the English Ministry should have been forced to take such a step, because this circumstance rendered it impossible for the Prince to insist afterwards upon certain concessions from a Cabinet which had been prepared to sacrifice its existence in his favour. The Parliament and the public declared for uniting the Ionian Islands with Greece in the case of the Prince's accepting the throne; the Cabinet, at the utmost, could only defer the measure, as a majority had been secured, but could not oppose it effectually. Many influential persons went so far as to wish for the addition of Candia. As the Porte had left it with the Conference assembled in London to make such arrangements as would appear the most useful, the demarcation of the new frontiers might have been done without opposition and in a manner favourable to the new kingdom. Unfortunately, the English Cabinet felt very little inclined to accede to the wishes of the Greeks, which continued to be strongly defended by the Prince. What Greece required most, in the next place, was a starting fund, procured by a loan under the guarantee of the three powers, as her credit had been entirely ruined by previous ill-conducted money transactions. The Prince went to Paris in April, 1830, in order to procure the required capital. He obtained the consent of France and Russia, but not without the greatest difficulty that of England. A sum of sixty millions of francs was agreed upon; twenty to be guaranteed by each of the three powers. Such was the

state of affairs when the frontiers had to be settled definitively. Comte Capo d'Istrias tried to act upon the powers by means of a National Assembly. This was looked upon as an intentional disturbance of the pending negotiations, because it rendered it impossible for the Prince to accept a line of frontier different from and less favourable than the one laid down in the vote of the National Assembly. France and Russia showed themselves inclined to accept a settlement favourable to the wishes of the Greeks; but a truly impossible project was brought forward by the English Cabinet.

Since February, 1830, the Prince had been fighting, not only for a good line of frontiers, but also for Candia. Against the latter demand the Duke of Wellington observed that Candia must belong to the possessor of the Dardanelles. The English proposal was to draw a line from the Gulf of Zeitun by Vrachori to the Aspro Potamos, the latter river bringing the frontier down to the sea. By this line the district of Arta, as well as all the country to the north of the Gulf of Volo, was cut off. In vain the Prince represented the impossibility of determining a line of frontier in a country like Greece, right across mountains and valleys, merely by pegs and painted sticks, and then to expect that such a frontier would be respected by the inhabitants.

Lord Aberdeen was principally entrusted with the management of the affair, and acted in the name of the Cabinet. The Prince, in order to conciliate the wishes of the Greeks, proposed a line from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta, and made this line a *conditio sine quâ non* for his accepting the Greek Crown. The declaration was clear and binding; accepted by the Conference, it would have bound the Prince to the fulfilment of his promise. Lord Aberdeen declared then that the Greek throne, and the conditions attached to its acceptance, did not admit of a negotiation; that no alteration could be allowed. As the Prince could not help considering the proposed frontiers as an impossibility, he withdrew.

The Conference, after having ruined the whole affair, resolved to send Commissioners to Greece, who finished their investigation in March, 1831, and reported that the line from Volo to Arta was the only possible frontier. This report determined the frontiers of the kingdom as they are still existing.

October 29, 1862.

II.

MEMORANDUM OF DEBATES IN 1837 ON THE EMPLOYMENT
OF THE BRITISH LEGION IN SPAIN.

THE session of 1837 witnessed two vigorous attacks made in the House of Commons upon the Whig conduct of foreign affairs; and our relations with Spain were specially chosen as apparently offering the weakest points to the enemy. On the 10th of March Lord Mahon, who had been Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the Peel administration, brought the whole subject before the consideration of the House, and expressed the want of confidence in Lord Palmerston entertained by those for whom he acted as spokesman. Lord Palmerston, in a very clear and able speech, defended the policy of the Government. He said that he differed widely with Lord Mahon in thinking the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act disgraceful to the Government of this country. "Examples of the same kind were to be found in the most brilliant periods of the history of England. The age of Elizabeth, which hardly any Englishman could make light of, was full of instances of the precise kind alluded to by the noble lord. That great and enlightened sovereign frequently allowed her subjects to volunteer in support of the Huguenots of France and of the Protestants in the Low Countries, and even to interfere in the affairs of Scotland; and she acted wisely in so doing." As to the loss of British authority, he denied it, and urged facts in contradiction, adding: "If when the noble lord com-

plained of the decay of British influence in Spain, he meant the power of dismissing one minister by underhand intrigues, and substituting another by means equally discreditable, he (Lord Palmerston) desired no such influence." He concluded by contrasting the efforts of the Tory party to maintain the cause of despotism with the successful endeavours of the Government towards a more enlightened policy. The former supported in Portugal Don Miguel, and in Spain Don Carlos, author of the assassination decree of Durango* and the champion of the Inquisition; while "Ministers might boast of the support they had given to national liberty in Spain, of the part they had taken in the emancipation of the Greeks, of the free constitutions of Belgium and Portugal which had grown up under their auspices; and if he could contribute, however humbly, to the establishment of the same happy state of things in Spain as existed in Belgium and Portugal, he should esteem it a source of proud satisfaction to the latest hour of his life."

Lord Palmerston was considered to have had the best of this encounter; and there is little doubt that the attack would not have been renewed unless the complete defeat of General Evans'† troops on the 16th of March, before Hernani, had encouraged the Opposition again to try their fortune, trusting to the alliance of that large body of political speculators who judge of measures and of policy chiefly by the event. Sir Henry Hardinge accordingly, on the 18th of April, moved for an address to the King condemning the employment of British forces in Spain; and he was seconded by Sir Stratford Canning. The debate lasted for three nights; and towards the end of the last night Lord Palmerston rose to reply. He observed that the manner in which the question had been dealt with by his opponents was not fitted to impress him with the strength of their convictions. Their

* Refusing quarter.

† Afterwards Sir De Lacy Evans. He was at the head of a British legion of about 4000 men.

courage seemed to ebb and flow with the tide of war in Biscay. Last autumn, when it was thought that Bilboa would be taken, loud was their song of triumph; but Bilboa was relieved by British naval co-operation, and then nothing further was said upon the subject. Now this disaster seemed to have renewed their courage. He justified the Quadruple Treaty and the Order in Council permitting the enlistment of British subjects in the service of Spain, and reminded the House that the question before them was no less than whether England should disgracefully abandon an ally whom she had pledged herself to succour. This, however, he said, was far short of the real and ultimate tendency of the motion. The contest now waging in Spain was but a portion of that great conflict which was going on elsewhere throughout the world. The House had to decide that night between two opposite systems of foreign policy, intimately connected with and deeply affecting all our domestic interests. The object of one party was to support Carlos and despotism; that of the other to uphold Isabella and the constitution. In the days of the Reformation, when religion divided the different powers of Europe, we saw despotic sovereigns and free states united in league to defend the principles of religious liberty. In the present day things were reversed in this respect, and we now saw men of the most opposite opinions on religious subjects united together to retard the progress of political improvement. The opinion which the House of Commons was about to pronounce would, in fact, decide not only between conflicting parties in England, but between antagonistic principles struggling for ascendancy in every other country of Europe.

The general opinion about Lord Palmerston's speech on this occasion may be gathered from the following letter, written to Lady Holland from the House of Commons on the night in question, by a Member of Parliament who was never one of the great Foreign Secretary's personal admirers; namely, Mr. Edward Ellice:—"Lord Holland is so anxious to

hear Sir R. Peel's answer to Lord Palmerston, who has just sat down, that I have promised to write a report of the debate for him. It is, however, useless to say more of it than that Palmerston has made so admirable a speech in every respect as completely to have gained the House, and to have re-established himself entirely in their good opinion, if there was a question of his having lost it in some quarters. He spoke for three hours; and I never heard a more able, vigorous, or successful defence of the foreign policy of a government, or war better or more happily and fearlessly carried into the enemy's quarters. What more can I say? I would if I could find terms in which to praise it to your full satisfaction. Lord Holland will wait the end of the debate, which cannot be yet for an hour and a half, as Peel has *much* to answer. The House was riotous with cheering throughout the speech."

The House divided, when 242 members voted for the motion and 278 against it, giving the Government a majority of 36.

III.

CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE SYRIAN QUESTION OF 1840.

THE following correspondence with Sir John Hobhouse, afterwards Lord Broughton, contains a recital of the various steps taken by Lord Palmerston before he determined to act in the Syrian question in 1840 without the concurrence of France :—

“ July 7, 1843.

“ MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

“ When I was at Paris Lord Cowley said that Guizot had told him the French Government would not have quarrelled about the treaty of 15th July, if they had had *fair warning* that it would be signed without them if not with them. Guizot assured him that the warning was not given. I then took upon myself to say that Guizot had said what was not true. It was possible that you might not have said to him, ‘ We shall sign *on the 15th*,’ but it was certain you had told him decidedly that the treaty would be concluded ‘ without the French, if not with them.’ If I was right, I wish you would send me one line to tell me so, for Guizot was very positive, and attributed much of the differences between his Government and ours to unnecessary concealment. It was necessary, I recollect, that the French should not know more of our intentions than was indispensable for fair play ; because they would have instantly betrayed everything to Mehemet Ali, and put him on his guard against the attack on the coast of Syria.

“ I should not have thought so much about this, were it not that it appeared to me to be part of the plan at Paris to make a distinction between the two Governments (ours and Peel’s). As if you were resolved to quarrel, and did not much care how or why. Some one said to me: *Dites-moi donc, Monsieur, ce Lord Palmerston c’est un homme bien fougueux, n’est-ce pas ?*

“ Sincerely yours,

“ JOHN HOBHOUSE.”

“ July 27, 1843.

“ MY DEAR HOBHOUSE,

“ My general answer to your question as to the course we pursued towards France with regard to the Syrian question is, that in the course of the negotiation which preceded the treaty of July, I gave France full warning that if she would not join in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, to drive him out of Syria, and if Austria, Russia, and Prussia would do so, England would go on in company with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and would not be prevented from doing so by the refusal of France to join.

“ We found, however, in the progress of those negotiations, that France positively refused to join in such coercive measures, and I found also that France and her coadjutors were setting all engines to work to prevent us from acting. Therefore, when at last the Cabinet came in the beginning of July to the determination to conclude a treaty for action with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, without France, and had founded that determination upon the formal decision of France not to take part in such action, I, of course, did not communicate to Guizot our intention then to conclude that treaty; because to have done so would have been an act of egregious folly, seeing that there was no possible chance of obtaining the accession of France, but a dead certainty of affording her the means and opportunity to defeat our intentions.

“ Now, taking the papers laid before Parliament, and not

going further back than Sept. 10, 1839, you will find a despatch of that date from me to Bulwer, giving an account of a conversation I had with Sebastiani, in which I explained to him our plan of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, which were very nearly the same as those which we carried into execution the year after; and I said, that although we were anxious to co-operate with the whole of the other four powers, yet if *all the four* could not be persuaded to join us, we should be ready to act in concert *with a less number than the four*, if we had a fair prospect of being able to do so with success. Sebastiani said that this was a very important decision, and implied a separation from France and a dissolution of the alliance. I denied that such a result would be a necessary consequence of our decision; but I repeated that such would be our course, and in order that there might be no mistake from any omission of Sebastiani's to report what I had said, I desired Bulwer to *show Marshal Soult my despatch*.

"Again, in my despatch to Bulwer of Sept. 23, 1839, I gave him an account of another conversation with Sebastiani, in which I had again intimated to him that if France refused to join us, we should go on without her.

"In my despatch to Lord Granville of Oct. 29, 1839, I gave a summary of the negotiation up to that time, and of the efforts made to induce France to join us, and I again stated the course which we thought necessary for the settlement of the affairs in question; and I desired Granville to give Soult a copy of that despatch.

"On the 12th December, 1839, I told Granville that Sebastiani had shewn me a despatch to him from Soult, in which Soult said that if the Russian proposals about to be communicated by Brunnov were not accompanied by any insidious conditions, or reserves, tending to counteract their ostensible effect, the French Government would, in such an altered state of things, be prepared to *reconsider the whole Turco-Egyptian Question, not even excepting those points on*

which different Governments had, up to that time, taken views so different as to render further negotiation upon them apparently hopeless.

“ The Russian proposals brought at that time by Brunnow, and which related to the naval and military arrangements to be made for the defence of Turkey, in the event of Ibrahim’s advance through Asia Minor to Constantinople, were perfectly satisfactory ; but the French Government did *not* reconsider its former decision ; or, if it did, the result was only to confirm that decision, and to render further negotiation on the points to which that decision related, not only apparently, but manifestly, hopeless.

“ But on the 5th January, 1840, I informed Sebastiani, by a letter from Holland House, in the papers laid before Parliament, what was the nature of Brunnow’s proposals ; and that Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, being agreed, there remained only the concurrence of France wanting, for the establishment of a European concert, and I said that we earnestly hoped such concurrence would not be refused to us.

“ The propositions of Brunnow having been approved by the Cabinet, and the concurrence of Austria and Prussia having been signified, I proceeded to draw up a draft of treaty between the five powers in accordance with those propositions, and the object of that treaty was to get Mehemet Ali out of Syria, by persuasion, if possible, but by force, if persuasion should fail ; and Granville’s despatch to me of 24th January, 1840, contains undeniable proof of my anxiety to obtain the co-operation of France, and of the unreserved confidence with which I treated the French Government. For that despatch proves, and from the testimony of the French Government itself, that I had shown to Sebastiani, confidentially, for his opinion thereupon, my draft of that treaty, even before I had submitted that draft to the Cabinet.

“ Both Soult and Louis Philippe said to Granville that

they were gratified and obliged by this unequivocal proof of confidence, and they both acknowledged that a great point would be gained for Europe, if Russia could be persuaded to abandon her claim to a separate protectorship of Turkey, and would sign, in conjunction with the other four powers, a treaty for maintaining the independence of the Porte. But both seemed to doubt that the Emperor would agree to pursue such a course. Granville, however, added, in his confidential despatch of the 27th of January, 1840, that nothing fell from Louis Philippe which led him to think that France would be a party to coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, although such measures constituted the very essence of the proposed treaty. But on the contrary, the French King restated to Granville all the reasons and difficulties which made it impossible for France to become a party to such measures.

“Soon after this, Sebastiani was recalled, and recalled very suddenly, and Guizot was appointed to succeed him. The change may have been occasioned by considerations of domestic convenience, but it did so happen that Sebastiani was sincerely anxious to maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey, and did not care a straw for Mehemet Ali; and that Guizot was heart and soul for Mehemet Ali, and did not care much for the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

“On the 10th of February, 1840, Granville, in a despatch to me, records that he had, at my request, urged Soult not to leave us without a French ambassador, with whom I might communicate in regard to the negotiations then going on, and Guizot was soon afterwards sent over, and arrived in the beginning of March.

“In the meantime, however, on the 9th of March, Granville wrote me a despatch giving an account of a conversation with Thiers, in which he said Thiers told him that even if the English and French Governments should not be able to agree as to the measures to be pursued on the

Turco-Egyptian question, their disagreements would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries.

“On the 12th of March, 1840, I wrote a long despatch to Granville, giving him an account of a conversation which I had with Guizot, and from which anybody who reads the despatch will see that it was manifest that France was determined not be a party to any measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali. But it being at that time uncertain whether Thiers, who had become minister in France, would be able to maintain himself, that uncertainty was made a pretext by Thiers for gaining time, by withholding from Guizot any positive or decisive instructions upon the matter under negotiation.

“But though Guizot said he was without instructions, yet Thiers in a conversation with Granville, which Granville reported in a despatch of the 13th of March, 1840, said that France *refused* to be a party to coercive measures against Mehemet Ali; and he gave his reasons for so refusing, and added that it was impossible for any Ministry in France, however composed, to act hostilely against Egypt for the purpose of restoring that Pashalic to the direct authority of the Porte; and a direct attack upon Egypt was one of the means of coercion which in case of need we had proposed to resort to.

“On the 3rd of April, 1840, Granville stated that no change was to be expected in the views and conduct of the French Government in regard to the proposed measures against Mehemet Ali; and that even though Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England should remain firm to their purpose, they must despair of inducing the French Government to agree even to the general principles laid down by those four powers; and Granville adds that he is every day more and more convinced, and so are all his diplomatic colleagues, that France will not join in hostile measures to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, whatever may be the party who may form the Government.

“On the 15th of April, 1840, Granville again repeats, with reference to a speech delivered by Thiers in favour of Mehemet Ali, in the House of Peers, his conviction that no Ministry which could be formed in France would agree to adopt coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

“So far, however, this belief of Granville had rested only on his own conviction, and on the opinions of his colleagues, and on the statements made by Thiers and Louis Philippe in official conversations; but we put the matter to a more stringent test. To prove our anxiety to conceal nothing from France, and to carry France entirely along with us, we, the other four powers, proposed to France to establish here, in London, a formal conference of the five powers, to consider and determine what measures should be adopted on the Turco-Egyptian affair; and on the 17th of April, 1840, Granville informed me, by a despatch of that date, that *Thiers declined being a party to such a conference*, and upon the specific ground that if in such a conference four powers out of the five, that is, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, should decide upon having recourse to coercive measures to drive Mehemet Ali out of Syria, *France would refuse to be a party to such measures*; and her refusal to join in such measures, after she had been a party to such a conference, would render her separation from the other powers a more marked step than it would be if no such conference of the five were to take place.

“But it may be said that France hoped and expected that her refusal to join the other four powers would prevent them from acting without her, and that we here in London had misled Guizot into such an expectation. This, however, is contradicted by my despatch to Granville of the 5th of May, 1840, in which, giving him an account of a conversation I had had with Guizot about the naval armaments of France, I said that Guizot read me a despatch from Thiers, in which Thiers said that whenever France should acquire the certainty that she would not be left alone by the other four

powers on the Turco-Egyptian question, the French Government would make certain changes in the state of their navy afloat; a proof that at that time Thiers and Guizot considered it possible that France might be so left alone.

“In my subsequent communications with Guizot I found that France was unchangeably determined not to join in any coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, and thereupon I recommended to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet determined, that the four powers should go on without France.

“Of course, as I have already said, we were not weak enough to inform Guizot that we were going on a given day to sign a convention; nor did we show him the draft of that convention, because, as we know beyond a doubt that the French Government would not be a party to the convention, but would, on the contrary, employ all the means within its reach to prevent the four powers from concluding it, we should, by such communication, have certainly defeated our own purpose. But I happen to know that Guizot was so well informed of our general intentions, that about a fortnight before we signed the treaty he wrote to Thiers that such a treaty would in all probability be signed by the four powers and the Porte; and that Thiers might expect to hear of its conclusion any day of the week. A day or two before the 15th of July, Guizot was indeed misled by Princess Lièven, who, in trying to pump Bulow, was overreached herself; and, in consequence of what she said to Guizot, Guizot wrote to Thiers to say that the danger had passed over for the moment, and that some further time must elapse before the treaty would be signed.

“The great object of France, in fact, then was to gain time, because if operations were not begun in Syria before the end of October, they could not commence till the next spring; and if the French Government could, by negotiation, have spun matters out till the time of year when orders sent from hence would not have reached the coast of Syria in time for operations in 1840, they reckoned for

certain, that before the spring of 1841, something or other would happen to enable them to divide the four powers, and to patch up an arrangement that would have left Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria and a pressing candidate for nominal independence under the protection of France. This calculation of the French Government was perfectly well-founded, and it was the signal frustration of such national expectations that excited such uncontrollable fury from one end of France to the other.

“I have gone into a much longer detail than you expected when you asked me the question to which this is a reply, but you will see from what I have said in this letter that a single Yes, or No, would not have been a sufficient answer. The state of the case, in a few words, may be said to be, that as long as we had a hope that France would act with us we treated her with unlimited confidence; and that when at last we found it certain that she would not act with us we did not think it prudent to let her into our councils, for fear she should thwart us by intriguing in Europe, and by sending information to Egypt.

“Truly, &c.,

“PALMERSTON.”

IV.

REPLY BY LORD PALMERSTON TO AN ADDRESS FROM THE
ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY.

THIS reply to an address presented by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, illustrates Lord Palmerston's earnest feelings on slavery and the slave trade.

(Copy.)

“October 18, 1842.

“GENTLEMEN,

“I feel highly gratified and flattered by the address which you have done me the honour to present to me; and this proof of your good opinion is the more valuable to me because it comes at a time when I have ceased to have any official power to assist you in the attainment of those great ends which form the object of the association of which you are the organ. You do me but justice in believing that I take the deepest interest in everything that can tend finally to extinguish the slave trade, and to abolish all over the world the condition of slavery.

“The official situation which I lately filled, and which I held for ten years, gave me great means for labouring to promote the abolition of the slave trade: I employed those means to the best of my ability, and although during the whole of the period that I was Secretary of State I was engaged in conducting, in conjunction with foreign governments, political transactions of great moment, requiring intense application and the most assiduous devotion of time

and attention, yet I never lost sight of those important matters which you have so much at heart.

“I am afraid that it is impossible to hope that the slave trade can be entirely and permanently abolished until the condition of slavery shall itself have ceased to exist; because as long as slavery anywhere prevails there will be a great temptation held out to unprincipled men to carry on that criminal traffic. But, nevertheless, if all the governments of Christendom would sincerely combine to hinder their own subjects and citizens from carrying on the slave trade, and would also agree to an interchange of assistance to prevent their respective laws against slave trade from being violated, I verily believe that the slave trade might be reduced to an amount infinitely small as compared with its present extent, and that so long as due vigilance was exerted by land, and a sufficient maritime police was kept up, it would be almost entirely suppressed.

“It was, therefore, an object of unceasing solicitude on the part of the Government to which I had the honour to belong, to multiply, as much as possible, treaties with foreign states for the concession of a mutual right of search for the suppression of the slave trade; and we had the great satisfaction of being able to conclude a considerable number of fresh treaties of that kind, and to introduce into those treaties such amended stipulations as experience had shewn to be essential for the attainment of their object.

“Now the power and influence of England is great, greater perhaps than many persons in this country are aware of. If that power and influence are steadily and vigorously exerted by the executive government, as I am sure that in this matter they will be; and if the executive government is well backed up and supported by public opinion and national feeling, of which in this case there can be no doubt, I am convinced that the unanimous determination of the British Government and British nation to obtain from foreign powers a faithful and complete execution of the engagements which those

powers have entered into with Great Britain for the entire suppression of the slave trade will, in the end, be crowned with success. But for this purpose we must be firm and decided; we must not care for giving offence to the guilty parties whose crimes we are endeavouring to punish or to prevent, and we must not be stopped by clamour raised against us by those who are interested in enormities which we are seeking to put down.

“I can assure you that I shall always consider it as one of my first duties, as a public man, to do all that may lie in my power to promote the attainment of those great objects for the accomplishment of which your Association has been formed.”

THE END.

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